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Chapter 1 Introduction and Summary
Chapter 1
Introduction and Summary
The identiﬁcation and implementation of welfare increasing policy programs are
key challenges for every government. While the ﬁrst challenge clearly depends on
society's ability to learn about policies and on the availability and distribution of
policy-oriented research results, political institutions and policy processes determine
the implementation challenge. Understanding the impact of diﬀerent political in-
stitutions and policy processes on policy decisions will thereby help governments to
understand and face the implementation challenge.
Regarding the impact of political institutions on policy outcomes, it is widely rec-
ognized that the seminal work of Persson and Tabellini contributes to understand
how a country's constitution and thereby formal political institutions aﬀect economic
policy decisions (Persson and Tabellini, 1999, 2000, 2003). They show theoretically
as well as empirically that electoral systems and the form of government determine,
for instance, central government spending. However, supporting theoretical models
about the impacts of political institutions with empirical analyses demands for ad-
vanced econometric methods. Such methods are needed to solve estimation issues
caused by time-series cross-section data which are typically used in comparative
political economy. In particular, estimation problems arise due to unobserved het-
erogeneity among countries and dynamic processes in the endogenous variable (see
e.g. Beck, 2001; Baltagi, 2005). In addition to this, the non-random choice of polit-
ical institutions in countries, i.e. the endogeneity of political institutions, demands
adequate econometric techniques to guarantee a valid analysis of the causal eﬀects
of formal political institutions (see e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 2003; Angrist and
Krueger, 2001). Regarding the quantitative impact analysis of political institutions
on agricultural protection, theoretical models as well as a sound empirical analysis
are still missing.
With regard to policy processes, participatory policy-making is a speciﬁc type of
policy processes through which stakeholders inﬂuence and share control over pri-
ority setting and policy-making (World Bank, 2011). Donor organizations recently
engaged in promoting these processes as a tool for designing eﬃcient policy pro-
grams. The implementation of these processes in developing countries is promoted
in order to guarantee that local non-governmental and governmental organizations
feel responsible for formulating and implementing eﬃcient development programs.
Further, it is widely assumed that the ownership and commitment to programs due
to participation in their formulation will lead to the adoption of pro-poor growth
policy programs in countries. In terms of pro-poor growth policy programs, agricul-
tural policy programs are perceived as an option for stimulating economic growth.
Hence, understanding the nature of participatory policy processes is key for interna-
tional organizations to eﬃciently support partner countries in formulating eﬀective
agricultural policy programs. But so far, literature about policy processes provides
neither a theoretically founded framework to analyze participatory policy processes
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nor a quantitative assessment of these processes. However, policy network analy-
sis as already applied to, for instance, legislative decision-making in the European
Union, is a promising approach to derive a framework that makes a theoretically
founded quantitative evaluation of these policy processes possible (e.g. Pappi et al.,
1995).
In this context, two main goals of the thesis can be characterized. First, studies
aim at a quantitative impact analysis of political institutions on agricultural protec-
tion. Hence, Chapters 2 to 4 present an empirical analysis of the impact of political
institutions on agricultural protection. Hypotheses for the empirical analysis are
derived from theoretical models of voter behavior and legislative bargaining. The
centerpiece of the theories is interaction between formal and informal political insti-
tutions in determining agricultural policy decisions. Further, Chapter 2 and Chapter
3 also consider lobbying as another determinant of policy choices. At the empirical
level, studies consider the endogeneity of political institutions as well as estimation
issues inherent in time-series cross-section data. Further, econometric models cap-
ture the theoretically derived latent policy regimes in countries that are determined
by political and socio-economic framework conditions.
Secondly, studies in Chapters 5 and 6 pursue the quantitative network analysis of
policy processes in developing countries using the example of a participatory policy
process in Malawi. In particular, a policy process framework based on social inﬂuence
and legislative bargaining theory is introduced that allows evaluating participatory
policy processes comprehensively. Further, advanced network estimation derives
detailed insights into factors that determine communication relations among a pair
of organizations. Such insights are valuable in terms of designing and understanding
mechanisms that inﬂuence information diﬀusion in participatory policy processes.
The Chapter proceeds as follows. First, I summarize and discuss literature related
to the topic of quantitative impact analysis of political institutions. Summaries of
each of the studies presented complete this part. Next, I introduce literature and
research questions that are concerned with the quantitative network analysis of
policy processes. This part ﬁnishes again with summaries of each of the studies
presented under this topic. Table 1.1 classiﬁes the studies presented in this thesis
according to their theoretical and empirical focus.
Table 1.1: Classiﬁcation of articles
Chapter Theory Empirical analysis
Formal
institutions
Informal
institutions
Interaction
eﬀects of
institutions
Econometric
analysis
Social
network
analysis
2 ++ + + +
3 + + ++ +
4 ++ + + +
5 + ++ + +
6 + ++ ++ +
Notes: + denotes that a study considers the respective research topic, ++ denotes the
main focus of the study.
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Quantitative impact analysis of political institutions Reviewing the literature
to date, several questions about the determinants of agricultural protection or tax-
ation, respectively, are still unsolved. A case in point is the still missing theoretical
and empirical explanation for the observed variation in agricultural protection among
countries similar in standard polit-economic determinants of protection levels. How-
ever, two main strands of literature exist that contribute to the understanding of
international agricultural policy patterns.
A ﬁrst strand corresponds to models of agricultural protection that understand ﬁ-
nal policy outcomes as the result of political bargaining among various social groups
for income redistribution. While socio-demographic country characteristics shape
these bargaining results, another important factor inﬂuencing policy outcomes are
political institutions (Persson and Tabellini, 2003). While the electoral system
shapes legislators' preferences in parliament, the form of government as laid down in
a country's constitution determines the formal rules according to which legislators'
policy preferences will be aggregated to reach a ﬁnal policy decision.
With regard to agricultural policy decisions, Beghin et al. (1996), Swinnen et al.
(2001), Thies and Porche (2007) and Olper and Raimondi (2009a) provide an econo-
metric analysis of political institutions as determinants of agricultural protection,
while including socio-economic factors as control variables, based on the well-known
work of Beghin and Kherallah (1994). Olper and Raimondi (2009b), for instance,
show that the increase in agricultural protection rates depends on the choice of
the electoral system in a democratic country. According to their empirical analysis,
adopting proportional representation leads to a signiﬁcant increase in protection lev-
els when compared to adopting majority rule as electoral system. Although present
studies derive ﬁrst insights into political institutions as determinants of agricultural
protection, they neither base their empirical analyses on a well-grounded theory nor
do they use a sound empirical approach. In fact, they have the following empirical
drawbacks.
First, they mostly use narrow data sets provided the OECD or focus on coun-
try or product speciﬁc protection patterns. One exception are Olper and Raimondi
(2009a) who use the encompassing data set by Anderson et al. (2008). Second, stud-
ies fail to consider that political institutions and policy outcomes might be aﬀected
by the same factors (see Persson and Tabellini, 2003; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005;
Boix, 1999; Benoit, 2007). Persson and Tabellini (2003) already suggested consid-
ering endogeneity of political institutions for identifying the true causal eﬀects of
political institutions. Amongst other methods, they promote to solve the endogene-
ity problem via an instrument variable estimation approach (IV) (see also Angrist
and Krueger, 2001). Third, previous studies always deﬁne the electoral system as
dichotomous with one system deﬁned by single-member districts, i.e. majority rule,
and the other one deﬁned by multi-member district, i.e. proportional representation.
Consequently, they neglect the heterogeneity within multi-member systems and em-
ploy solely one dummy variable for the electoral system in empirical analysis. Finally,
they even disregard that the inﬂuence of electoral systems on agricultural protection
might diﬀer with latent policy regimes determined by a country's socio-economic
framework.
A second strand of literature that lays the basis for analyzing international pat-
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terns of agricultural protection analyzes agricultural protection and political insti-
tutions in the European Union (e.g. Runge and v. Witzke, 1987; Bilal, 2000; Thies
and Porche, 2007; de Gorter et al., 1998). Agricultural protection in the Euro-
pean Union is, on the one hand, an issue in international agreements about trade
and, on the other hand, covers roughly about 40% of the EU-Budget. Nevertheless,
there hardly exist a comprehensive political economy theory that explains the em-
pirically observed high protection levels and the declining rates of protection after
1987. However, as the European Union is considered as an unique political system in
comparative political economy (see Hix, 1999), the speciﬁc institutional settings in
the EU might be an important determinant of protection levels that clearly exceed
protection levels in countries with other national or supranational political systems,
respectively. So far, a comprehensive empirical analysis of determinants of agricul-
tural protection in the EU is also missing in the literature. Present studies neglect
to analyze whether agricultural protection rates diﬀer over time by employing just
one time-constant dummy variable for EU member countries, even if time-series
data on agricultural protection rates in the EU provide evidence for time-dependent
protection levels (see Thies and Porche, 2007).
In this context, the contribution of Chapters 2 to 4 for a better understanding of
international agricultural policy patterns is twofold. First, all three Chapters provide
a micro-political founded theory to understand the eﬀect of political institutions on
the level of agricultural protection or taxation, respectively. The theoretical mod-
els explicitly focus on the phenomenon of "clustered"' institutions as put forward
by Acemoglu et al. (2002). Hence, they derive hypotheses about the interaction of
formal and informal political institutions in determining agricultural policy choices.
Second, the empirical parts of Chapters 2 to 4 analyze determinants of agricultural
protection rates by using the new data set of "Nominal Rates of Assistance to the
agricultural sector" by Anderson et al. (2008) and advanced econometric methods.
Results from such an advanced empirical analysis based on a large data set allow
evaluating political institutions as determinants of agricultural protection compre-
hensively. In fact, these theoretical and empirical analyses explain variation in pro-
tection among countries similar in socio-economic attributes with their divergent
political institutions.
Chapter 2: Interaction Eﬀects of District Magnitude, Voter Beliefs and Protection-
ism: Evidence from Agriculture
Chapter 2 is concerned with developing a micro-political founded theory to under-
stand the interaction of formal political institutions and voter beliefs in determining
the level of agricultural protection in industrialized countries. The theoretical part
explicitly derives legislators' policy preferences from electoral competition and ﬁnal
policy outcomes from postelection bargaining in legislatures.
In detail, the model derives legislators' policy preferences within a probabilis-
tic voting environment where agrarian voters are less ideologically committed than
non-agrarian voters in industrialized countries (Lohmann, 1998). Hence, legisla-
tors maximize political support functions that depend on the share of agricultural
population in total population of their constituency. It follows that legislators' pref-
erences vary with the composition of population in their constituency and also with
the electoral system that determines the size and thereby the population composi-
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tion of electoral districts. Given legislators' preferences, we further model legislative
decision-making in parliamentary systems to capture the eﬀect of coalition disci-
pline on agricultural protection. Consider here, that our model implies a conﬂict
between the prime minister and her parliamentary majority, as majority members
favor diﬀerent agricultural policies than the prime minister due to divergent political
support functions and voter belief formation. In such a case, coalition discipline is
another determinant, besides electoral rules and voter belief formation, of the ﬁnal
agricultural policy level. But consider ﬁrst, that voters expect a pro-agrarian policy,
if the communication process is dominated by agricultural interest groups and an
anti-agricultural policy, if non-agricultural interest groups dominate political com-
munication. Hence, we show that the prime minister will support pro-agricultural
policies in the ﬁrst case and anti-agricultural policies in the latter. In bargaining at
the legislature, this generates a conﬂict between the prime minister and the decisive
majority member that holds policy preferences in opposition to the prime minister
according to his political support function. As district size grows and the electoral
system converges to a pure proportional system, both of these biases are attenuated.
That is, an inverse u-shaped relationship between district size and agricultural sub-
sidies results if agricultural interest groups dominate political communication and
if the prime minister is able to discipline her coalition. If anti-agricultural interest
groups inﬂuence highly voters' beliefs and again given that the prime minister exerts
coalition discipline, an u-shaped relationship results.
Second, the hypothesis of the non-linear relation between agricultural protection
and district size is tested empirically using the data set of "Nominal Rates of Assis-
tance to the agricultural sector" by Anderson et al. (2008). This data set allows us
to include 23 parliamentary democracies into our analysis where observations cover
the years between 1966 and 2005. The empirical model bases on a two-way ﬁxed
eﬀect error component model as adapted by Wallace and Hussain (1969) to control
for country- and time-speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity. In detail, country spe-
ciﬁc heterogeneity is modeled in two ways. First, country ﬁxed eﬀects are included
into the model speciﬁcation. Second, heterogeneity is accounted for via including a
dummy variable for a set of countries that is derived from an out-of-sample predic-
tion test as proposed by Beck (2001) into the model. Further, we control for model
dynamics and serial correlation in error terms by including the lagged dependent
variable into the model. Finally, the potential endogeneity of political institutions
is also checked using a two-step approach as advocated and discussed by Angrist
and Krueger (2001), which accounts for the discrete nature of our measurement of
the electoral systems. Inference is based on cluster robust standard errors while
the downward bias of these errors in samples with a small number of countries is
corrected by a wild cluster residual based bootstrap suggested by Cameron et al.
(2008).
Empirical results conﬁrm the suggested nonlinear relationship between the elec-
toral system and agricultural protection. Agricultural protection ﬁrst increases and
then decreases signiﬁcantly with district size c.p. . However, although estimation
results are stable over diﬀerent model speciﬁcations in favor of the suggested rela-
tionship and imply that valid instruments are used for the instrument variable esti-
mation, interpretation of estimated coeﬃcients as causal eﬀects is still problematic.
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The idea of clustered institutions put forward by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) and
well captured within the developed theory implies an interaction eﬀect between for-
mal electoral rules and coalition discipline. However, variables that identify coalition
discipline are not available. Thus, the documented link can just be interpreted as a
causal eﬀect of clustered institutions combining electoral rules, coalition discipline
and interest groups.
Chapter 3: Constitutional Rules, Informal Institutions and Agricultural Protection
in Developing and Industrial Countries: Theory and Empirical Evidence
This Chapter extends the analysis of political institutions as determinants of agri-
cultural protection presented in Chapter 2. In fact, it derives more detailed insights
by considering also a presidential form of government and by deriving explicitly
the impact of lobbying on legislators' policy preferences. Furthermore an advanced
econometric model permits the empirical analysis of the impact of electoral rules
dependent on latent policy regimes.
The major theme of the Chapter is the eﬀect of "clustered" institutions in deter-
mining agricultural protection. The phenomenon of "clustered institutions" is put
forward by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) to describe the fact that formal and infor-
mal institutions evolve jointly and inﬂuence policy outcomes altogether. Hence, we
model the interaction of electoral rules, legislative organization, lobbying and demo-
graphic country characteristics in order to derive hypotheses about the role of po-
litical institutions in agricultural protection based on well-grounded micro-political
model of policy-making. In detail, we introduce a probabilistic voting model to de-
duce legislators' policy preferences from electoral competition. Following Lohmann
(1998), the general assumption within this voting model is that agricultural and
non-agricultural voters diﬀer in their ideological commitment to an incumbent de-
pending on their relative group size. Hence, legislators maximize political support
functions that depend on the share of agricultural population in total population of
their constituency. It follows that legislators' preferences vary with the composition
of population in their constituency. Even though policy preferences now diﬀer among
legislators, they have to agree on a mutually accepted agricultural policy in parlia-
ment. Such legislative bargaining in parliament is reﬂected by models capturing the
essential characteristics of parliamentary and presidential systems, respectively. In
detail, the subunits of a legislative system that have conﬂicting policy preferences
over agricultural policy diﬀer with the legislative organization in a country. In a
parliamentary system, the conﬂict occurs between the prime minister, who will tend
to favor rural or urban districts, and her parliamentary majority, where the opposite
policy preferences will dominate. In a presidential system, the conﬂict arises between
the median of the agricultural committee, who will tend to favor rural (urban) dis-
tricts and the ﬂoor median, who tends to favor the opposite urban (rural) districts
in industrialized (developing) countries, respectively. As the electoral system de-
termines preference heterogeneity among legislators, where increasing district sizes
lead to more homogenous preferences, the conﬂict among subunits of government is
shaped by distinct types of the electoral system.
In essence, this paper contributes to the understanding of agricultural protection
in that way that it introduces policy regime dependent eﬀects of the electoral system.
Policy regimes are considered to depend on socio-economic and political framework
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conditions according to our model. In detail, theory predicts an inverse u-shaped
relation between district size and agricultural protection in industrialized countries,
while an u-shaped relation would result for developing countries. The discrepancy in
the relationship between these types of countries results due the fact that we observe
a share of agricultural population in total population below 50% in industrialized
countries and above 50% in developing countries.
Further, our model considers that campaign spending of parties ﬁnanced by in-
terest groups determines voter behavior, as voters' policy preferences are swayed by
such activities. Campaign spending can be understood as the result from a lobbying
game played by interest groups and the party leader. Hence, the usual legislator
assumes campaign spending as given when forming her optimal policy position from
political support maximization, while the party leader will consider them to maxi-
mize his political support. Hence, campaign spending is another reason why policy
positions diﬀer between legislators and party leader. However, lobbying has not any
impact on the relation between district size and agricultural protection according
to our model. It solely determines the absolute protection or taxation level, respec-
tively, while the share of agricultural population in total population determines how
electoral rules inﬂuence agricultural policy decisions.
In the second part of the paper, our hypotheses are tested empirically using the
data set on agricultural protection by Anderson et al. (2008). This data set allows
us to consider 52 countries between 1961 and 2005. The theoretical considerations
given above imply for the impact of electoral rules to depend on an unobserved policy
regime induced by socio-economic and political framework conditions. Therefore,
we apply a switching regression model to account for diﬀerent latent policy regimes
where information criteria suggest the modeling of six latent policy regimes. As
regimes are unobserved, the probability to be in either regime depends on country
speciﬁc characteristics and is parameterized as a logit-type probability. Note that the
results are robust with respect to the use of the lagged dependent variable in order
to account for serial correlation endemic to time-series cross-section data. Further,
robustness of empirical results with respect to potential endogeneity of political
institutions is checked using a two-step approach as advocated and discussed by
Angrist and Krueger (2001). The empirical results support our main hypothesis that
the relation between district size and agricultural protection is non-linear. In fact,
we ﬁnd signiﬁcant inverse u-shaped relations between district size and agricultural
protection.
Chapter 4: How the European Union works: Theory and Empirical Evidence from
EU Agricultural Policy
This Chapter develops a spatial model of political decision-making in the EU.
The centerpiece of the model is informal political exchange. Modeling this vote
trading process among political agents is extremely helpful for explaining pork-
barrel politics. In particular, diﬀerent cooperative legislative bargaining procedures,
i.e. legislative norms, are identiﬁed that facilitate informal political exchange (Wein-
gast, 1979). To complete the theoretical model, legislators' preferences are derived
from political support functions that vary for members of speciﬁc subunits of the
legislative system.
The contribution to understanding EU agricultural protection rates is twofold.
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First, the model allows determining the eﬀect of joining the EU that is in fact
an institutional regime switch in a country, on redistributive politics. Agricultural
protection rates observed for member countries will signiﬁcantly diﬀer from their
counterfactual levels under parliamentary or presidential systems, respectively, due
to the informal legislative norms in the supranational system. Second, the model
shows that agricultural policy outcomes vary systematically across informal legisla-
tive bargaining procedures and for each bargaining procedure with the number of
EU member countries. Hence, the theoretical model derives informal institutional
rules that enable legislators to reform the CAP as observed after 1986.
Our hypotheses are tested empirically using the data set of protection measures
provided by Anderson et al. (2008). Overall, data on 58 countries between 1961 and
2005 is available for estimation. In a ﬁrst step, the treatment eﬀect of institutional
change, which occurs in countries joining the EU and in EU member states due to
rearrangements within the Council, is analyzed with a two-way ﬁxed eﬀect error
component model with a lagged dependent variable. To capture both eﬀects, a
country-political regime interaction variable that is one for years after a country has
joined the EU and a time-political regime interaction variable that indicates with
one the institutional regime switch after 1986 in EU member countries are employed
in the model.
Second, cross-section estimations for ﬁve time periods are used to determine
whether the EU supranational decision-making process compared to diﬀerent na-
tional political systems inﬂuences agricultural protection rates signiﬁcantly. The
time periods are deﬁned by the EU enlargements. The yearly available data is
averaged for the estimation over the periods 1961-1972 (EU-6), 1973-1984 (EU-9),
1985-1993 (EU-12), 1994-2002 (EU-15) and 2003-2005 (EU-25). Note that we cannot
diﬀerentiate between the EU-9 and EU-10 because data is not available for Greece.
Furthermore, country-speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity is ascertained via an out-of-
sample prediction experiment (Stone, 1974; Beck, 2001). Based on the experiment
results, a dummy variable for a group of countries that are less well predicted than
all other countries is employed in the estimations. This strategy allows capturing
local unobserved factors boosting the demand for agricultural protection, for which
we do not control with explaining variables, in the models.
Results support our main theoretical implications for the inﬂuence of informal leg-
islative bargaining rules on agricultural protection. Both, the time-political regime
interaction variable and the country-political regime interaction variable are statis-
tically signiﬁcant and show the theoretically expected sign. That is joining the EU
has an positive impact on protection rates for the new member country and a regime
switch in informal institutions leads to lower rates of protection after 1986 for EU
members. In addition to this, results from the cross-section estimations reveal a
positive impact on agricultural protection for the supranational political system of
the EU compared to other national political systems. However, results are solely
signiﬁcant for the period of the Luxembourg Compromise.
Overall, this study contributes to the understanding of the observed high and
time-varying protection levels in the EU at the theoretical and empirical level.
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Quantitative network analysis of policy processes Based on the Paris Decla-
ration on Aid Eﬀectiveness, we observe a growing demand for research studies that
examine the origins and consequences of political systems in developing countries
(see OECD, 2005). Such studies would enable policy consultants in donor countries
to identify institutional framework conditions of eﬃcient policy program design and
implementation. One example of this new strand of research is the research pro-
gramme "Africa power and politics" by the Overseas Development Institute. The
program aims to discover institutional features that provide a positive and distinc-
tively African approach to governance for development. At the methodological level,
it predominantly bases on qualitative in-depth country studies and cross-country
comparisons.1
Regarding agricultural policies, a good case in point to study participatory pol-
icy processes is the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
(CAADP). On the one hand, the African Union promotes agriculture-led economic
growth with this program, because previous programs neglected the potential of the
agricultural sector in contributing to poverty reduction and economic well-being.
On the other hand, a key principle of the program is the inclusion of local stake-
holder organizations into planning, formulating and evaluating sector speciﬁc growth
policies(see NEPAD, 2010). However, a CAADP working group on non-state actor
participation recently assessed the ability of stakeholders to use the newly created
opportunities of participation critically. Using information gathered by a qualitative
stakeholder survey and desk research, they point out that CAADP has not consis-
tently achieved high quality inclusion of non-state actors at national, regional and
local levels (see Randall, 2011).
While both, the presented case study and the research program, provide insights
into policy processes in Africa, a quantitative evaluation of participatory policy
processes and a comprehensive policy process framework based on micro-political
theories is still missing. Nevertheless, at the methodological level, one policy anal-
ysis framework -the Advocacy Coalition Framework by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith
(1993)- has gained wide attention by political scientists. This framework explicitly
identiﬁes beliefs as drivers of policy-making and of advocacy coalitions. Hypotheses
of the framework mainly relate to policy learning and coalition dynamics. Further,
the framework contributes to the understanding of policy processes as a mechanism
that involves a broad a set of actors to reach a ﬁnal policy decision. That is the
framework clearly proposes to disregard the familiar political iron triangle as a unit
of policy process analysis. Nevertheless, the framework provides neither a theoretical
model how the actors agree on a mutually accepted policy decision nor a theoretical
model of belief formation among actors involved in policy-making.
Regarding the latter, consider the strand of social inﬂuence theory and policy net-
work analysis (e.g. Friedkin and Johnsen, 1990; Laumann and Knoke, 1987; Pappi
et al., 1995). Policy network is a term used to label entities consisting of public
and private actors interested in a speciﬁc policy and considered by others as inﬂuen-
tial players (Pappi and Henning, 1998). Within these networks, an actor exchanges
information on impacts of speciﬁc policy decisions on the state of world with oth-
ers actors. Such information processes enable actors to change policy beliefs and
1See for further information on the program http://www.institutions-africa.org/.
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thereby the preferred policy strategy of political agents in favor of their own inter-
ests. Hence, formally powerless actors gain inﬂuence on policy decisions through
their embeddedness in policy networks. Final policy decisions will then reﬂect the
knowledge of formally powerless but well-embedded actors. Consider now that social
inﬂuence theory essentially models the eﬀect of communication within a network on
an actor's ﬁnal position (e.g. Friedkin and Johnsen, 1990, 1997; Pappi et al., 1995).
Hence, integrating social inﬂuence theory into a policy process framework allows for
an advanced framework that includes belief formation according to an actor speciﬁc
embeddedness in policy networks. Such a network-based approach models policy
processes theoretically founded and close to reality.
The contribution of Chapters 5 and 6 is twofold. First, two distinct methods both
focusing on policy networks are introduced to analyze participatory policy processes.
One method corresponds to a micro-political founded framework enabling a quan-
titative analysis of participatory policy processes with regard to the inclusion of
stakeholder organization into the process and consensus building in these processes.
The other method refers to an advanced econometric network estimation technique
that allows for insights into determinants of political communication to design par-
ticipatory policy processes. Second, both methods are applied empirically using
a participatory policy process in Malawi as an example. However, data collection
must consider several issues for an eﬃcient empirical application of the framework.
First, the boundaries of the policy networks must be consistently speciﬁed to gain
adequate information about the complete network. Second, to ensure the compara-
bility of actor's policy positions and interests, interviewees must be interviewed with
standardized questionnaires where questions permit assigning actors locations in the
policy space in order to assess metric distances between them empirically. Here, all
studies use quantitative survey data of the project "Policy Network Analysis of
Malawi's Agricultural Policy Programme" that has collected data via face-to-face
interviews with Malawi's political elite in 2010.2 In general, a policy network study
involves questions about policy positions and interests as well as communication
networks.3 The central theme of the survey used in this thesis is the policy process
leading to the approval of the sector investment program "Agricultural Sector Wide
Approach" (ASWAp) in April 2010, which is based on the principles of CAADP
(The Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, Republic of Malawi, 2010).
Since policy networks are the centerpiece of the models used to analyze participa-
tory policy process, the study collected data about diﬀerent networks among actors:
i) Reputation, ii) Monitoring, iii) Expert information, iv) Social Relations and v)
Membership in Organizations. In line with our theoretical framework, the following
studies use the network about expert information on agricultural policy. Expert
2This network study in Malawi would not have been possible without the assistance and funding
of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). I wish to thank all stakeholders
who participated in the interviews for their cooperation. I also greatly appreciate the kind
research support oﬀered by the whole project team. The ﬁndings, interpretations and conclu-
sions expressed in studies presented here are entirely those of the authors and should not be
attributed to the International Food Policy Research Institute.
3The questionnaires are based on a method that was used to identify policy preferences, policy
interests and policy networks of relevant actors of the Common Agricultural Policy of the
European Union. See for more information Pappi et al. (1995).
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information is not necessarily available in public but circulates among persons inter-
ested in or working in the speciﬁc policy ﬁeld. Further expert information on how
policy instruments relate to policy goals is a valuable resource to inﬂuence policy
beliefs of political agents. The reputation network predominantly helps to identify
interview partners during the interview rounds, while the membership in organiza-
tions network is used to explain the formation of expert information networks. So
far, the monitoring network is not used to analyze policy processes because our the-
ory focuses on participatory policy process as a knowledge transmission mechanism,
while monitoring networks reﬂect information ﬂows regarding policy proposals to
be approved soon. Further, we decided to focus on networks among organizations
and not among individuals because information for policy design is mainly provided
by organizations interested in the speciﬁc policy domain and not by individuals.
Respondents are considered as corporative actors, i.e. experts of their organization
for the speciﬁc policy ﬁeld, if they answered policy network and policy preference
questions during the interviews (see Coleman, 1990). Overall, the project team in-
terviewed the top ten of most inﬂuential players in Malawi and further 27 highly
inﬂuential organizations. Finally, such a policy network study in combination with
the proposed methodological approach allows deriving comprehensive insights into
the participatory policy process in Malawi.
Chapter 5: A Network Based Approach to Evaluate Participatory Policy Processes:
An Application to CAADP in Malawi
This Chapter introduces a theoretical framework to analyze participatory policy
processes. The framework combines policy networks which enable policy belief for-
mation among members of a country's political elite with a cooperative legislative
decision-making model. While the belief formation part builds on work by Fried-
kin and Johnsen (1990), Friedkin and Johnsen (1997) and Pappi et al. (1995), the
legislative decision-making part uses the mean-voter rule by Henning (2000). The
combination of both strands of theories enables us to model the policy process as
a set of political institutions and policy networks. That is the framework reﬂects
the policy process as mechanism aggregating policy preferences of divergent actors
to a distinct ﬁnal policy decision, even if some of the actors with vested interests in
the speciﬁc policy domain are not endowed with formal political power by constitu-
tion. In fact, formally powerless actors gain inﬂuence through their embeddedness
in policy networks because these networks enable them to convey information on
the impact of policy decisions on the state of the world to political agents. This
information in turn changes the agent's beliefs and thereby their preferred policy
strategy. Hence, a ﬁnal policy decision considers the knowledge and the positions of
formally powerless actors.
Further, the framework permits modeling ﬁnal policy decisions by taking into
account informal political institutions that shape power distributions among political
agents (see e.g. Shepsle and Weingast, 1987). The legislative decision-making rule
is able to capture the informal political games because a ﬁnal policy decision is
modeled as the weighted sum of agents' ideal positions where the weights can be
deﬁned according to an agent's observed informal or formal political power. A case
in point for the latter is the phenomenon of "Big Man" presidentialism in African
countries (Bratton, 2007; van der Walle, 2003). At methodological level, weights can
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be calculated according to the classical Banzhaf power index. This index ﬁrst counts
all possible winning coalitions among actors and for each actor all winning coalitions
where the vote of the actor is critical for winning (Banzhaf, 1965; Coleman, 1971).
Second, the Banzhaf index is deﬁned as the number of an actor's winning coalitions
to the total of winning coalitions. By deﬁning the threshold of votes to be met
for a collective decision and identifying whose vote is compulsory for a ﬁnal decision
calculated Banzhaf indices reﬂect diﬀerent voting power distributions among agents.
In summary, the proposed framework reﬂects essential components of policy pro-
cesses by combining policy network research with formal legislative bargaining the-
ory. Thereby it provides a theoretically founded methodology that, on the one hand,
models policy processes close to reality and, on the other hand, allows capturing
country-speciﬁc attributes of policy processes.
In the second part of the chapter, the framework is used to empirically ana-
lyze the participatory policy process in Malawi that has led to the approval of the
"Agricultural Sector Wide Approach" (ASWAp) in 2010. We use data obtained
via the network study "Policy Network Analysis of Malawi's Agricultural Policy
Programme" that was conducted in Malawi in 2010 in joint cooperation of the In-
ternational Food Policy Research Institute and the University of Kiel. Three main
results of the comprehensive analysis of participatory policy processes can be sum-
marized as follows. First, the proposed framework is able to reﬂect policy processes
in Malawi. Second, Malawi speciﬁc policy network structures facilitate consensus
building on agricultural policy issues. Third, government highly inﬂuences the policy
beliefs of stakeholder and donor organizations. Hence, the policy process in Malawi
resembles a top-down instead of a bottom-up process as advocated by international
organizations.
Hence, the framework can be used as a theoretical basis for future research on
policy processes in diﬀerent countries. However, while participatory policy processes
promote national consensus on agricultural policy programs, the policy process still
resembles a top-down instead of a bottom-up process in Malawi.
Chapter 6: The Formation of Elite Communication Networks in Malawi: A Bayesian
Econometric Approach
Chapter 6 delivers detailed insights into determinants of communication networks.
Communication networks are an essential component of belief formation models and
thereby of the framework proposed in Chapter 5. They constitute an important
means by which stakeholders who are (well-)informed about impacts of policy de-
cisions on the state of the world can contribute to eﬃcient policy choices (see for
example Ball, 1995; Lohmann, 1993; Austen-Smith, 1993). At the same time, par-
ticipatory policy processes can lead to distorting policy choices, if communication is
biased in favor of a speciﬁc interest group. However, such a bias in communication
can be rational for the receiver of information because communication ties with or-
ganizations similar interests to oneself reduce biased information signals and allow
for an individually eﬃcient communication process.
Our approach explicitly analyzes the information/distortion potential of partici-
patory policy processes by employing two variables in the empirical analysis. First,
we use an external measure of an actor's knowledge about policy impacts derived
from a Computable General Equilibrium Model and survey data of actor's policy
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preferences to analyze information diﬀusion in the network. Second, we employ an
index of homophily in policy interests between a pair of organizations to describe
the distortion potential. Insights about this tradeoﬀ are valuable in order to eval-
uate the potential of participatory policy processes in increasing the likelihood of
approving welfare increasing or distorting policy programs.
In addition to these variables, we employ in the empirical analysis variables ac-
cording to theories explaining an actor's communication choices by structural fac-
tors. These factors describe communication opportunities due to his political in-
ﬂuence, structural embeddedness and human resources (see Moody, 2001; Knoke
et al., 1996). Thus, variables enter the empirical model that describes an actor's
political reputation, number of staﬀ and overlapping membership in organizations
with the communication partner. We use empirical data obtained via the network
study "Policy Network Analysis of Malawi's Agricultural Policy Programmes".
At the methodological level, a Bayesian estimation approach is used to analyze the
network generating process. Estimation is based on MCMC methodology namely
Gibbs sampling. This estimation technique is well suited to deal with missing val-
ues in explaining factors and missing values in the binary network relationship via
incorporation of a sequential regression algorithm.
Results from the Bayesian estimation suggest the importance of structural factors
for the probability to observe a tie between a pair of organizations. We especially
observe that the network is clearly driven by the reputation of the information
receiver. With regard to designing a political communication process, the high
quantitative impact of overlapping membership in organizations on the probability
to communicate suggests promoting umbrella organizations as a means to increase
information diﬀusion among actors. Finally, estimated parameters for the deter-
minants knowledge and political homophily are of special interest to evaluate the
information/distortion trade oﬀ in participatory policy processes. The signiﬁcant
and relatively high quantitative impact of the sender's level of knowledge is highly
appreciated in terms of well-informed policy decisions. However, marginal eﬀects
reveal that structural embeddedness of actors has a higher quantitative impact on
the probability to communicate. That is accumulating knowledge is not as valuable
as investing into network relations. Nevertheless, empirical ﬁndings suggest that
participatory policy processes do not suﬀer from special-interest bias as indicated
by the insigniﬁcant parameter estimate of political homophily.
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Abstract
This paper analyzes how electoral rules and legislative bargaining determine the politi-
cal success of agriculture in attracting government transfers in industrialized parliamen-
tary systems based on a probabilistic voting environment. Assuming voters expect a pro-
agrarian policy, rural districts are pivotal in determining if the coalition obtains a majority,
whereas urban districts are pivotal within the majority itself. In bargaining at the legis-
lature, this generates a conﬂict between the prime minister, who will tend to favor rural
districts, and the parliamentary majority, which will be dominated by urban concerns.
As district size grows and the electoral system converges to a pure proportional system,
both of these biases are attenuated. Overall, the result is an inverse u-shaped relationship
between district size and agricultural subsidies. However, when voter beliefs tend toward
a liberal agricultural policy, an u-shaped relationship results. Based on a dynamic econo-
metric panel model using time-series cross-country data for 23 parliamentary democracies
since 1966 our theory is empirically validated. The ﬁndings remain stable under various
robustness checks including a test of potential endogeneity of electoral rules.
Keywords: comparative political economy; agricultural protection; electoral rules; endo-
geneity of political institutions; time-series cross-country data
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2.1 Introduction
Since the seminal papers of Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2000, 2003) the question
how constitutional rules inﬂuence economic policies and hence economic performance
is on top of the research agenda in comparative political economy. In particular,
Persson and Tabellini are interested in identifying the causal eﬀects of formal po-
litical institutions on economic and political outcomes. However, Acemoglu and
Johnson (2005) demonstrate that identifying causal eﬀects of formal constitutional
rules is a complex undertaking. For example, disentangling the impact of formal
constitutional rules from the impact of informal institutions is often plagued by
the problem of "clustered" institutions. "Clustered" institutions describe the fact
that a combination of mutually reinforcing formal and informal institutions evolve
jointly (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). Thus, observed political outcomes are the
result of informal and formal rules of political games. In this context identifying
true causal eﬀects of constitutional rules demands for a comprehensive theory that
reﬂects the interaction of formal and informal political institutions. Additionally, ad-
equate econometric techniques must be used to guarantee a valid empirical analysis
of the causal eﬀects of formal constitutional rules.
A case in point to analyze the eﬀects of constitutional rules is special interest pol-
itics, i.e. policy biases in favor of a speciﬁc voter group at the expense of the general
public. Pars pro toto this paper focuses on the political success of agricultural vot-
ers in attracting government transfers. Reviewing the literature to date important
questions on how and why constitutional rules determine special interest politics,
i.e. agricultural protection, are still unsolved. In particular, two strands of literature
exist. A ﬁrst strand corresponds to classical political economy models of agricultural
protection. While these models explain observed diﬀerences in agricultural protec-
tion comparing industrialized and developing countries (Gardner, 1987; Swinnen,
1994; Tyers and Anderson, 1992; Miller, 1991; Zusman, 1976), these approaches fail
to shed light on observed large cross-country diﬀerences in agricultural protection
among industrialized or developing countries, respectively. As these models neglect
political institutions, they might be the missing link. More recently, based on the
well-known work of Beghin and Kherallah (1994), Beghin et al. (1996) and Swinnen
et al. (2000), Thies and Porche (2007) as well as Olper and Raimondi (2009) provide
a comprehensive econometric analysis of the political determinants of agricultural
protection, including socio-economic factors as control variables. Neither Thies and
Porche (2007) nor Olper and Raimondi (2009), however, provide a political economy
theory of agricultural protection, that explains the observed eﬀects of political de-
terminants on agricultural protection. They derive their hypotheses rather ad hoc
applying various existing political economy theories on protection.
A second strand of literature this paper is related to corresponds to theoretical
and empirical studies analyzing the impact of the electoral system as constitutional
rule on policy outcomes. However, apparently conﬂicting theories exist in the litera-
ture regarding special interest politics and electoral rules.1 Scholars such as Persson
1In particular, the eﬀects of two archetypical electoral systems, labeled "majoritarian" and "pro-
portional", on general economic policy outcomes are contrasted. Scholars mostly neglect mixed
electoral systems in their analysis
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and Tabellini (2003) or Grossman and Helpman (2005) argue that special interest
politics, occur more frequently in majoritarian than in proportional representation
systems. Other scholars such as Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002) or Rogowski and Kayser
(2002) state that distributional policies are less likely in majoritarian than in pro-
portional systems. Interestingly, Hee Park and Jensen (2007) criticize already the
use of a simple majoritarian-proportional dichotomy to explain distributive poli-
tics and suggest the Cox-threshold as the relevant indicator to measure the impact
of electoral rules on distributive policy outcomes (see Cox, 1987; Myerson, 1993).
The Cox-Myerson theory, however, does not provide a complete model of politi-
cal decision making. The latter necessarily incorporates a model of post-election
legislative bargaining among legislators representing diﬀerent constituencies with
heterogeneous interests.
In this context the paper tries to make the following contributions. First, this
paper develops a micro-political founded theory to understand the interaction of
formal and informal political institutions in determining the level of agricultural
protection. In our theory we explicitly derive legislators' policy preferences from
electoral competition and ﬁnal policy outcomes from post-election bargaining in leg-
islatures. Assuming voters expect a pro-agrarian policy, rural districts are pivotal in
determining the coalition obtaining a majority, whereas urban districts are pivotal
within the majority itself. In bargaining at the legislature, this generates a conﬂict
between the prime minister, who will tend to favor rural districts, and the parlia-
mentary majority, which will be dominated by urban concerns. As district size grows
and the electoral system converges to a pure proportional system, both of these bi-
ases are attenuated. Overall, an inverse u-shaped relationship between district size
and agricultural subsidies results. Assuming, however, voter beliefs tend toward a
liberal agricultural policy, the prime minister tends to favor urban concerns and a
rural legislator becomes decisive within his parliamentary majority. Accordingly, a
u-shaped relationship results. Hence, in contrast to classical approaches, our theory
is able to explain observed large cross-country diﬀerences in agricultural protection
among industrialized countries.
Second, these hypotheses are tested empirically. Based on a two-way ﬁxed eﬀect
error component model as adapted by Wallace and Hussain (1969) empirical re-
sults conﬁrm the suggested nonlinear relationship between the electoral system and
agricultural protection. Note that the results are robust with respect to diﬀerent
speciﬁcations of country speciﬁc heterogeneity, serial correlation. Also robustness
of empirical results with respect to potential endogeneity of political institutions
is checked using a two-step approach as advocated and discussed by Angrist and
Krueger (2001), which accounts for the discrete nature of our measurement of the
electoral systems. However, although our estimation results provide stable evidence
in favor of the suggested relationship and imply that we are using valid instruments,
interpretation of estimated coeﬃcients as causal eﬀects is still problematic. The idea
of clustered institutions put forward by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) well captured
within the developed theory implies an interaction between formal electoral rules
and coalition discipline, as well as the inﬂuence of interest as informal institutions.
Thus the documented link may not be interpreted as a causal relationship.
This paper starts in Section 2 introducing the theoretical model, while Section 3
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provides our empirical analysis, including the derivation of the applied econometric
estimation strategy and description of used data. Further, we test potential endo-
geneity of electoral rules in this Section. Finally, Section 4 summarizes our main
results and gives an outlook on future research.
2.2 Theoretical model
2.2.1 The population and economy
Consider a society is divided into two sectors: agricultural and non-agricultural. The
group of voters economically active in the agricultural sector are denoted with A. M
represents the group of voters economically active in the non-agricultural sector. If
government does not engage in agricultural policy, the equilibrium per capita income
of the agricultural and non-agricultural population is IA0 and I
M
0 , respectively. The
share of each group in total population is denoted by αA or αM , respectively.
Agricultural policy is characterized by redistributive transfers from the non- agri-
cultural to the agricultural sector. For simplicity we assume that income redistribu-
tion occurs via subsidization of agricultural and taxation of non-agricultural sectors.
Let s denote the resulting per capita subsidization of the agricultural population,
while t denotes the per capita taxation of the non-agricultural population. Any
feasible policy must satisfy the following budget constraint:
αAΓ˜(s) = αM t ⇔ t = α
A
αM
Γ˜(s) = Γ(s) (2.1)
The function Γ includes deadweight costs. In particular, we assume Γ to be strictly
convex and increasing in the level of subsidization, i.e., Γ′ > 0 and Γ′′ > 0.2 As-
suming identical individuals for both groups implies the following welfare function
of each member given the policy s:
W J =
{
IA0 + s if J = A
IM0 − Γ(s) if J = M (2.2)
Equation 2.2 implies a conﬂict of interest between the agricultural and non- agricul-
tural population about the right level of redistributive transfers s. In the following
Sections we derive how diﬀerent electoral systems interacting with informal political
institutions determine the accepted level of agricultural protection.
2.2.2 Legislative decision making
For our theoretical model of legislative bargaining in parliamentary systems, we
suggest a rather simple legislative majority bargaining game that is based on the
existence of a stable ex ante majority coalition and on the principle of proposal
2Deadweight costs signiﬁcantly vary across various agricultural policy instruments. However,
we do not focus on the choice of economically eﬃcient redistribution instruments, although
discussion on agricultural policy is to a large extent concerned about this issue (see e.g. de
Gorter and Swinnen, 2002; Becker, 1983; Lohmann, 1998).
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power of the government. As has been demonstrated by Huber (1996) and Dier-
meier and Feddersen (1998), stable ex ante majority coalition built among legisla-
tors essentially characterize parliamentary systems. Legislators who are members
of this majority coalition make legislative decisions exclusively. The rational of ex
ante majority coalition building corresponds to the fact that this coalition at least
weakly increases the utility of all majority members when compared to their utili-
ties derived under a default policy outcome that would result from non-cooperative
behavior of legislators. In particular, ex ante ﬁxed parliamentary majorities are able
to guarantee their members higher utilities due to additional rent legislators realize
from being part of a stable majority (Huber, 1996).
We formally deﬁne a legislative system as a ﬁnite set of political agents, N , where
i = 1, . . . , n denotes a generic element of the legislative system. Within the legislative
system speciﬁc institutions are deﬁned as subsets of N : the prime minister (PM),
the majority (Pinc) and the opposition (Popp). In general, Pinc could correspond to
a multi-party coalition or a single majority party. To simplify following analyses
at the election stage, we assume a two-party set-up, i.e. Pinc corresponds to the
majority party and Popp denotes the opposition party. Further, Pinc is a ﬁnite subset
of legislators g ∈ N and g is a generic element of Pinc. Moreover, we assume that
the party leader of the majority party coincides with the PM . Following Huber
(1996) as well as Diermeier and Feddersen (1998), we can concentrate on the prime
minister, PM , and her parliamentary majority Pinc that is ex ante identiﬁable for
modeling legislative decisions.
The model has two stages. At the ﬁrst stage, we model the default policy out-
come s¯. For simplicity we assume that agricultural policy is one-dimensional and
that parliament decides about agricultural policy by simple majority voting.3 We
denote the uni-dimensional policy space by S. Further, we assume that policy pref-
erences of a legislator can be represented by a single-peaked function Ui(s). Let
Yi denote the ideal point of legislator i. Obviously, under these assumptions the
well-known median voter theorem applies. The unique equilibrium outcome of the
non-cooperative legislative decision-making game neglecting any ex ante coalition
building is the ideal point of the ﬂoor median (Black, 1958).
At the second stage, legislators, who are members of the majority Pinc, and the
PM bargain over policy to improve their utility derived under the default outcome.
In detail, they proceed in two steps. First, the PM proposes a policy, sPM , to her
parliamentary majority and announces side payments γ being paid to the majority
in case it admits the governmental proposal. Regarding content we interpret these
side payments as rent the PM can pay to the majority due to speciﬁc formal leg-
islative procedures, like issuing a conﬁdence vote, or informal procedures, like the
possibility to generate favors in terms of political career for party members. We are
not speciﬁcally interested in modeling exactly how the PM can generate rent valu-
able to her majority, but generally subsume this under the term party (coalition)
3Of course we could also assume more complex legislative decision-making procedures including
agenda setting power of the parliamentary committees or the government. However, this would
not change our major results and therefore we keep analyses as simple as possible at this point
and leave the analysis of more complex legislative institutions for future work.
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discipline that is exerted by the PM .4
At the second step each individual majority member can decide whether or not
to accept the proposal of the PM . For their decision, legislators maximize the sum
of actual rent, γ, and the utility derived from policy, Ug(s). If all majority members
agree to the proposal, the proposed policy, sPM , passes parliament and all majority
members receive the announced rent. Otherwise, the default policy s¯ becomes the
legislative decision and no rent is paid.
Proposition 1. Assuming a one-dimensional agricultural policy choice s, there ex-
ists a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for our legislative majority bargaining
game deﬁned above. The equilibrium outcome, s∗, depends on the rent, γ, the default
policy outcome, s¯, and the policy preferences of the PM and the majority members,
g.
1. In equilibrium agricultural policy choice, s∗ results from the following maxi-
mization5:
s∗ = arg max
s
UPM(s) s.t. s ∈
⋂
g
Sg, (2.3)
where Sg = {s ∈ S|Ug(s) + γ ≥ Ug(s¯)}.
2. In particular, it holds that the outcome of the legislative bargaining game cor-
responds to the minimal distance between the ideal point of the PM and the
interval [s−, s+]:
s∗ = arg min
s
∥∥Y PM − s∥∥ s.t. s ∈ [s−, s+] (2.4)
where s− = min
⋂
g
Sg and s
+ = max
⋂
g
Sg.
If the rent γ is suﬃciently large or if legislators' preferences are suﬃciently ho-
mogeneous, the ﬁnal agricultural policy outcome corresponds to the ideal point of
the prime minister. Under this condition our model corresponds to pre-election po-
litical models, which generally assume that governmental policy simply corresponds
to political preferences of the party leader who becomes the omnipotent head of
government after elections. If party discipline, i.e. the rent γ, is not suﬃciently
high or analogous, policy preferences of the PM and her parliamentary majority are
suﬃciently heterogeneous, agricultural policy outcome is no more fully determined
by the PM 's policy preferences. Under this assumption policy outcome is also de-
termined by the intersection set of the subsets Sg that is determined by the policy
preferences of the majority members, the rent γ and the default policy, s¯.
4Note further that we assume that at this stage the PM can commit to paying the rent. However,
this assumption is not necessary; in a richer modeling set-up including the speciﬁc procedures
it is possible to get essentially the same result without assuming this kind of commitment.
5Note that the maximization problem always has a unique solution, as long as the utility functions
of legislators are strictly concave. Note that all sets Sg are compact and convex subsets of S.
22
Chapter 2 Interaction Eﬀects of District Magnitude, Voter Beliefs and
Protectionism: Evidence from Agriculture
2.2.3 Election stage
We derive policy preferences of legislators from electoral competition using a proba-
bilistic voting model (see Persson and Tabellini, 2000). For explaining special interest
politics, these approaches basically argue that speciﬁc groups, such as farmers, are
less ideologically biased relative to other groups and therefore become a natural tar-
get for politicians who vie for electoral support. Electoral support is important for
politicians because their future rents depend on the probability of being reelected.
Generally legislators are modeled as rent-seeking actors who maximize the sum of
actual and future rent while making policy choices. Obviously, voters hold legislators
accountable through retrospective voting.
Electoral competition and hence the preferences of the legislators are moderated
by the electoral rule used to elect parliament. Voters elect legislators in electoral dis-
tricts where the size of a district is determined by the electoral rule laid down in the
constitution. Every electoral district dk contains the same share of voter population,
αdk , and the sum of voter population over all districts covers total population eligi-
ble to vote. Usually, proportional representation (PR) and a majoritarian election
system (MS) are distinguished as ideal-typical electoral systems if electoral systems
are characterized by the number of legislators elected in a constituency, i.e. by the
district magnitude. In PR systems incumbents are elected in a multiple-member
national electoral district, while they are elected in one-member constituencies in
pure majoritarian systems. Denoting the total number of parliamentary seats by n,
the district magnitude of PR systems is n and of pure MS systems 1, respectively.
In general, the district magnitude of a speciﬁc electoral system k ranges from 1
to n. In this paper we study if electoral rules determine agricultural protection in
a nonlinear way conditional on the interaction with informal political institutions.
Thus, we refrain from explaining the heterogeneity in agricultural protection among
countries through the simple majoritarian-proportional dichotomy.
2.2.3.1 Voter behavior
An individual incumbent g ∈ Pinc is re-elected in a generic voting district d. In
principle, a voter votes for an incumbent if the utility she has derived under the im-
plemented policy, s∗, is higher than her speciﬁc reservation utility. However, beyond
economic welfare derived under observed policies, W J(s∗), voters care for another
dimension, which generally is referred to as ideological preferences for parties, al-
though this dimension could include other characteristics of parties or candidates,
e.g. competence or appearance. The crucial point is that ideological preferences are
exogenous in the sense that ideology is a permanent attribute of parties, i.e. cannot
be changed at will during election campaign (see Persson and Tabellini, 2000).
In this paper we do not further analyze ideological preferences of voters; we only
assume that ideological preferences can be subdivided into three components: a
group-speciﬁc relative importance of ideology compared to economic well-being, KJ ;
a voter speciﬁc component µjd that has a district speciﬁc mean µ¯d; and a national
component, δ. Thus, a voter j ∈ J votes for the incumbent g if the utility she
observes under the agricultural policy s∗ is higher than a speciﬁc reservation utility,
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W J(s0), corrected by the ideological preferences for the incumbent party Pinc:
W J(s∗) > W J(s0) +KJ(µjd + δ). (2.5)
Parameters µjd and δ can take negative and positive values and measure the ide-
ological bias of voter j toward the opposition party Popp. A positive value implies
that voter j has a bias in district d in favor of party Popp.
The voter-speciﬁc ideological preferences are uncertain at the time political agents
have to make their policy decisions. In detail, we assume that the parameter µjd has
district-speciﬁc uniform distribution on
[
µ¯d − 12χ , µ¯d + 12χ
]
. Thus, two parameters,
µ¯d and χ, fully characterize the distribution of ideological preferences in an electoral
district.
Moreover, we assume that the relative importance of ideology KJ diﬀers across
groups. In particular, we assume that the agricultural population has less relative
interest in ideology, i.e. KA < KM . Note that assuming a diﬀerent relative impor-
tance of ideological preferences implies that groups generally diﬀer in their eﬀective
ideological homogeneity, i.e. have diﬀerent eﬀective densities φJ = χ
KJ
. Thus, it
results that the agricultural population is more ideologically homogeneous than the
non-agricultural population, i.e. φA > φM .
2.2.3.2 Legislators' preferences and the electoral system
Political agents know the distribution of regional and group-speciﬁc ideological com-
ponents, µ¯d and φJ , when they decide on agricultural policy, while the electoral un-
certainty derives from the uncertainty of the national component, δ. The parameter
δ measures the average popularity of party Popp in comparison to party Pinc. Here,
we assume a uniform distribution on
[
− 1
2ψ
,+ 1
2ψ
]
. Thus, the national ideological
shock is unbiased on average.
Given the assumption above the total vote share candidates of an incumbent
party Pinc receive in district d after regional and national ideological shocks have
been realized follows as:
Πd =
∑
J
αJdφ
JωJ − χ [µ¯d + δ] + 1
2
, (2.6)
where ωJ =
(
W J(s∗)−W J(s0)). Assuming that all k candidates of party Pinc
running for election in the k-member district dk have the same chance, 1k , to get a
parliamentary seat won by party Pinc in this district, the re-election probability of a
majority member g ∈ Pinc in an electoral system k, p˜ikg , conditional on the national
shock δ is given by:
p˜ikg (δ) =
1
k
Πdk =
1
k
[∑
J
αJdkφ
JωJ − χ [µ¯dk + δ] +
1
2
]
(2.7)
The expected re-election probability after national ideological shocks have been
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realized, pikg , results in:
pikg =
1
2ψ∫
− 1
2ψ
p˜ikg (δ)ψdδ =
1
k
[∑
J
αJdkφ
JωJ − χµ¯dk +
1
2
]
(2.8)
Overall, maximizing the expected probability of re-election taking the groups'
reservation utilities as given corresponds to maximizing an additive social welfare
function, where the weight of group J , β¯Jdk , results as:
β¯Jdk = α
J
dk
φJ (2.9)
Thus, obviously legislators have diﬀerent policy preferences as long as electoral
districts are demographically heterogeneous. To cover the heterogeneity of electoral
districts in our model we use a common approach in electoral studies (Lipset and
Rokkan, 1967). We divide the population in classes of individuals who share char-
acteristics that predominantly aﬀect their vote. In particular, beyond employment
in the agricultural and non-agricultural sector, respectively, we further assume that
generally living conditions in urban versus rural living areas impact on voting behav-
ior. We diﬀerentiate two types of districts, rural districts (DR) and urban districts
(DU), where the population share of the agricultural voter group αAdk is higher for
rural when compared to urban districts. Accordingly, the weight of the agricul-
tural voter group β¯Adk , is higher implying a higher preferred subsidization level of
the elected legislator for the former. Thus, legislator's preferences for protectionism
vary systematically depending on their re-election in a rural or urban district, re-
spectively. In more speciﬁc terms, let suk and s
r
k denote the preferred subsidization
level of urban and rural legislators, respectively, it holds for any electoral system k :
suk ≤ srk.
Consider now the case that district magnitude increases. The electoral districts
become demographically more homogeneous. Thus, we can state the following for
k = 1, ..., n:
αAdk ≤ αAd(k−1) ∀ d ∈ DR and αAdk ≥ αAd(k−1) ∀ d ∈ DU . (2.10)
Because agrarian population shares in rural and urban districts, respectively, con-
verge to the national share with increasing district magnitude k, the subsidization
levels preferred by rural and urban legislators converge toward a common national
level (compare Figure 2.1). It holds:
srk ≥ srk+1 and suk ≤ suk+1 and sun = srn (2.11)
2.2.3.3 Deriving the re-election probability of the PM
In contrast to a majority member, the PM is only re-elected if party Pinc wins the
election, thus only if party Pinc wins the majority of total seats. To formally derive
the probability of re-election of party Pinc as the governmental party, we deﬁne the
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following stochastic variable Λdk for each electoral district:
Λdk =

k with probability Prkdk
k − 1 with probability Prk−1dk
...
1 with probability Pr1dk
0 with probability (1−∑
k
Prkdk)
(2.12)
Given the deﬁnition of Λdk the probability that party Pinc wins the election or rather
that the PM is re-elected in an electoral system k, pikPM , results:
pikPM = Pr
[∑
dk
Λdk ≥ 0.5( n + 1)
]
(2.13)
Formally, the ideal position of the party leader, Y PM , is the policy position that
maximizes the re-election probability of the PM and results from the following
mixed-integer maximization problem:
Y PM = arg max
s,Λdk ,δ
δ (2.14)
subject to [∑
J
αJdkφ
JωJ − χ (µ¯dk + δ) + 0.5
]
k ≥ Λdk and (2.15)∑
dk
Λdk ≥ 0.5 (n+ 1). (2.16)
Despite assuming perfectly homogeneous electoral districts or a pure proportional
system with only one national district (i.e. k = n), it is generally diﬃcult to char-
acterize the solution of eq. 2.14, i.e., the preferred policy position of the PM . Ob-
viously, Y PM will always lie in the interval [suk , s
r
k], as outside of this interval the
expected vote shares of all districts monotonically increase or decrease with s. But
beyond this interval it is tedious to characterize Y PM . However, especially regarding
the ﬁnal outcome of legislative bargaining, it is crucial if the PM prefers a higher
or a lower subsidization level when compared to the default outcome s¯k.
Therefore, we basically follow Persson and Tabellini (2000) and introduce addi-
tional assumptions that allow a further characterization of the equilibrium for our
electoral competition set-up. We assume that electoral districts can be grouped into
three diﬀerent clusters D1, D2 and D3, respectively, according to the ideological bias
of the speciﬁc district µ¯dk . This corresponds to the real world phenomenon of party
strongholds observed under democratic elections. Moreover, we assume that none
of the clusters includes the majority of voter population, while any two clusters to-
gether include the majority of voters. Districts of cluster D1 are biased in favor of
party Pinc, while districts of cluster D3 are biased in favor of the opposition party
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Popp:
µ¯dk = µ¯
Pinc
k < 0 ∀ d ∈ D1 and µ¯dk = µ¯Poppk > 0 ∀ d ∈ D3. (2.17)
Overall, districts are unbiased, i.e. it holds:∑
dk∈DR
αdk µ¯dk =
∑
dk∈DU
αdk µ¯dk = 0. (2.18)
In particular, we assume that the ideological biases toward party Pinc in districts
of cluster D1, and toward party Popp in districts of cluster D3 are suﬃciently large
that electoral competition only takes place in the unbiased districts of cluster D2.
It follows that party Pinc wins the election if and only if it wins the majority of
parliamentary seats in the unbiased electoral districts of cluster D2, that might be
dominated by rural or urban districts, respectively. In general, PM's policy position
maximizing the probability that the majority party wins the majority of seats in D2
can be derived from eq. 2.14.
To understand how the ideal position results denote the number of seats the
majority party wins in unbiased urban and rural districts by ku and kr, respectively.
Obviously, if the PM wins elections it holds:
kushu + (1− shu)kr ≥ 0.5(k + 1
#D2
), (2.19)
where shu is the share of urban districts inD2 and #D2 is the total number of districts
in D2. Accordingly, let WD denote the set of all pairs (ku, kr) that guarantee that
the PM wins. Denoting Πl(s, kl), l = u, r, the probability that the party Pinc wins
at least kl seats in the unbiased district l = r, u, it follows:
Πl(s, kl) =
[∑
J
αJdkφ
JωJ + 0.5− kl
k
]
ψ
χ
+ 0.5 (2.20)
Moreover, the ideal position of the PM results from the maximization of his
winning probability as follows:
Y PM = arg max
s,(ku,kr)∈WD
{min {Πu(s, ku),Πr(s, kr)}} , (2.21)
Denoting by sPM , k∗l the solution of the PM 's optimization problem we can sep-
arate the following three cases:
(1) Πu(s, k
∗
u) ≥ Πr(s, k∗r) ∀s ∈ [su, sr]
(2) Πu(s, k
∗
u) ≤ Πr(s, k∗r) ∀s ∈ [su, sr]
(3) else
Obviously, the ﬁrst two cases are trivial in the sense, that in the ﬁrst case only
rural districts are decisive, e.g. the PM prefers sr, while in the latter only urban
districts are decisive, i.e. the PM prefers su. Thus, the most interesting cases are
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the one where neither rural nor urban districts are solely decisive. In this case it
follows for the ideal position of the PM , Y PM = sPM :
Πu(s
PM , k∗u) = Πr(s
PM , k∗r) (2.22)
⇔
∑
J
(
αJrk − αJuk
)
φJωJ − (k
∗
r − k∗u)
k
= 0 (2.23)
After some rearrangements the above equation results in:(
αArk − αAuk
)
(∆W (sPM)−∆W (s0))− ∆k
k
= 0, where (2.24)
∆W (sPM) = φAWA(sPM)− φMWM(sPM),
∆W (s0) = φAWA(s0)− φMWM(s0) and
∆k = k∗r − k∗u.
2.2.3.4 Voter belief formation and PM's policy position
From eq. (2.24) it follows that the position of the PM depends on voter's reservation
utilities W J(s0) and on ∆k, i.e. the diﬀerence in the number of seats the majority
party wins in equilibrium in rural and urban districts, respectively. As will be
explained in more detail below, voters' reservation utilities depend on voter beliefs,
i.e. protection levels expected by voters. Understanding determinants of ∆k is more
complex. Therefore, in this paper we will focus our analysis on the interaction eﬀect
of voter beliefs, electoral rules and agricultural protection. Accordingly, to simplify
further analysis we assume that ∆k = 06, i.e. in equilibrium the PM tries to win a
bar majority of seats in both unbiased rural and urban districts, respectively.7
Further, it is easy to show that it holds from eq. (2.24):
sPM = s0 for ∆k = 0,
∂sPM
∂s0
≥ 0 and ∂s
PM
∂∆k
≥ 0. (2.25)
The reservation utilities of agricultural and non-agricultural voters W J(s0) depend
on the policy outcome s0 expected by voters, i.e on voters' beliefs. Understanding
s0 as voter's common beliefs the PM position results ceteris paribus as a function of
6Please note that essentially our theoretical results will not change if we drop this assumption.
Furthermore, it can be shown that for any non-zero share of rural districts in D2, there exists
a ﬁnite positive value for KJ such that the solution of the maximin problem eq.(2.21) implies
∆k = 0, i.e. assuming ideology is suﬃciently important for voters' electoral choices, it follows
that the PM wins election if and only if his party wins the majority of seats in both unbiased
urban and rural district, respectively.
7Please note further, that at this stage we do not explicitly verify to what extend speciﬁc conditions
discussed above hold true empirically. Analyzing empirically if the PM prefers a higher or a
lower agricultural protection when compared to the median is an interesting question, which
we leave for future research. But, in our empirical analyses below we do not make any ex ante
assumptions regarding the ideal position of the PM. Nevertheless, we have to admit that in our
empirical analyses we implicitly assume, that at least in our sample countries the position of
the PM lies homogeneously below or above the median position, respectively.
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voters' beliefs, i.e. Y PM = Y PM(s0). Moreover, the ﬁnal policy outcome s∗ results
from legislative bargaining and, therefore, is also determined by voters' policy beliefs,
i.e., s∗ = s∗(s0). Thus, assuming rational expectations implies that voters' beliefs
s0 result in a ﬁnal policy outcome that corresponds with voters' initial beliefs, i.e.
s∗(s0) = s0.
Now, for any position of the PM the outcome of legislative bargaining is restricted
to the interval
[
s−k , s
+
k
]
, where s−k and s
+
k are solely determined by the demographic
composition of the electoral system and the party discipline γ. Therefore, assuming
voters form rational expectations implies that voters form common beliefs that lie
in the interval s0 ∈ [s−k , s+k ] ∩ [suk , srk].
The question that arises is how voters form their common beliefs. Belief formation
of voters is a very interesting subject in itself, where classical work goes back to
Fiorina (1981). Nevertheless, we leave this interesting topic for future work and
provide only an intuitive model of voters' belief formation. Following the interesting
work of Golub and Jackson (2009), we assume belief formation results from a social
communication process among voters. Belief formation might be biased to the extent
that communication is dominated by speciﬁc central actors. In this regard interest
groups are often central players dominating stakeholder communication.
Given the fact that the PM 's preferred policy position resulting from the rationale
in eq.(2.24) is increasing in voters' beliefs, agrarian interest groups have an interest
to inﬂuence voters' beliefs toward high agricultural subsidization, while non-agrarian
interest groups have an interest to inﬂuence voters' beliefs toward low agricultural
subsidization levels. Taken into account that at least in industrialized democracies
political communication is strongly dominated by agrarian interest groups, it seems
plausible that voters' initial beliefs correspond to high agricultural protection levels
in these countries. Formally, we assume that voters' common beliefs result as a
weighted mean of preferred policy outcomes of rural and urban legislators, respec-
tively, i.e. s0 = CAsrk + (1 − CA)suk , with 0 ≤ CA ≤ 1. Thus, CA measures the
relative inﬂuence of agrarian interest groups. Rational expectations, however, imply
that voter take legislative bargaining into account, e.g. voters' common beliefs result
as: s0 = max (min (CAsrk + (1− CA)suk , s+) , s−), with 0 ≤ CA ≤ 1. Please note that
voters' rational expectation beliefs imply sPM(s0) = s0 and also: s∗(s0) = s0.8
2.2.4 Policy outcomes under diﬀerent electoral systems
Overall, it follows from our theory that legislators' policy preferences systematically
change with the electoral system, in which the preferred agricultural subsidization
levels decrease with the district magnitude k for rural and increase for urban leg-
islators. For pure proportional representation systems (k = n), all legislators and
the PM have identical political preferences (see also Figure 2.1 below.). We denote
s¯n as the common ideal point of all legislators under proportional representation
that trivially becomes also the unique policy outcome. Assuming further that ini-
tial voter beliefs in industrialized countries correspond to high agricultural support
implies that under mixed and majority rules (k < n) the PM also tends toward
8This only holds for ∆k = 0, but please note that also for ∆k 6= 0 a similar non-linear relationship
between district size, protection levels and voter beliefs results.
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rural preferences.9 Next, we are able to summarize the overall equilibrium of our
legislative bargaining game under diﬀerent electoral systems in proposition 2. (The
proof is given in the appendix.)
Proposition 2. Let s∗k and s¯k denote the equilibrium and default policy outcome,
respectively, of the majority bargaining game deﬁned in proposition 1 assuming an
electoral system k = 1, .., n. Then the following holds:
1. The equilibrium policy outcome is deﬁned by:
s∗k = arg min
s
∥∥Y PMk − s∥∥ s.t. s ∈ [s−k , s+k ]
s+k = max
{
sk ∈
⋂
g
Sgk
∣∣∣∣∣∑
J
βJukw
J(s) + γ ≥
∑
J
βJukw
J(s¯k)
}
(2.26)
s−k = min
{
sk ∈
⋂
g
Sgk
∣∣∣∣∣∑
J
βJrkw
J(s) + γ ≥
∑
J
βJrkw
J(s¯k)
}
where βJuk and β
J
rk
denote the group weights of an additive SWF corresponding
to the electoral competition equilibrium in urban and rural districts, respec-
tively, deﬁned by the electoral system k.
2. In particular, it holds for the equilibrium outcome s∗k:
s∗k = max
{
s−k , Y
PM
k
} ≤ s¯k if Y PMk ≤ s¯k (2.27)
s∗k = min
{
s+k , Y
PM
k
} ≥ s¯k if Y PMk ≥ s¯k.
3. Let s0 = max
[
min
[
CA ∗ srk + (1− CA)suk , s+k
]
, s−k
]
denote the common beliefs
of voters regarding the agricultural policy outcome, then it holds:
Y PMk = s
0 ≤ s¯n for CA suﬃciently close to 0 (2.28)
Y PMk = s
0 ≥ s¯n for CA suﬃciently close to 1,
where s¯n is the unique common ideal position of all legislators under propor-
tional representation, i.e., k=n.
4. There always exists a k∗ with 1 ≤ k∗ ≤ n and it holds:
(i) For CA suﬃciently close to 1:[
s∗k ≤ s∗k+1 ∀k < k∗ and s∗k ≥ s∗k+1 ∀k ≥ k∗
]
(ii) For CA suﬃciently close to 0:[
s∗k ≥ s∗k+1 ∀k < k∗ and s∗k ≤ s∗k+1 ∀k ≥ k∗
]
9However, please note that even if we would assume other voter beliefs implying urban preferences
of the PM our main theoretical implication that agricultural policy outcomes systematically
change with the electoral system would still result.
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Three things are worth noting. First, assuming the non-agrarian population is
suﬃciently more ideologically biased when compared to the agrarian population, i.e.
φM << φA both rural and urban legislators prefer a subsidization of the farm sector
for any electoral system k. Second, in extreme cases of perfect party discipline, the
restriction of the decisive (urban or rural) majority member is never binding, i.e., the
equilibrium outcome is solely determined by the preferences of the PM . In this case
k∗ equals 1. Third, if this restriction is binding, the equilibrium is solely determined
by the preferences of the decisive majority member being re-elected in an urban
or rural district and the rent γ. Note, in particular, that under this condition the
equilibrium would not change with changed preferences of the PM as long as the
PM prefers a suﬃciently high (low) subsidization level, i.e., a level that is higher
(lower) than the maximum (minimum) level the decisive urban (rural) majority
member is willing to accept in exchange for the rent γ. This last point is crucial
regarding the impact of the electoral system on agricultural policy. In contrast to
existing pre-election models, in our approach the impact of an increased district
magnitude on agricultural protection is ambiguous and depends on the interplay
of formal constitutional rules and informal institutions, i.e., party discipline and
relative strength of agrarian interest groups.
In particular, if political communication is dominated by agrarian interest groups,
voters believe in protectionist agricultural policy and electoral competition pushes
the PM to take pro-agrarian policy positions. In this case legislative bargaining
occurs between a pro-agrarian PM and an urban legislator that tends to be biased
against agrarian interest. A contrario, if political communication is dominated by
non-agrarian interest groups, voter beliefs tend toward a liberal agricultural pol-
icy. Hence, the PM tends to favor non-agrarian interests and legislative bargaining
occurs among a pro-urban PM and a pro-agrarian rural legislator as a decisive gov-
ernment member. As district magnitude grows and the electoral system converges
to a pure proportional system, policy biases among rural and urban districts are
attenuated. Accordingly, in the ﬁrst case there is an inverse u-shaped relation, while
in the second case a u-shaped relation between district magnitude and agricultural
protection results as shown in Figure 2.1.
2.3 Empirical Analysis
2.3.1 Data and estimation strategy
According to our theory we focus on parliamentary democracies to empirically an-
alyze political determinants of agricultural protection.10 A country is deﬁned as a
parliamentary democracy if the country has a polity score, provided by the Polity IV
data set, above zero (see database of Marshall et al., 2008) and if the constitution
provides the presence of a vote of conﬁdence and the separation of the head of state
and the head of government (see database of Lundell and Karvonen (2003) and of
10These countries include: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hun-
gary, Iceland, India, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Por-
tugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey.
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Figure 2.1: Legislator's ideal points (black thin lines), legislator's ideal points with
rent γ (black dashed lines) and policy outcomes (grey bold lines) condi-
tional on district magnitude
Source: Authors.
Beck et al. (2001)).11 All country-years where both requirements were fulﬁlled are
included into our analysis. But countries belonging to the European Union (EU)
are excluded from our analysis, because the European Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) is negotiated at the supranational level by EU institutions thus not meeting
the prerequisites of our theoretical approach.12
As dependent variable we use the Nominal Rate of Assistance to Agriculture
(NRA), which is an advanced measure of agricultural protection provided by An-
derson and Valenzuela (2008). The NRA is calculated as a weighted average of
commodity-speciﬁc NRAs using the undistorted production values of the commodi-
ties as weights. Analogously to the commonly used Producer Support Estimate
(PSE) published yearly by the OECD, the NRA includes indirect market interven-
tions such as direct transfer payments or exchange rates distortions, respectively.
Related to our main theoretical conclusions we deﬁne the following three electoral
systems based on the principle of district size: (1) a majoritarian system where
only one legislator gets elected in a district, (2) a mixed system where on average
2 up to 9.9 legislators are elected per district and (3) a proportional representation
system where 10 or more legislators get elected per district on average in a coun-
try. This results in two binary indicator variables as set of institutional variables
I = {maj, prop}, wheremaj=1 indicates a majoritarian and prop=1 indicates a pro-
11If these data sets diﬀer in their classiﬁcation or if countries are not clearly coded as parliamentary
or presidential, we use further information by Ismayr (2002a), Ismayr (2002b), Lijphart (1999)
and Armingeon et al. (2008).
12Note that countries are dropped from our sample one year before their EU accession in order to
account for a possible impact of anticipated CAP.
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portional electoral rule, while maj = prop=0 indicates a mixed system. Information
on district size is taken from data sets of Lundell and Karvonen (2003) and of Beck
et al. (2001). The data sets are supplemented by data of the Inter-Parliamentary
Union (2008). Such classiﬁcation particularly allows to analyze the impact of an
intermediate system between a pure majoritarian and a pure proportional represen-
tation system on special interest politics.
We also use distr as a continuous measure of district size for robustness checks.
distr is deﬁned as the relation of total number of electoral districts divided by
total number of parliamentary seats. By construction distr ranges between 0 and
1, taking a value of 1 for pure majority systems and a value close to 0 for pure
PR systems. Because our theory implies a non-linear relationship between district
size and agricultural protection, our set of institutional variables I consists of the
variables distr and distr2, the squared district size, for the robustness checks.
Following existing studies the set of macroeconomic controls, denoted as X for
the time varying and Z for the country speciﬁc variables, includes the initial gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita (initialgdppc), the real GDP per capita growth
(gdppcgrowth) (included to capture in combination the state of economic develop-
ment), the logarithm of agricultural share in employment (emplln) to account for
diﬀerences in economic structure and industrialization, the ratio of the agricultural
share in value-added and the agricultural share in employment (compad) to proxy
comparative advantages in agriculture, and arable land per farm worker (factorend)
to take the relative incomes of agricultural farmers into account (see for information
on this variables Tyers and Anderson, 1992; Beghin and Kherallah, 1994; Swinnen,
1994; Olper, 2001; Anderson, 2008). Following Beghin and Kherallah (1994) we
deﬁne budget as the net agricultural export per capita in order to account for gov-
ernmental budget constraints. In particular, budget costs due to agricultural trade
policy crucially depend on the country's agricultural net trade position. All used
economic and demographic control variables were calculated using data available
from the World Bank database of development indicators and the database of the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAOSTAT, 2008; World
Bank, 2008).
Overall, our sample corresponds to unbalanced time-series cross-section data in-
cluding 23 countries with an average time period of 17.7 years per country.13 In
response to the given data structure, the modeling of country speciﬁc heterogeneity
and the consideration of model dynamics need to be addressed by the economet-
ric speciﬁcations in order to provide a valid assessment of the inﬂuence of political
institutions on the level of agricultural protection. Note that the issue of possible
endogeneity of institutional variables is discussed in detail in Section 2.3.3.
We start with the following baseline two-way ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation, which is
related to the model proposed, among others, by Wallace and Hussain (1969):
NRAit = %Xit + υIit + ϕt + ξi + it, i = 1, . . . , N, t = D(i), . . . , T (i), (2.29)
with N denoting the number of countries, D(i) the ﬁrst and T (i) the last observation
for country i, where NRAit denotes the measure of agricultural protection, Xit
13Summary statistics of all variables are presented in Table 2.2 in the appendix.
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refers to the set of macroeconomic control variables (including a constant, when the
model does not include country speciﬁc eﬀects), Iit denotes the set of institutional
indicators, and ϕt and ξi represent time and country speciﬁc eﬀects, respectively.
This baseline speciﬁcation in eq.(2.29) addresses the issues of country speciﬁc
heterogeneity via consideration of country speciﬁc eﬀects ξi and accounts for year
eﬀects with time ﬁxed eﬀects. The latter are included into the regression to consider
the impact of year speciﬁc events like an oil crisis. However, this speciﬁcation hinders
the direct incorporation of country speciﬁc time-invariant variables (see Greene,
2010). Given the fact that our used institutional indicators are time-variant, though
rarely changing, a regression with country ﬁxed eﬀects is applicable, though not
necessarily optimal. Therefore, we follow an alternative modeling of country speciﬁc
heterogeneity providing as a byproduct possibly more eﬃcient estimation results.14
Based on a cross validation experiment discussed by Stone (1974) and adapted to
time-series cross-section data by Beck et al. (2001), we test whether heterogeneity
is related to groups of countries. Therefore we estimate the model speciﬁcation of
eq. (2.29) neglecting country speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, but including initial GDP per
capita as a time invariant variable, i.e.
NRAit = %Xit + υIit + ϕt + ξZi + it. (2.30)
We estimate the speciﬁcation of eq. 2.30N -times withN−1 countries and predict the
NRA of the left out country to identify country speciﬁc heterogeneity via computed
mean squared forecast errors (MSFE). Based on the comparison of country speciﬁc
MSFE's with average MSFE, we were able to identify countries that are less well
predicted via pooled regression. With this information at hand we construct a
dummy variable for the less well predicted countries and introduce it into eq. (2.30)
to capture identiﬁed unobserved heterogeneity. Now, Zi incorporates country speciﬁc
information as well as a group indicator. This speciﬁcation puts more emphasis on
the cross-section variation, which may be preferable to analyze the impact of rarely
changing political institutions in terms of estimation eﬃciency.
After controlling for country speciﬁc heterogeneity we deal with specifying model
dynamics. It is well-known in the literature that signiﬁcance testing in speciﬁcations
as given in speciﬁcations 2.29 and 2.30 is possibly subject to substantially inﬂated
t-values, when the issue of model dynamics and autocorrelation is not properly
addressed (see Bertrand et al., 2004). To deal with this issue, we check the robustness
of results via the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable, NRA(t − 1), as an
explaining factor.
Note that inference for these speciﬁcations is based on cluster robust standard er-
rors deﬁning countries as clusters as suggested by White (1980). However, as noted
by Cameron et al. (2008) these standard errors although controlling for both het-
eroscedasticity and general correlation patterns within clusters will generally still be
14As a possible alternative Plümper and Troeger (2007) suggest a three-step procedure to estimate
time invariant and slowly changing variables in the presence of country heterogeneity. However,
several authors have criticized this approach, recommending instead the application of a stan-
dard Hausman-Taylor model or a shrinkage estimator combining the Hausman-Taylor and the
Plümper and Tröger approach (Greene, 2010; Mitze, 2009; Breusch et al., 2010). Estimation of
these alternative models, however, essentially reproduced results presented here.
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biased downwards. We hence adapt the proposed wild cluster residual based boot-
strap of Cameron et al. (2008) in order to perform a robust test of the hypothesis
that electoral rules inﬂuence agricultural protection as suggested by theory.15 Note
that this strategy is accompanied by a careful check of the adequate model speciﬁca-
tion incorporating features of latent heterogeneity and serial correlation as outlined
above based on the Akaike (AIC) and Schwarz (BIC) information criteria.
2.3.2 Results
Following our estimation strategy, we present in Table 2.1 ﬁve model speciﬁcations
corresponding to the diﬀerent approaches discussed above. Model 1 corresponds
to the standard ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation in eq.(2.29). Speciﬁcation 2 is based on
eq.(2.30) to perform out-of-sample predictions as described above. By comparing
the country speciﬁc MSFEs, we see that Norway, Iceland and Switzerland are less
well predicted by a pooled model with country speciﬁc time invariant variables than
other countries. These three countries can be seen as peripheral European countries
with high GDP per capita and a highly specialized agricultural sector. Thus, we
include a dummy Protec+ in speciﬁcation 3 as an additional Z-variable to tackle
this group related unobserved heterogeneity. The positive coeﬃcient of this coun-
try group dummy reveals that these countries tend to more highly subsidize their
agricultural sector compared to other parliamentary democracies. To compare non-
nested model speciﬁcations 1 to 3, we refer to the standard information criteria,
the AIC and BIC. Both criteria indicate that speciﬁcation 1 is preferable when
compared to speciﬁcation 2. However, according to the BIC criterion, model 3 is pre-
ferred when compared to the standard ﬁxed eﬀect model 1. Note that the AIC often
prefers overparameterized model speciﬁcations. After checking the correct modeling
of country heterogeneity, we next deal with model dynamics endemic to our type of
data.
In Table 2.1 speciﬁcation 4 reports estimation results from a dynamic speciﬁcation
including a lagged dependent variable into model speciﬁcation 3. The coeﬃcient of
the lagged dependent variable turns out to be highly signiﬁcant. Intuitively, the
use of a lagged NRA can be explained by a slow annual speed of adjustment of
agricultural policies to changing socio-economic framework conditions. Altogether
model 4 is our preferred model.16 Finally, we perform in model speciﬁcation 5 a
ﬁrst robustness check of our results replicating speciﬁcation 4 with I = distr, distr2.
Further robustness checks are postponed to Section 2.3.3, where we discuss the
problem of possibly endogenous institutions in more detail.
15In detail, we follow the strategy outlined in Appendix B of Cameron et al. (2008) based on the
Wald type test statistic for assessing the hypothesis ν = 0, i.e.
Wν = νˆ
′Σ˜ν
−1
νˆ,
where νˆ denote the estimate of ν and Σ˜ν the corresponding covariance matrix.
16Please note, however, that our central results are unaﬀected by model speciﬁcations as proposed
and discussed by Greene (2010). We also examined a dynamic speciﬁcation of model 1, but
both information criteria reveal that a speciﬁcation with modeling group related heterogeneity
and a lagged dependent variable is preferred. Estimation results for all model speciﬁcations are
available from the authors upon request.
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We start with interpreting the standard controls.17 As predicted by Olson's theory,
we ﬁnd a negative and highly signiﬁcant impact of the agricultural employment share
emplln on agricultural protection for all model speciﬁcations except speciﬁcation 2.
A low share of employment in agriculture indicates low costs of collective action for
agricultural voter groups due to a decreasing free-riding problem and, thus, implies
ceteris paribus higher agricultural protection. The negative sign for the variable
compad is in line with the theory and empirical ﬁnding of Honma and Hayami
(1986), where lower comparative advantages in agriculture increase the demand for
agricultural protection. This parameter is only statistically signiﬁcant for model
speciﬁcations 1 and 3. Analogously, the negative coeﬃcient of factorend estimated
for all model speciﬁcations corresponds to the relative income hypothesis of Tyers
and Anderson (1992) and de Gorter and Tsur (1991), predicting decreasing rates of
assistance with increasing relative income of the agricultural sector. This variable
turns out to be statistically signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations.
For the control variables inititalgdppc, gdppcgrowth and budget, however, some
variations in the signiﬁcance and sign of estimated parameters can be observed
across model speciﬁcations. In particular, following the development-paradox hy-
pothesis a positive parameter for both inititalgdppc and gdppcgrowth is expected.
As can be seen from Table 2.1 according to our estimation all model speciﬁcations
display a positive sign for gdppcgrowth, which is in line with the development para-
dox by Tyers and Anderson (1992), but the impact is not signiﬁcant for model 2
and 3, while for inititalgdppc a signiﬁcant and positive parameter is only found for
model 2. The estimated budget parameter displays the correct negative sign for
the speciﬁcations 2-5, but it is only signiﬁcant for model 2, while for model 1 it
is even signiﬁcantly positive contradicting Beghin and Kherallah (1994), who state
that increasing budget expenditures to ﬁnance agricultural protection c.p. reduce
protection levels. However, also Beghin and Kherallah (1994) got mixed results for
this variable.
Now we turn to our central explaining variables, maj and prop, describing electoral
rules. For all model speciﬁcations we ﬁnd highly signiﬁcant and negative coeﬃcients
for both variables maj and prop. Interpreting the estimated parameters of our
preferred speciﬁcation as causal eﬀects would imply that the maximum increase in
agricultural protection induced by a shift from a majoritarian to a mixed system
amounts to 0.11 in the short run and 0.34 in the long run. Analogously, a change
from a pure proportional representation to a mixed system induces an increase in
the NRA measure of 0.07 in the short run and 0.22 in the long run (see speciﬁcation
4, Table 2.1). The performed Wald test assessing the hypothesis ν = 0 indicates,
except for speciﬁcation (1), that a simple majoritarian-proportional dichotomy is
not suﬃcient to explain agricultural protection as a special case of redistributive
politics.18 Agricultural protection ﬁrst increases and then decreases with district
17Note that estimating all models without time ﬁxed eﬀects and with a dummy for the eﬀect of
the Uruguay negotiations in 1994 revealed similar results.
18As noted above, the high multicollinearity between ﬁxed eﬀects and the rarely changing insti-
tutional variables may cause the failure to reject the null hypothesis in speciﬁcation (1). To
investigate this issue further, we regress the estimated country ﬁxed eﬀects on country spe-
ciﬁc variables and the institutional variables. To deal with the occurring time variation within
institutions, we classiﬁed a country according to its modal institutional setting. Regressing esti-
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magnitude if we control for the impact of standard control variables and address
diﬀerent model speciﬁcations concerning country heterogeneity and dynamic issues.
Protection is ceteris paribus the highest for mixed electoral systems when compared
to both pure majoritarian and pure proportional representation systems.
Our main ﬁndings remain robust against the speciﬁcation of the electoral system
(see speciﬁcation 5). We substitute our dummy variables by a continuous measure
of district magnitude and include the squared district magnitude in our speciﬁca-
tion. Again, estimation results support a non-linear (inverse u-shaped) relationship
between district magnitude and agricultural protection.
In summary, these estimation results clearly support our theory. But the idea of
endogenous electoral rules gives reason to question the identiﬁcation of causal eﬀects
via model 4 in Table 2.1 and lead us to a further robustness check of our results via
the implementation of instrument variable estimation as suggested by Angrist and
Krueger (2001).19 Strategy and results are discussed in more depth below.
2.3.3 Endogeneity and causal eﬀects of electoral rules
There is a consensus among scholars of comparative political economy that polit-
ical institutions and economic performance might be aﬀected by the same factors
(e.g. Acemoglu, 2005; Persson and Tabellini, 2003). Accordingly, the literature
stresses the importance to control for potential endogeneity of political institutions
if the goal is the identiﬁcation of causal eﬀects (see Persson and Tabellini, 2003; Ace-
moglu et al., 2001; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). Especially Persson and Tabellini
(2003) have promoted to solve the endogeneity problem and to identify the causal
eﬀects of political institutions on economic performance via appropriate econometric
strategies. A common approach in micro-econometrics to solve endogeneity is the
instrument variable estimation (see Angrist and Krueger, 2001). The critical part
within an IV estimation is to ﬁnd variables that on the one hand are suﬃciently cor-
related with the endogenous variable, but not with the error term of the explained
variable, i.e. valid instruments. Otherwise the IV strategy will not solve the endo-
geneity problem. This leads us to discussing the origin and choice of electoral rules
in more detail.
Despite the consensus about the non-random choice of political institutions in the
comparative politics literature, many scholars criticize the lack of theory explain-
ing the choice and development of political institutions (see Shugart, 2005; Benoit,
2007; Boix, 1999). The latter would especially facilitate the identiﬁcation of reli-
able instruments. Acemoglu (2005) even argues that often instrument variables can
mated country speciﬁc eﬀects on a constant, inititalgdppc, maj and prop revealed the following
results (overall R2 = 0.1905)
ξˆi = −0.9029 + 0.0292inititalgdppci +−0.4182maj i +−0.0842propi + ei.
Results clearly indicate that cross country variation within ﬁxed eﬀects can be explained via
the considered institutions.
19Note that the possible endogeneity of macroeconomic controls has also been subject to robustness
checks. We adapt the common approach in macroeconometrics which uses lagged variables as
instruments. With lagged macroeconomic controls no changes with respect to signiﬁcance and
direction in parameter estimates occurred. Results are provided upon request by the authors.
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only explain the quality of general institutional set-ups, but not the speciﬁc design
of political institutions. In this case IV-estimations are unable to identify causal
eﬀects of speciﬁc political institutions. Accordingly, we refrain from using the Hall-
Jones-Variables as instruments, as we are convinced by the criticism of Acemoglu
(2005) that these variables are at best valid instruments for a bundle of institutions,
but not for electoral rules as a speciﬁc institution. In our speciﬁc case the use of
the Hall-Jones instruments is further limited due to the fact that these variables
show no suﬃcient variance in our sample. Moreover, there is reasonable doubt on
the exogeneity of colonial history, as it is correlated with other factor inﬂuencing
agricultural protection, e.g. preference for a liberal trade policy for former British
colonies.
Therefore, identifying potential instruments, we follow Aghion et al. (2004), Ho-
rowitz (1985), and Rokkan (1970) suggesting that social cleavages mainly determine
the choice of electoral rules. In particular, we include ethnic fragmentation (ethnic)
and the squared term of ethnic into our set of instrument variables, where data on
ethnicity is provided by Alesina et al. (2003). Second, society's demand for political
representation impacts on the choice of an electoral system (Blais and Massicotte,
1997). Accordingly, the logarithm of the geographic size of a country (lngeo) is
included as an instrument in our model. Finally, the choice of electoral rules is at
least partly also an epoch phenomenon, which leads us to consider constitutional
timing variables as additional instrument variables. In particular, we deﬁne three
timing dummies indicating whether a country adopted its electoral rule after 1981
(CON81), between 1951 and 80 (CON5180) or between 1921 and 50 (CON21),
where an adoption before 1921 represents the omitted category (see Persson and
Tabellini, 2003). All proposed instrument variables are theoretically unrelated to
agricultural protection and are available for our sample of countries.
Based on this variable set, we estimate an instrument variable model for our pre-
ferred speciﬁcation 4 in Table 2.1. We estimate a linear model for district magnitude
and use forecast trajectories thereof to obtain expected values of the two institutional
dummies maj and prop. These expected values are obtained as the frequencies for
the forecast trajectories given as point estimates plus noise following a normal dis-
tribution with estimated variance exceeding the corresponding thresholds deﬁning
the institutional regimes, see Section 2.3.1.20 Speciﬁcation (6) in Table 2.1 presents
the results of the main stage, results of the ﬁrst stage can be found in Table 2.3 in
the Appendix.
Overall, our central estimation results are robust when endogeneity is taken into
account. The estimated parameters still imply an inverse u-shaped relation of district
magnitude and agricultural protection. Furthermore, coeﬃcients of the instrument
variables are in line with theory and statistically signiﬁcant on conventional levels,
except con2150. The validity of our instrument variable approach is checked on
the basis of a Wu-Hausman test implemented as a F -Test for joint signiﬁcance of
the expectations of institutional dummies and an Overidentiﬁcation test checking
whether the assumed instrument variables possess any explanatory power for the
20Note that an alternative approach instrumenting directly the institutional dummies based on a
multinomial logit model as proposed by Hirano et al. (2000) yields similar results. Results are
provided by authors upon request.
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residuals of the main equation and thus should be included directly.21 Both tests
indicate that the chosen instrument variable approach is valid. Furthermore, the
Wu-Hausmann test reveals that electoral rules are not endogenous to agricultural
protection. At a theoretical level this ﬁnding corresponds to Benoit (2007) who
promoted the idea that especially the choice of district size is signiﬁcantly driven
by pure technocratic motivations, e.g. administrative costs. Of course, the latter
should not be correlated with agricultural protection, thus endogeneity should not
be a problem.
However, can we now really interpret estimated parameters as causal eﬀects of
electoral rules? Here, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) have nicely pointed out that
political, economic, social and legal institutions are likely evolving jointly, i.e., rein-
forcing each other and thus can only be observed in speciﬁc clusters. Accordingly,
even if we are conﬁdent that our instruments were able to identify correct parame-
ters, an interpretation of these parameters as a causal eﬀect of a speciﬁc institution
might still be problematic due to the fact of clustered institutions. Interestingly, it
follows directly from our theoretical model that the speciﬁc impact of electoral rules
on agricultural protectionism crucially depends on the relative political inﬂuence of
agrarian when compared to non-agrarian interest groups. In speciﬁc terms only if
agrarian interest groups are suﬃciently strong to dominate political communication
inducing voters to expect high protection outcomes a switch from majoritarian to a
mixed system implies an increase in protection. In contrast, assuming agrarian inter-
est groups are comparatively weak implies voters expect low agricultural protection
levels and, hence, the same switch implies a decrease in protection. Thus, our the-
ory of agricultural protection is a good example of Acemoglu's clustered institutions
argument. Therefore, overall we conclude that based on our theory estimated pa-
rameters are causal eﬀects of clustered institutions combining electoral rules, party
discipline and interest groups' inﬂuence on voter beliefs. Accordingly, these can be
at best interpreted as conditional causal eﬀects of electoral rules.
2.4 Conclusion
Despite numerous bilateral and multilateral agreements on trade liberalization, agri-
culture remains highly protected in many but not all industrialized countries. Thus,
inspired by new comparative political economy studies of Persson and Tabellini
(2003) and others, our main aim in this article is to explain how agricultural pro-
tection levels are systematically tied to diﬀerent modes of political representation
in industrialized countries. To this end, this paper suggests a political economy
21The corresponding value of the Wu-Hausman F -test statistic is 0.5685, where bootstrapped
critical values suggest no joint signiﬁcance of the expected institutional dummies when the
observed institutional regimes are included within the regression, whilst the corresponding test
statistic for checking the exogeneity of the instrument variables given as
R2
N∑
i=1
(T (i)−D(i) + 1) = 0.2262,
where R2 denotes the coeﬃcient of determination of the regression of the residuals on the
assumed exogenous instrument variables.
40
Chapter 2 Interaction Eﬀects of District Magnitude, Voter Beliefs and
Protectionism: Evidence from Agriculture
model that focus on the interaction eﬀect between formal electoral rules, coalition
discipline and the inﬂuence of interest groups on voters' beliefs in determining agri-
cultural protection.
In detail, our model derives legislators' policy preferences within a probabilistic vot-
ing environment where agrarian voters are less ideologically committed when com-
pared to non-agrarian voters. As a consequence our theory implies that, while all
electoral systems tend to protect agricultural interests at the expense of the general
public, especially mixed systems when compared to majoritarian or proportional
systems, respectively, induce high governmental incentives to protect agriculture.
Assuming agrarian interest groups have a strong inﬂuence on voters' beliefs im-
plies voters expect a pro-agrarian policy. In this case electoral competition drives
the prime minister to favor high agricultural protection, whereas urban districts
are pivotal within the parliamentary majority. In bargaining within the legislature,
this generates a conﬂict between the prime minister and the parliamentary major-
ity, where the bargaining result mainly depends on coalition discipline. As district
size grows and the electoral system converges to a pure proportional system, both
of these biases are attenuated. Overall, an inverse u-shaped relationship results
between district size and agricultural subsidies. Assuming, however, voter beliefs
tend toward a liberal agricultural policy the prime minister tends to favor urban
concerns and a rural legislator becomes decisive within his parliamentary major-
ity. Accordingly, a u-shaped relationship results. Hence, in contrast to classical
political economy approaches, our theory can explain observed large cross-country
variation of agricultural protection levels even within industrialized countries. Using
a dynamic panel estimation based on time-series cross-country data for 23 parlia-
mentary democracies since 1966, our theory is conﬁrmed empirically. Interpreting
estimated parameters as causal eﬀects would imply that electoral rules have an im-
portant impact on agricultural protection levels, e.g. quantitatively a switch from a
majority to a mixed system implies an increase in protection by 34%.
However, we consider our theory of agricultural protection as a good example of
Acemoglu's "clustered institutions" argument. Although our IV estimations imply
that we are able to ﬁnd valid instruments for electoral rule variables, estimated pa-
rameters have to be interpreted as causal eﬀects of clustered institutions combining
electoral rules, coalition discipline and interest groups. Therefore, we conclude that
identiﬁed eﬀects can be at best interpreted as conditional causal eﬀects of formal elec-
toral rules. Please note further that homogeneity of countries included in the data
sample in regard to unobserved informal institutions is crucial for the identiﬁcation
of causal eﬀects of clustered institutions. We tried to take care of this problem by
following a conservative strategy that just allows to include industrialized countries
protecting agriculture into our country sample. However, future research might focus
on more advanced estimation techniques, e.g. applying switching regression models
with latent regimes that allow identiﬁcation of causal eﬀects even within a more
heterogeneous sample comprising of industrialized and developing countries.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Proof of proposition 2
Part (1) and (2) follow directly from proposition 1 given the assumption that only
two types of legislators' preferences, rural and urban, exist. These preferences cor-
respond to an additive SWF characterized by speciﬁc relative weights of the agricul-
tural population, βAuk and β
A
rk
, which depends on the relative shares of the agricultural
population in the rural and urban district, respectively.
Proof of Part (3): Note that for any common voter belief s0 ∈ Sk it holds:
Πu(s
0) = Πr(s
0) = 0.5. (2.31)
Note further that it holds:
Πu(s) > 0.5 Πr(s) < 0.5 for s
−
k ≤ s < s0 (2.32)
Πu(s) < 0.5 Πr(s) > 0.5 for s
+
k ≥ s > s0
Therefore, it follows that Y PMk = s
0 delivering directly part 3. Finally, to prove part
(4) assume electoral competition implies that Y PMk > s¯k. For simplicity we assume
CA = 1
22, then it follows:
Y PMk = min
{
s+k , s
r
k
}
(2.33)
Then using part (2) the ﬁnal policy outcome results as:
s∗k = min{Y PMk , s+k } (2.34)
By assumption it holds:
αAdk ≤ αAd(k−1) ∀d ∈ DR and αAdk ≥ αAd(k−1) ∀d ∈ DU (2.35)
Thus, it directly follows:
srk ≥ srk+1, suk ≤ suk+1, s−k ≥ s−k+1, s+k ≤ s+k+1 (2.36)
Therefore, it follows that if there exists a k+ = 1, .., n such that it holds: srk+ ≤ s+k+ ,
then it already holds:
srk ≤ s+k ∀k ≥ k+ (2.37)
Obviously, there always exists such a k+, i.e., eq. 2.37 holds for k+ = n. We deﬁne
k∗ as the minimum of all k+'s for which eq. 2.37 holds. Trivially, k* always exists
and it follows:
Y PMk = min
{
s+k , s
r
k
}
= s+k ∀k < k∗ (2.38)
Y PMk = min
{
s+k , s
r
k
}
= srk ∀k ≥ k∗
Therefore, it follows that s∗k equals s
+
k for all k < k
∗ and s∗k equals s
r
k for all k ≥ k∗.
22Please note that the proof will not change substantially if we assume that CA is lower, but
suﬃciently close to 1.
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Thus, the ﬁrst statement of part (4) is proven. The proof of the second statement
is perfectly analogous (assuming CA = 0) and therewith proposition 2 is proven.
Q.E.D.
2.A.2 Data description
Table 2.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Standard Deviaton Minimum Maximum
NRA 0.713 0.938 -0.244 4.239
initialgdppc 14.094 6.956 1.583 33.295
gdppcgrowth 2.570 3.181 -15.840 12.507
compad 0.652 0.277 0.219 1.991
factorend 0.209 0.337 0.004 1.255
budget 0.024 0.390 -0.926 1.547
emplln -2.340 0.729 -4.142 -0.502
distr 0.383 0.411 0.007 1.000
2.A.3 Endogeneity of district magnitude
Table 2.3: Instrument variable estimation: ﬁrst step
(1)
con −2.0705∗∗∗
(0.4635)
ethnic 3.8067∗∗∗
(0.8445)
ethnic2 −4.5112∗∗∗
(1.1580)
lngeo 0.1644∗∗∗
(0.0331)
con2150 −0.0445
(0.1060)
con5180 0.1804∗∗
(0.0889)
con81 −0.4534∗∗∗
(0.1548)
R2 0.8382
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors are given in parentheses. ∗ indicates signiﬁcance at
the 10 percent level, ∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level, and ∗∗∗ indicates
signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level. Source: Authors.
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Abstract
This paper empirically investigates the interaction of formal and informal political
institutions as well as lobbying in determining the ability of agriculture to avoid
taxation or attract government transfers. Based on our theory, we identify speciﬁc
interaction eﬀects between district size and political as well as demographic frame-
work constellations that determine two diﬀerent regimes, e.g. an u-shape and an
inverse u-shape relation between district size and the level of agricultural protec-
tion. Further, our theory predicts diﬀerent patterns of how these interaction eﬀects
impact on agricultural protection levels in developing and industrialized countries.
Using time-series cross-section data, this paper tackles the quantitative assessment
of the theoretical implications. We estimate latent regimes of agricultural protec-
tion and assess the role of political institutions in agricultural policy. We check our
results for robustness concerning dynamic speciﬁcation issues and latent heterogene-
ity. Furthermore, we gauge the possible endogeneity of institutions via an extended
treatment framework.
Keywords : comparative political economy; agricultural protection; political institu-
tions; lobbying; latent policy regimes; endogeneity of political institutions
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3.1 Introduction
Reviewing the literature to date important questions about the determinants of
agricultural protection or taxation, respectively, are still unsolved. In particular,
two strands of literature exist that contribute to the understanding of international
agricultural policy patterns.
A ﬁrst strand corresponds to classical political economy models of agricultural pro-
tection that understand ﬁnal policy outcomes as the result of political bargaining
among various social groups for income redistribution. While these models explain
observed diﬀerences in agricultural protection comparing industrialized and develop-
ing countries (i.e. explaining agricultural protection with the development paradox),
these approaches fail to shed light on observed large cross-country diﬀerences in
agricultural protection among industrialized or developing countries, respectively.
As these models neglect political institutions, they might be the missing link. More
recently, based on the well-known work of Beghin and Kherallah (1994), Beghin
et al. (1996) and Swinnen et al. (2000b), Thies and Porche (2007) as well as Olper
and Raimondi (2009) provide a comprehensive econometric analysis of the political
determinants of agricultural protection, including socio-economic factors as control
variables. Neither Thies and Porche (2007) nor Olper and Raimondi (2009), how-
ever, provide a comprehensive political economy theory of agricultural protection
that explains the observed eﬀects of political determinants on agricultural protec-
tion. They derive their hypotheses rather ad hoc applying various existing political
economy theories on protection.
The second strand of literature corresponds to theoretical and empirical studies an-
alyzing the impact of the constitutional rules on policy outcomes. Since the seminal
papers of Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2000, 2003) the question how constitutional
rules inﬂuence economic policies and hence economic performance is deﬁnitely on top
of the research agenda in comparative political economy. In this context, Acemoglu
and Johnson (2005) demonstrate that identifying causal eﬀects of formal constitu-
tional rules is a complex undertaking. In particular, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005)
argue that disentangling the impact of formal constitutional rules from the impact
of informal institutions, like for example legislative norms or lobbying inﬂuence, is
often plagued by the problem of "clustered" institutions. "Clustered" institutions
describe the fact that a combination of mutually reinforcing formal and informal
institutions evolve jointly (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). Thus, observed political
outcomes are the result of both informal and formal rules of the political game.
Identifying true causal eﬀects of formal constitutional rules demands therefore for a
comprehensive theory reﬂecting the interaction of formal and informal political insti-
tutions. Additionally, adequate econometric techniques must be used to guarantee
a valid empirical identiﬁcation of these disentangled theoretical eﬀects.
In this regard, this paper analyzes the impact of electoral rules on agricultural pro-
tection levels where we especially focus on the question how this impact is inﬂuenced
by the speciﬁc legislative organization in presidential versus parliamentary systems
as well as by lobbying and the demographic composition of a society. In particular,
we make the following theoretical and empirical contributions to the understanding
of agricultural protection patterns around the world.
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First, we develop a micro-political founded theory to understand the interaction of
formal and informal political institutions in determining the level of agricultural pro-
tection or taxation, respectively. In our theory, we explicitly derive legislators' policy
preferences from electoral competition and ﬁnal policy outcomes from postelection
bargaining in legislatures. In detail, our model derives legislators' policy prefer-
ences within a probabilistic voting environment assuming diﬀerent electoral rules,
where, depending on their relative group size, agrarian and non-agrarian voters are
diﬀerently ideologically committed. This implies heterogeneous agricultural policy
preferences for legislators being elected in urban or rural dominated constituencies.
Following Lohmann (1998) ideological bias of agrarian population will be higher the
higher the share of the latter in total population. Accordingly, this generates a con-
ﬂict between legislators in bargaining at the legislature. In a parliamentary system,
this conﬂict is generated between the prime minister, who will tend to favor rural
or urban districts, and her parliamentary majority that will be dominated by the
opposite urban or rural concerns. Legislative bargaining in a presidential system
is characterized by a conﬂict between the median of the agricultural committee,
who will tend to favor rural (urban) districts, and the ﬂoor median, who tends to
favor the opposite urban (rural) districts in industrialized (developing) countries,
respectively.
At the election stage, asymmetric lobbying activities amplify preference hetero-
geneity. Since district populations become more homogenous with increasing district
size, the heterogeneity in preferences is attenuated, when district size grows and the
electoral system converges to a pure proportional representation. Moreover, political
exchange in legislative bargaining translates legislators' preference heterogeneity in
more extreme policy results. Based on our theory, we are able to identify speciﬁc
interaction eﬀects between district size and distinct political as well as demographic
framework constellation. In fact, two diﬀerent regimes can characterized, i.e. an
u-shape and an inverse u-shape relation between district size and the level of agri-
cultural protection. Moreover, we identify monotonically decreasing or increasing as
well as constant relations as special cases of these two regimes. Further, we show
that political, economic and demographic framework diﬀering between developing
and industrialized countries, respectively, imply speciﬁc diﬀerent patterns of how
the interaction of electoral rules, formal and informal legislative norms and lobbying
impacts on agricultural protection levels in these two country types.
Second, our hypotheses are tested empirically using the data set of protection
measures provided by Anderson et al. (2008). Our sample includes cross-country
panel data for 52 countries over the time period 1961-2005. Since our theory derives
an impact of district size on agricultural protection dependent on an unobserved
policy regime induced by demographic, economic and political framework conditions,
we apply a switching regression model to account for diﬀerent latent policy regimes.
As regimes are unobserved, the probability to be in either regime depends on country
speciﬁc characteristics and is parameterized as a logit-type probability. We consider
up to six policy regimes. Our results are robust with respect to considering serial
correlation endemic to time-series cross-section data via a lagged dependent variable.
Also robustness of empirical results with respect to potential endogeneity of political
institutions is checked using a two-step approach as advocated and discussed by
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Angrist and Krueger (2001).
This paper starts in Section 2 with introducing the theoretical model. While
Section 3 describes the applied econometric estimation strategy and used data sets,
Section 4 summarizes our main results and tests for the potential endogeneity of
political institutions. Section 5 concludes and gives an outlook on future research.
3.2 Theoretical model
3.2.1 The population and economy
Consider an economy that is subdivided into two sectors, agriculture and manufac-
ture. The group of voters economically active in the agricultural sector is the rural
population denoted by A, while the urban population corresponds to the group of
voters economically active in the non-agricultural sector denoted byM . Agricultural
policy is considered as a redistribution between the agricultural and non-agricultural
sector. For simplicity we assume that income redistribution occurs via subsidization
and taxation, where two diﬀerent policy regimes are considered. In particular, let
sA and sM denote the per capita subsidy paid to rural and urban population, while
tA and tM denote corresponding per capita tax. Accordingly, sA − tA is the net-
subsidization of rural population, where a positive net subsidy, i.e. sA− tA > 0 indi-
cates a agricultural subsidy regime and vice-versa a negative net-subsidy, sA−tA < 0
indicates a agricultural tax regime.
Any feasible agricultural policy, (sA, tA) must satisfy the following budget con-
straint:
tM =
αA
αM
Γ˜S(sA)⇔ tM = ΓS (sA) (3.1)
sM =
αA
αM
Γ˜T (tA)⇔ sM = ΓT (tA) (3.2)
The functions Γ˜S and Γ˜T include per capita deadweight costs (Becker, 1983), where
it holds: Γ˜S(sA) > sA, SA > 0 and Γ˜T (tA) < tA, tA > 0. Moreover, we assume
increasing per capita deadweight costs, i.e. Γ˜S is strictly convex and increasing in
the level of subsidization, while Γ˜T is strictly concave and decreasing in the level
of taxation. Deadweight costs signiﬁcantly vary across various agricultural policy
instruments. However, we do not focus on the choice of economically eﬃcient redis-
tribution instruments, although discussion on agricultural policy is to a large extent
concerned about this issue (de Gorter and Swinnen, 2002; Becker, 1983; Lohmann,
1998).
Assuming identical individuals for both groups implies the following welfare func-
tion of each member given agricultural policy (sA, tA):
WA = Y 0A + sA − tA; WM = Y 0M + ΓT (tA)− ΓS(sA)
Y 0A and Y
0
M denote the equilibrium income of rural and urban population, respec-
tively, without any agricultural policy intervention. Note further, that due to dead-
weight costs eﬃcient agricultural policy implies: tA ∗ sA = 0. That is eﬃcient
net-subsidization of agriculture implies that agricultural taxation is zero, and vice
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versa, eﬃcient net-taxation of agriculture implies that agricultural subsidy is zero.
Accordingly, we can focus on the net subsidization s = sA − tA analyzing agricul-
tural policy. A net-subsidization s > 0 corresponds to a subsidization level sA = s
and a taxation level of tA = 0 and vice versa a net-subsidization s < 0 implies a
subsidization of s = 0 and a taxation level of tA = −s.
3.2.2 The political system
3.2.2.1 Legislative decision-making
A legislative system of a country consists of a ﬁnite set of political agents N where
i = 1, . . . , n denotes a generic element of the legislative system. Within the leg-
islative system speciﬁc institutions can be deﬁned as subsets of N . In democratic
regimes the government, G, and parliament, P are known as common subsets of the
legislative system N . Furthermore, democratic legislative systems are characterized
by separating government and parliament into further subunits, i.e. governmental
departments or ministries and committee systems, respectively. According to the
division-of-labor argument, diﬀerent committees and governmental departments are
usually responsible for diﬀerent policy domains (Shepsle, 1979). In particular, we
denote CA as the agricultural committee and GA as the agricultural department,
respectively.
The legislative process in democratic systems typically begins when the govern-
ment submits a bill to the parliament.1 Then the responsible committee works on
the bill to present parliament the government proposal including their recommended
amendments. On the ﬂoor, there is a ﬁnal vote on the entire bill, where additional
amendments might be submitted or not. Beyond this general structure, the organi-
zation of legislative procedures varies, where in the political science literature two
ideal typical regimes, a presidential and a parliamentary system, are deﬁned. Thus,
to analyze the impact of the organization of legislative decision-making under these
two regimes on agricultural protection, we can focus on the interaction between the
government, G, the agricultural committee, CA, and the ﬂoor, F .2
For our formal analysis we consider the net-subsidization of agriculture s ∈ S
as the relevant agricultural policy outcome, where S is the interval [−1, 1], where
s = −1 implies maximal taxation and s=1 maximal subsidization of agriculture.3
1Although in most democratic systems members of the parliament can initiate legislation if there
is no proposal of the government.
2Note that in general government, ﬂoor and the agricultural committee consist of multiple mem-
bers.
3For simplicity we focus our analysis on a unique net-subsidization level, although in reality
net-subsidization levels vary across agricultural commodities. However, it is straightforward
to extend our analysis to multiple agricultural commodities. In this case s ∈ S is a convex
compact subset of the m-dimensional cube (−1, 1)m, where m is the number of agricultural
commodities. sr is the r's component of s and denotes the protection level of the commodity
r. sr = −1 implies maximal taxation, while sr = 1 corresponds to some maximal protection
level for commodity r. Assuming protection levels are separately decided for each agricultural
commodity r implies that our results derived for the one-dimensional case can be directly applied
to the multidimensional case. Please note that as matter of fact in most countries agricultural
protection levels are decided in separate legislative acts for each commodity. However, the
assumption of separability is not essential for our theoretical results, but rather make analyses
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3.2.2.2 Parliamentary system
It has been nicely demonstrated by Huber (1996) as well as Diermeier and Fedder-
sen (1998) that parliamentary systems are characterized by a stable ex ante major-
ity coalition built among legislators, where legislative decision-making occurs solely
within the majority coalition. The rational of ex ante majority coalition building
correspond to the fact that this coalition at least weakly increases the utility of all
majority members when compared to their utilities derived under a default outcome
s¯I , I = A,M resulting under non-cooperative behavior of legislators. In particular,
ex ante ﬁxed parliamentary majorities are able to guarantee their members higher
utilities due to an additional rent legislators realized from being part of a stable
majority (Huber, 1996).
Following Huber (1996) as well as Diermeier and Feddersen (1998), we suggest
a rather simple legislative majority bargaining game that captures the essential
characteristics of legislative bargaining in parliamentary systems. In particular,
we can concentrate on the prime minister, PM , and her parliamentary majority
Pinc that is ex ante identiﬁable for modeling legislative decisions. Pinc is a ﬁnite
subset of the set of all legislators N and g ∈ Pinc is a generic element of Pinc. Pinc
could correspond to a multi-party coalition or a single majority party. However,
to simplify following analyses at the election stage we assume a two-party set-up,
i.e. Pinc corresponds to all parliamentary members of the majority party, where Popp
denotes the opposition party. Moreover, we generally assume that PM is also the
party leader of the majority party.
The model of legislative bargaining in parliamentary systems has two stages. At
the ﬁrst stage, we model the default policy outcome s¯. Agents' policy preferences
can be represented by a single-peaked function Ui(s). Please note that we will explic-
itly derive legislators' single-peaked preferences from political support maximization
applying a probabilistic voter model incorporating interest group activities below.
Let Y i denote the ideal point of legislator i, i.e. Y i is the maximum of Ui(s).
According to their single-peaked policy preferences each political agent desires to
achieve policy outcomes that are as close as possible to her ideal position Yi. Obvi-
ously, under this assumptions the well-known median voter theorem applies, i.e. the
unique equilibrium outcome of the non-cooperative legislative decision-making game
neglecting any ex ante coalition building is the ideal point of the ﬂoor median (Black,
1958), i.e. denoting the latter by Y F the default policy results as s¯ = Y F .
At the second stage, the bargaining improving legislators utility derived under the
default outcome within the majority occurs. In detail we assume two steps. At a ﬁrst
step the PM proposes a policy, spar, to her parliamentary majority and announces
side payments γ being paid to each member of the majority in case it admits the
governmental proposal. Regarding content, we interpret these side payments as a
rent the PM can pay to the majority due to speciﬁc formal legislative procedures,
e.g. issuing a conﬁdence vote, or informal procedures, i.e. the possibility to generate
favors in terms of political career for party members. In this paper, we are not
speciﬁcally interested in modeling exactly how the PM can generate this rent, but
generally subsume this under the term party or coalition discipline, that is exerted
more traceable.
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by the PM . In fact, the speciﬁc procedures for exerting party or coalition discipline
vary across political systems. Our major point is that these procedures allow the PM
to extract political favors from its majority and that is what we capture, introducing
some party discipline in our modeling strategy4.
At the second step, each individual majority member can decide whether or not to
accept the governmental proposal. If all majority members accept the governmental
proposal, the proposed policy, spar, is the ﬁnal legislative decision, and all majority
members receive the announced rent. Otherwise, the default policy s¯ is the legislative
decision and no rent is paid.
We assume that legislators value the rent γ oﬀered by the prime minister, i.e.
overall we assume that legislators maximize the sum of actual rent, γ, and the
utility derived from policy, Ug(s).
Under these assumptions the legislative majority bargaining game has a unique
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, where spar denotes the equilibrium outcome that
is characterized in proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Assuming a one-dimensional agricultural policy choice s, there ex-
ists a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for our legislative majority bargaining
game deﬁned above. The equilibrium outcome, spar, depends on the rent, γ, the de-
fault policy outcome, s¯, and the policy preferences of the PM and of the majority
members, g.
1. In equilibrium, agricultural policy choice spar results from the following maxi-
mization:5
spar = arg max
s
UPM(s) s.t. s ∈
⋂
g
Sg, (3.3)
where Sg = {s ∈ S|Ug(s) + γ ≥ Ug(s¯)}.
2. In particular, it holds that the outcome of the legislative bargaining game cor-
responds to the minimal distance between the ideal point of the PM and the
interval [s−, s+]:
spar = arg min
s
∥∥Y PM − s∥∥ s.t. s ∈ [s−1 , s+1 ] (3.4)
where s−1 = min
⋂
g
Sg = Y
F − γ and s+1 = max
⋂
g
Sg = Y
F + γ.
Proof: see appendix.
If the rent γ is suﬃciently large or if legislators' preferences are suﬃciently ho-
mogeneous, the ﬁnal agricultural policy outcome corresponds to the ideal point of
4Note further that we assume that at this stage the PM can commit to paying the rent. However,
this assumption is not necessary; in a richer modeling set-up including the speciﬁc procedures
it is possible to get essentially the same result without assuming this kind of commitment
Ashworth and de Mesquita (2004).
5Note that the maximization problem always has a unique solution, as long as the utility functions
of legislators are strictly concave. Note that all sets Sg are compact and convex subsets of S.
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the prime minister. Under this condition, our model corresponds to pre-election po-
litical models, which generally assume that governmental policy simply corresponds
to political preferences of the party leader who becomes the omnipotent head of
government after elections. If party discipline, i.e. the rent γ, is not suﬃciently
high or analogous, policy preferences of the PM and her parliamentary majority are
suﬃciently heterogeneous, agricultural policy outcome is no more fully determined
by the PM 's policy preferences. Under this assumption, policy outcome is also de-
termined by the intersection set of the subsets Sg that is determined by the policy
preferences of the majority members, the rent γ and the default policy, s¯ = Y F .
Regarding the policy preferences of legislators, it is generally assumed that they
reﬂect agents' interest in political support by politically responsive interests located
in their constituencies (see for example Weingast and Marshall, 1988; Persson and
Tabellini, 2000). Electoral competition induces political agents, at least in part, to
represent the interest of their constituents. Since economic importance of the farm
sector is not uniformly distributed across constituencies, farm interests also are not
uniformly distributed over constituencies. We will explicitly derive legislators' policy
preferences from electoral competition in subsection 3.2.4. In particular, we will
demonstrate that the electorate system has signiﬁcant implications on legislators
preferences and thus on the ﬁnal policy outcome of our legislative decision-making
game.
However, before we analyze the election stage, we ﬁrst derive a model of legislative
decision-making for presidential systems.
3.2.2.3 Presidential systems
In contrast to parliamentary systems, presidential systems are not characterized by a
stable ex ante coalition or legislative cohesion, respectively. Presidential systems are
characterized by more dispersed proposal powers, where proposal power over speciﬁc
policy domains resides with corresponding parliamentary committees (Persson and
Tabellini, 2002). In particular, we assume that the agricultural committee exerts
agenda setting power vis-a-vis the ﬂoor, when formulating an agricultural policy
proposal s. Accordingly, to model legislative bargaining in presidential systems on
agricultural policy, we focus on the ﬂoor median F and the agricultural committee
median CA (Weingast et al., 1981; Krehbiel, 1991). Let UF (s) denote the policy
preferences of the ﬂoor median regarding the net-subsidization level of the agriculture
and let UCA(s) denote the corresponding policy preferences of the median of the
agricultural committee.
In essence legislative procedure starts with the committee submitting a policy
proposal sCA to the ﬂoor and the ﬂoor chooses the ﬁnal policy based on the com-
mittee proposal. Voting in the ﬂoor on the committee proposal can follow diﬀerent
procedures. In particular, the ﬂoor can operate under the closed or open rule, re-
spectively. Under the closed rule the ﬂoor can only vote on the committee proposal
vis-a-vis the status quo, while under the open rule the ﬂoor can make any amend-
ment to the committee proposal and vote on amended proposals. We assume in the
following that the ﬂoor operates under the closed rule granting agenda setting power
to committee (Krehbiel, 1991). As we show in proposition 2 below, the game has a
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unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, spre.
Proposition 2. Assuming an unidimensional policy choice s, there exists a unique
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for our legislative bargaining game in a presidential
system as deﬁned above. The equilibrium outcome, spre∗, depends on the default
policy outcome, SQ, and the policy preferences of the committee median (CA) and
ﬂoor median (F ).
1. In equilibrium policy choice, spre, results from the following maximization:
spre = arg max
s
UCA(s) s.t. s ∈ SF (3.5)
with SF =
{
s ∈ S|UF (s) ≥ UF (SQ)} (3.6)
2. In particular, it holds that the outcome of the legislative bargaining game corre-
sponds to the minimal distance between the ideal point of the committee median
CA and the interval
[
s−2 , s
+
2
]
:
spre = arg min
s
∥∥Y CA − s∥∥ s.t. s ∈ [s−2 , s+2 ] (3.7)
where s−2 = Y
F − ∥∥Y F − SQ∥∥ and s+ = Y F + ∥∥Y F − SQ∥∥.
Proof: see appendix.
3.2.3 Voter behavior
An individual incumbent g ∈ Pinc is re-elected in a generic voting district d. In
principle, a voter votes for an incumbent, if the utility she has derived under the im-
plemented policy s is higher than her speciﬁc reservation utility. However, beyond
economic welfare derived under observed policies, W J(s), voters care for another
dimension, which generally is referred to as ideological preferences for parties, al-
though this dimension could include other characteristics of parties or candidates,
e.g. competence or appearance. The crucial point is that ideological preferences are
exogenous in the sense that ideology is a permanent attribute of parties, i.e. cannot
be changed at will during election campaign (see Persson and Tabellini, 2000).
In this paper, we do not further analyze ideological preferences of voters; we
only assume that ideological preferences can be subdivided into three components:
a group-speciﬁc relative importance of ideology compared to economic well-being,
KJ ; a voter speciﬁc component µjd, a district speciﬁc δd and a national component
δ. Thus, a voter j ∈ J votes for the incumbent g, if the utility she observes under
the agricultural policy s is higher than a speciﬁc reservation utility, W¯ J , corrected
by the ideological preferences for the incumbent party Pinc:
W J(s) > W¯ J +KJ(µjd + δd + δ − hCinc). (3.8)
Parameters µjd, δd and δ can take negative and positive values and measure the
ideological bias of voter j toward the opposition party Popp. A positive value implies
that voter j has a bias in favor of party Popp. We assume that all three components
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are mutually independent, and that the number of voters in any given district is
large enough to permit the application of the law of large numbers. Without loss of
generality, both district and voter speciﬁc components have zero means, representing
deviations from the nationwide average.
The voter-speciﬁc ideological preferences are uncertain at the time political agents
have to make their policy decisions. In detail, we assume that the distribution of
the voter speciﬁc preferences µjd within each district is uniform distributed on the
interval
[
− 1
2χ
,+ 1
2χ
]
. Thus, the parameter χ fully characterizes the distribution of
ideological preferences in an electoral district6.
Moreover, we assume that the relative importance of ideology KJ diﬀers across
groups. Note that assuming a diﬀerent relative importance of ideological preferences
implies that groups generally diﬀer in their eﬀective ideological homogeneity, i.e. have
diﬀerent eﬀective densities φJ = χ
KJ
. Thus, it results that the group with the lower
weight KJ < KI is more ideologically homogeneous than the other, i.e. φJ > φI .
Voters are swayed by campaign spending Cinc. These may reﬂect the inﬂuence
of election advertisements, or other eﬀorts made to mobilize support, e.g. election
rallies, door-to-door visits by campaign workers, etc.. Please note that we assume
that voters are only swayed by campaign spending to the extend voters base their
vote on ideological preferences, i.e. KJh where h > 0 is the eﬀectiveness of campaign
spending in securing votes from group J . Of course, the eﬀectiveness of campaign
spending of the governmental party, Cinc, also depends on the campaign spending
of the opposition party. For example, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2002) assume that
voters preferences for the governmental party depends on the diﬀerence in campaign
spending of the governmental and opposition party, i.e. h(Cinc−Copp). However, to
simplify our analyses, we implicitly include the impact of campaign spending of the
opposition party, in the groups' reservation utility W¯ J .
3.2.4 Electoral competition and legislators' preferences in a local district
The simplest case of election is the one where only one candidate is elected in a
district. However, depending on electoral rules the number of candidates elected in
a single district can also be higher than one. In comparative politics the number of
candidates to be elected in a voting district is deﬁned as district size (Lijphart, 1984).
Based on the district size scholars of comparative politics deﬁne proportional rep-
resentation (PR) and a majoritarian election systems (MS) as ideal-typical election
systems.7
Focusing on the district size, PR systems are characterized by candidates that are
elected in one multiple-member national electoral district, while pure majoritarian
systems are characterized by one-member districts. Thus, denoting the total number
6This assumption implies that votes shares are linear functions of policy based utilities, which
greatly simpliﬁes our analysis.
7Beyond district size an electoral system is commonly deﬁned via the following two additional
components: electoral formula, i.e., the mechanism by which cast votes are transformed into
parliamentary seats; and the electoral threshold, i.e., the minimum number of votes a party
has to receive to be represented in the parliament (Lijphart, 1984). However, in this paper we
focus analysis on district size.
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of parliamentary seats by n, PR systems correspond to one national district with a
district size of n, while pure MS-systems correspond to n districts with a district
size of 1.
Accordingly, mixed electoral systems are characterized by multiple multi-member
districts with a district size 1 < k < n (Lijphart, 1984)8.
Consider ﬁrst the case of the reelection of one incumbent g ∈ Pinc in a single
district d with district size k = 1.
Political agents know the distribution of the group-speciﬁc ideological component
φJ when they decide on agricultural policy, while the electoral uncertainty derives
from the uncertainty of the national and regional component, δd+δ. The parameter
δd + δ measures the average popularity of party Popp in comparison to party Pinc in
district d. The ideological party preferences of voters may arise from incumbency,
personal characteristics of candidates nominated by diﬀerent parties, or random
events that cause voters to evaluate past policy positions diﬀerently, e.g. events in
ﬁnancial markets or foreign countries (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2002). These events
occur between the time government formulates and implements its' policy and the
time the next election take place. Hence the voter swings can be predicted neither
by parties nor by lobbies when deciding on their policy platforms and campaign
spending. Therefore, they render election outcomes inherently uncertain.
Regarding the distribution of the sum of the regional and national popularity
shock,δd+δ, we make no further assumptions, with exception for the support of δ and
δd being bounded suitable relative to the support of the voter speciﬁc shocks. This
enables us to avoid corner solutions for vote shares. Therefore, following Bardhan
and Mookherjee (2002) we assume that voter speciﬁc shocks are widely enough
dispersed, i.e. χ is close enough to zero. Then for the range of governmental policy
there will always be people in each district who will vote for any given party ensuring
interior vote shares.
Given the assumption above, the total vote share candidates of an incumbent
party Pinc receive in district d after regional and national ideological shocks as well
as campaign spending have been realized follows as:
Πd = ω
inc
d − χ [δd + δ] +
1
2
, (3.9)
where ωincd (s
inc
d , C
inc) =
∑
J
αJdφ
J(W J(sincd )− W¯ J) + χhCinc.
Now, assuming only one candidate is elected in the district d implies that the ex
ante probability of the incumbent to be reelected is given by:
Gδ
(
ωincd
χ
)
≡ Prob [ωincd − χ (δd + δ) ≥ 0] (3.10)
where Gδ is the distribution function of δd + δ and is a strictly increasing function
of the electoral strategy of the incumbent party, ωincd .
8Normalization delivers an election system index corresponding to a normalized relative district
size, RDS = k−1n−1 , measuring the extent to which a given system corresponds to a pure PR
or a pure MS-system, respectively. In particular, this index is 0 for MS systems and 1 for PR
systems.
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Each incumbent's objective is assumed to be maximizing the probability of be-
ing reelected. Accordingly, incumbent gd's behavior can be represented simply by
maximization of weighted sum of the welfare of the voting groups J represented in
district d and campaign spending (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2002):∑
J
αJdφ
J(W J(sincd )− W¯ J) + hCinc (3.11)
Accordingly, maximizing his expected probability of re-election in district d an
incumbent's gd preferred policy platform, Y gd , results from maximizing an additive
social welfare function (SWFd) taking the groups' reservation utilities as well as the
campaign spending as given:
SWFd(s) =
∑
J
βJdW
J(s) (3.12)
where the weight of group J ′s welfare equal β¯Jd = α
J
dφ
J .
As will be shown in detail below, the level of campaign spending depends on
lobbying strategies at the national level.
Assuming that more than one candidate is elected in the district d, i.e. a district
size of k > 1, does not change an incumbent's behavior as long as we assume that
all candidates of party Pinc running for election in the k-member district dk have
the same chance, 1
k
, to get a parliamentary seat won by party Pinc in this district.
Under this assumption the re-election probability of a majority member g ∈ Pinc is
given by:
1
k
k∑
r=1
Gδ
(
1
χ
(
ωincdk −
r
k
))
≡ 1
k
k∑
r=1
Prob
[
ωincdk − χ
(
δdk + δ +
1
2
)
≥ r
k
]
(3.13)
Therefore, it follows directly that all incumbents running for election in a multi-
member district dk, i.e. k > 1, prefer the same party platform that results from the
maximization of an additive social welfare function taking the groups' reservation
utilities as well as the campaign spending as given, where the weight of a group
J equals βJdk = α
J
dk
φJ , where αJdk denotes the population share of group J in the
district dk with district size k = 1, ..., n.
Hence, legislators' agricultural policy preferences crucially depend on the demo-
graphically composition of their constituency as well as on relative ideological pref-
erences of agricultural and non-agricultural voter groups, KA/KM . In particular,
these relations are summarized in proposition 3.
Proposition 3. Let U gd(s) denote the agricultural policy preferences of a legislator
gd who is reelected in the electoral district d
9. Then the following holds:
(i) U gd(s) is a strictly single-peaked function, where legislators' ideal point result
as: Y gd = argmax
s
SWFd(s) = argmax
s
∑
J
βJdW
J(s), with βJd = α
J
dφ
J
9For notational convenience we drop the index k in proposition, while it is clear that proposition
3 applies for a district with any district size d
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(ii) ∂Y
(gd)
∂αAd
> 0
(iii) ∂Y
(gd)
∂K
M
KA
> 0
(iv) Y gd > 0 if and only if it holds: KM > KA ∨ αAd
αMd
> α
A
αM
(v) Y gd < 0 if and only if it holds: KM < KA ∨ αAd
αMd
< α
A
αM
Proof: see appendix.
3.2.4.1 Multiple districts and heterogeneity of legislators' preferences
Consider an electoral system comprising nk districts with nk = 1, ...., n. Keeping the
number of parliamentary seats n constant implies an average district size of k = n
nk
.
Thus, assuming nk > 1 and demographically heterogeneous electoral districts
implies that legislators have heterogeneous policy preferences. To cover the hetero-
geneity of electoral districts in our model, we use a common approach in electoral
studies (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). We divide the population in classes of individuals
who share characteristics that predominantly aﬀect their vote. In particular, beyond
employment in the agricultural and non-agricultural sector, respectively, we further
assume that generally living conditions in urban versus rural living areas impact on
voting behavior. We diﬀerentiate two types of districts, rural districts DR and urban
districts DU , where the population share of the agricultural voter group αAd is higher
for rural and lower for urban districts when compared to the national population
share. Accordingly, the relative weight of the agricultural voter group βAd , is higher
implying a higher preferred subsidization level of a legislator being reelected in a
rural when compared to a legislator being reelected in an urban district. Let Y uk
and Y rk denote the ideal points of urban and rural legislators, respectively, for an
electoral system k, it holds for any electoral system k: Y rk − Y uk ≥ 0.
Consider now the case that district size increases. The larger the district size the
lower ceteris paribus the number of electoral districts and hence the larger is c.p.
the voting population of an electoral district. Accordingly, with increasing district
size k, the voting population of an individual district approximates the demographic
composition of the society. Hence, for a given society electoral districts become
demographically more homogeneous with an increased district size. Formally, we
capture this observation in the following assumption:
Let the index dk denote an electoral district of size k corresponding to the electoral
system k = 1, ..., n, then we assume the following property:
αAdk ≤ αAd(k−1) ∀ dk ∈ DRk and αAdk ≥ αAd(k−1) ∀ dk ∈ DUk . (3.14)
where αAdk is the agrarian population share in district dk , while D
R
k and D
U
k are
the corresponding sets of rural and urban districts deﬁned for the electoral system
k, respectively.
Because agrarian population shares in rural and urban districts, respectively, con-
verge to the national share with increasing district size k, the ideal points of rural and
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urban legislators converge toward a common national level with increasing district
size:
Y rk ≥ Y rk+1 and Y uk ≤ Y uk+1 and Y un = Y rn = Yn (3.15)
Moreover, let Ωrk denote the share of rural districts, while Ω
u
k = 1 − Ωrk is the
corresponding share of urban districts.
3.2.4.2 Electoral competition and lobbying at the national level
In contrast to a majority member, the PM is only re-elected as the head of govern-
ment if party Pinc wins the election, thus only if party Pinc wins the majority of total
seats. The simplest case to derive the re-election probability of the PM is to assume
a PR-system, i.e. all candidates are elected in one national n-member district. In
this case, the vote share of the incumbent party just results as:
ΠPM = ω
inc
n − χ [δd + δ] +
1
2
, (3.16)
where ωincn (s
inc
n , C
inc) =
∑
J
αJφJ(W J(sincn )− W¯ J) + hCinc.
Accordingly, the probability that party Pinc wins the national elections is Gδ (ωincn )
and hence political behavior of the incumbent party leader PM results from the
maximization of the following weighted sum of a social welfare function for the total
society, SWFn(s) and campaign spending:∑
J
αJφJ(W J(s)− W¯ J) + χhCinc (3.17)
With regard to campaign spending, the model assumes that there exist two lob-
bying groups representing the agricultural and the non-agricultural population, re-
spectively. For each group, frJ is an exogenous fraction that contributes ﬁnancially
to their corresponding lobby group, while remaining members of this group free-ride
on contributions.
Following the seminal model of Grossman (1994), the lobby game is as follows.
First, both lobby groups oﬀer nonnegative contribution schedules CincA (s) and C
inc
M (s),
to the party leader of the incumbent party, PM . Then, the PM selects a policy
to maximize the national vote share of her party, i.e. the PM selects a policy that
maximizes
SWFn(s) + h
∑
J
CincJ (s). (3.18)
Following Grossman (1994), we assume truthful strategies, i.e. interest group J 's
contribution schedule CincJ (s) correspond to the expected utility of lobby J's con-
tributing members derived from the policy s. Hence, it follows in equilibrium that
support schedules oﬀered by the interest group J result as:
CincJ (s) = frJα
JhW J(s) +RJ , (3.19)
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where RJ is a constant determined in equilibrium Grossman (1994).10
Overall, policy choices of the PM including lobbying follow from maximization of
this SFWPM (see Grossman, 1994):
SWFPM(s) =
∑
J
βJPM(s)W
J(s)
βJPM = αJ
θJ
θn
+ h
θn
frJ
1+ h
θn
FR
FR =
∑
J
αJfrJ
(3.20)
From the perspective of the PM , the relevant political weights of a voter group
J βJPM deviate from their corresponding population shares αJ : (i) the larger the
ideological preferences of the groups, i.e. the larger the absolute diﬀerence between
KA and KM and (ii) the higher free-riding varies across groups. Lower ideological
preferences and lower free-riding imply c.p. a relative higher political weight of a
group. Moreover, the more eﬃcient political campaigning (the higher h) and the
higher average ideological preferences of voters (the lower θn), the more important
is eﬀective lobbying for the political representation of a group.
In particular, following the seminal theory of Olson (1965) the problem of free-
riding inherent in the agrarian and non-agrarian voter group, respectively, is corre-
lated with the relative size of these population groups. Relative small groups have
c.p. a lower free-riding population. Moreover, Lohmann (1998) nicely demonstrated
that the relative importance of ideological preferences is also correlated with relative
group size, where relative small voter groups are c.p. better informed and hence put
a lower weight on ideological preferences when casting their votes.
Please note that we assume that the lobbying game is played between the party
leader and the lobbying group, while individual party members may free-ride on
agreements made by their party leader with the lobbying groups. Formally, the
latter follows from the fact that individual incumbents gd ∈ Pinc consider campaign
distributions as exogenous when deriving their preferred policy platform from the
maximization of their reelection probability in their electoral district d.
Hence, even for the simplest case, assuming national election is organized in a
PR-system, the PM has diﬀerent policy preferences when compared to her regular
party members as long as lobbying takes place. Technically, this follows from the
fact that the PM derives his policy choices from maximizing the welfare function
SWFPM , while all other legislators derive their preferences from maximizing the
welfare function SWFn. For the latter, diﬀerent relative weights of groups result
when compared to the former if lobbying takes place.
While a PR-system will be used for small countries, large countries normally elect
their representatives in more than one electoral district. For example, the United
States as well as United Kingdom have a pure majority system, while many other
countries use a mixed electoral system, 1 < k < n. Therefore, we next derive the
political behavior of the majority party leader, PM , assuming the electoral system
corresponds to mixed or a pure majority system k < n. Dealing with this problem is
10Basically, the constant RJ guarantees that the probability of the incumbent party resulting from
the lobbying game including the lobby group J will be at least as high as the corresponding
probability derived from a lobbying game excluding the support schedule of lobbying J . For
details see Grossman (1994).
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tentative (Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2002). Therefore,
following Bardhan and Mookherjee (2002), we introduce further assumptions to sim-
plify our analysis. In particular, we assume that all rural and also all urban districts
are perfectly homogenous, respectively. Moreover, we assume that the number of
districts is large enough to allow the application of the law of large numbers. In par-
ticular, we assume that all districts of the same type are ex ante homogenous with
respect to party loyalty, in the sense that the swing for the incumbent opposition
party Popp in districts d ∈ DR is given by δ+ δr +µd, while it is given by δ+ δu +µd
in districts d ∈ DU . µd is independent and identically distributed across districts,
with zero mean following a uniform distribution on a wide enough range
[− 1
2z
, 1
2z
]
.
Then the vote share of the incumbent party in a district of type ty (where ty = r
indicates rural and ty = u urban districts) results as:
Πty = ω
inc
ty − χ [δty + µd + δ] +
1
2
, (3.21)
Accordingly, the probability that the incumbent party wins at least kr seats, with
0 ≤ kr ≤ k follows as:
Prob
[
Πty ≥ kr
k + 1
]
=
z
χ
[
ωincty − χ [+δd + δ] +
1
2
− kr
k + 1
]
(3.22)
Hence, it follows:
Prob(kr = k) = z
χ
[
ωincty − χ [δty + δ]− kk+1
]
+ 1
2
Prob(kr = 0) = 1
2
− z
χ
[
ωincty − χ [δty + δ]− 1k+1
]
Prob(kr = k − i) = z
χ
[
1
k+1
]
, if 0 < i < k
(3.23)
Under this assumption, the expected number of seats that the incumbent party
wins in a district of type ty results as:
E(kty) =
k∑
i=0
Prob(kr = k − i)(k − i) = k
2
(
1 +
z
χ
[
2
(
ωincty − χ [δty + δ]
)− 1])
(3.24)
Therefore, overall the number of seats the incumbent party wins in a national
election conditional on the national and regional popularity shocks results as:
∑
ty
ΩtyE(k
ty) =
k
2
(
1 +
z
χ
[
2
(∑
ty
(Ωtyω
inc
ty )− χ
∑
ty
(Ωtyδty) + χδ
)
− 1
])
(3.25)
Thus, it follows for the probability that the incumbent party wins the national
election:
Prob
[∑
ty
ΩtyE(k
ty) >
k
2
]
= Gδ
(
1
χ
(∑
ty
Ωtyω
inc
ty −
1
2
))
(3.26)
Hence, assuming an electoral system of a mixed or majoritarian type implies that
political behavior of the incumbent party leader PM results from the maximiza-
tion of the following weighted sum of the social welfare function of a rural district
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SWFr(s) and an urban district SWFu(s) and campaign spending:∑
ty
Ωty
∑
J
αJtyφ
J(W J(s)− W¯ J) + hCinc, (3.27)
where αJty denotes the population share in the district type ty, i.e. a rural and urban
district, respectively. Deﬁning αJPM =
∑
ty
Ωtyα
J
ty implies that the weighted sum of the
rural and urban SWFs can be equivalently represented by SFW PM with the group
weights equal to αJPM . By construction, it always holds α
J
PM = α
J . Accordingly,
ignoring lobbying the PM 's ideal point would always equal the common ideal point
Yn derived for all legislators in a PR-system. Hence, ignoring lobbying the ideal point
of the PM would always take a middle ground between the ideal points derived for
urban and a rural legislators, respectively, assuming a mixed or majority system.
However, incorporating lobbying the policy preferences of the PM result from the
maximization of the following SFW :
SWFPM(s) =
∑
J
βJPM(s)W
J(s)
βJPM = α
J
PM
θJ
θn
+ h
θn
frJ
1+ h
θn
FR
FR =
∑
J
αJPMfrJ
(3.28)
Following the relevant literature, e.g. Persson and Tabellini (2000); Bardhan and
Mookherjee (2002), we have so far derived policy preferences of the PM assuming
that political behavior of the PM can be derived from maximization of the proba-
bility that she is reelected as the head of government. Persson and Tabellini (2000);
Bardhan and Mookherjee (2002) assume that the latter probability corresponds to
the probability that the incumbent party wins the national elections.
In fact, however, winning the national elections is only a necessary, but not a
suﬃcient condition for a PM to be reelected as the head of government. This
follows from the fact that in most parliamentary democracies the head of government
has to be a member of the parliament. Thus, to become reelected as the head
of government two conditions have to be fulﬁlled, the incumbent's party has to
win national elections and the PM has to be reelected in her constituency. Thus,
let Prob1 denote the ﬁrst, while Prob2 denotes the second probability, than the
overall probability of the PM to be reelected as the head of government results as:
Prob1(s)Prob2(s), where it follows from eqs. (3.26) and (3.13):
Prob2(s) = 1
k
k∑
r=1
Gδ
(
1
χ
(
ωincdk − rk
))
Prob1(s) = Gδ
(
1
χ
(∑
ty
Ωtyω
inc
ty − 12
)) (3.29)
Therefore, taking the fact into account that a PM has to be a member of the
parliament implies that political behavior of the PM results from the maximization
of the following weighted sum of a social welfare function SWF PM
′
and campaign
spending:
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∑
ty
Ωty
∑
J
βJPM ′(W
J(s)− W¯ J) + hCinc (3.30)
The social welfare function SFW PM
′
is a weighted sum of the social welfare
function SWF ty corresponding to the maximization of the reelection of a legislator
in an electoral district of type ty, in which the PM is reelected as a member of
parliament, and the social welfare function SWF n(s) corresponding to the reelection
of the incumbent party in national election. The weight of SWF ty just equals
Prob1(Y PM) while the weight of SWF n equals Prob2(Y PM). Thus, the lower the
probability that the PM is reelected in her constituency compared to the probability
that the incumbent party wins the national election the more policy preferences of
the PM are biased towards special interest of her constituency, i.e. rural or urban
interest, respectively. Assuming that based on voters' pure ideological preferences
the probability of the incumbent party to win the national election as well as to win
the majority of seats in the constituency of the PM is higher or equal than one half
implies: Prob1(Y PM) ≥ Prob2(Y PM) 11
Finally, incorporating lobbying, the policy preferences of the PM result from the
maximization of a SFW resulting from eq.(3.28) substituting αJPM by α
J
PM ′
12.
In contrast to SWF PM for SWF PM
′
, the relative political weights βJPM ′k vary
with district size, where the direction of the variation corresponds to the variation
of the corresponding political weights βJtydk derived from electoral competition in the
constituency of the PM assuming a change in district size.
3.2.5 Policy outcomes
Our theoretical considerations imply that electoral rules, namely district size, have
an impact on legislators' policy preferences derived from electoral competition at
national and district level. In this section, we focus our analysis on the question
how or to what extend the impact of district size on agricultural protection is in-
ﬂuenced by the speciﬁc legislative organization in presidential versus parliamentary
systems as well as by lobbying and the demographic composition of a society. Based
on our theory, we are able to identify interaction eﬀects between district size and
political as well as demographic framework constellations. Brieﬂy, these framework
constellations determine whether the relation between district size and agricultural
protection is u-shaped or inverse u-shaped. Further, we show that diﬀerences in
political, economic and demographic framework condition between developing and
industrialized countries, imply diﬀerent patterns of how electoral rules, formal and
informal legislative norms and lobbying impact on agricultural protection levels.
We ﬁrst summarize our main ﬁndings in proposition 4. Afterwards we discuss
major implications for the diﬀerent inﬂuence patterns of formal and informal po-
litical institutions on agricultural protection levels in developing and industrialized
countries, respectively.
11This follows as long as we assume that Gδ is locally concave over the interval [0.5,1]. The latter
holds for example for a logistic or a probit function.
12Please note that in contrast to αJPM the political weights α
J
PM ′ are not a constant, but depend
on the level of agricultural protection, i.e. the SWFPM
′
becomes a non-linear function in s.
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Proposition 4. Consider the society and economy as described above. Let k1, .kt, .kl
denote a sequence of electoral rules characterized by the district size of kt, with:
k1 = 1 < kt <, kl = n. n is the number of parliamentary seats to be elected.
αJdki
denote the share of the voter group J=A,M in district dki, while α
J denotes the
corresponding share of the voter group J in the total population. Based on the relative
population shares districts are subdivided in two types, rural (ty = A) and urban
(ty = M ) districts. Urban districts are characterized by a relative higher share of
non-agrarian population, αMki ≥ αM , and vice versa rural districts are characterized
by a relative higher district share of the agrarian population when compared to the
national share, αAki ≥ αA. Districts of each type are assumed to be demographically
homogenous, where αJdki
= αJdtyki
for dki ∈ Dty. DRki and DUki denote the set of rural
and urban districts for the electoral system ki which are assumed to be non-empty.
Further, let γtyki denote the share of districts of type ty for the electoral system ki.
In particular, we assume that the demographic composition of districts approxi-
mates the national demographic composition with increasing district size, i.e.:
αMk1 > α
M
k2
> .... > αMki > α
M
k(i+1)
> αMkl = α
M
αAk1 < α
A
k2
< .... < αAki < α
A
k(i+1)
< αAkl = α
A (3.31)
Moreover, deﬁne PS, POP as binary variables, where PS =′ 0′ indicates a par-
liamentary system and PS =′ 1′ indicates a presidential system while POP =′ 0′
indicates a rural society, i.e. αA > αM and vice versa POP =′ 1′ indicates an
urban society, i.e. αA < αM . Following the famous theory of Olson (1965) it re-
sults for POP = 0 a lower free-rider problem for the non-agricultural lobby group,
i.e.frM > frA, awhile vice-versa for urban societies POP = 1 the agricultural lobby
group observes a lower free-rider problem when compared to the non-agricultural
group, i.e. frM < frA
13.
Let s∗kt(PS, POP ) denote the agricultural policy outcome resulting in equilibrium
of the legislative bargaining game assuming a policy system PS and a demographic
composition POP . Then it holds:
(i) For any political system (PS) the relation between district size, ki, and agri-
cultural protection level, s∗ki, corresponds to one of the following two regimes
depending on the demographic composition of society:
If POP = 0 the following u-shape relation R1 results:
R1. U-shape relation: it exists a 1 ≤ ki#(PS, POP ) ≤ n such that it
holds: [
s∗ki ≥ s∗ki+1 ∀ki < ki# and s∗ki ≤ s∗ki+1 ∀ki ≥ ki#
]
If POP = 1 the following inverse u-shape relation R1 results:
13Basically, this assumption excludes empirically irrelevant cases from our theoretically analysis
and hence makes our analysis more traceable. For interested reader analysis of the excludes
cases is also available from the authors upon request.
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R2. Inverse u-shape relation: it exists a 1 ≤ ki#(PS, POP ) ≤ n such
that it holds:[
s∗ki ≤ s∗ki+1 ∀ki < ki# and s∗ki ≥ s∗ki+1 ∀ki ≥ ki#
]
(ii) Special cases:
Monotonic decreasing relation: A monotonic decreasing relation be-
tween district size and agricultural protection level results as a special
case of the u-shape or inverse u-shape relation in a parliamentary system
PS = 0, if for POP = 0 the party leader is reelected in an agricultural
district or if for POP = 1 a PM reelected in a rural district observes a
perfect party discipline of her party members. Analogously a monotonic
decreasing relation results for presidential systems PS = 1, if POP = 0
and the agricultural committee median (CA) is reelected in a rural dis-
trict or if POP = 1 and a rural committee median exerts perfect agenda
setting power vis-a-vis the urban dominated ﬂoor, i.e. SQ is suﬃciently
larger than Yn.
Monotonic increasing relation: A monotonic increasing relation be-
tween district size and agricultural protection level results as a special
case of the u-shape or inverse u-shape relation in a parliamentary system
PS = 0, if for POP = 1 the party leader is reelected in a urban district or
if for POP = 0 a PM reelected in a urban district observes a perfect party
discipline of her party members. Analogously, a monotonically increasing
relation results for presidential systems PS = 1, if POP = 1 and the
agricultural committee median (CA) is reelected in a urban district or if
POP = 0 and a urban committee median exerts perfect agenda setting
power vis-a-vis the rural dominated ﬂoor, i.e. SQ is suﬃciently smaller
than Yn.
Constant relation A constant relation applying that district size has no
impact on agricultural protection levels results as a special case of u-shape
and inverse u-shape relations only for the presidential system (PS=1).
The latter is the case if a gridlock situation occurs, i.e. SQ = Yn, and
for POP = 0 the agricultural committee median is reelected in an urban
district or for POP = 1 the committee median is reelected in a rural
district.
Proof: see appendix.
Overall, our theory has many interesting implications for the impact of electoral
rules on the pattern of agricultural protection in developing and industrialized coun-
tries that go far beyond the well-known development paradox.
First, since for industrialized countries the share of the agrarian population is
below 50% for this country type generally a R2-regime results, i.e. an inverse u-
shape relation between agricultural protection and district size should be observed.
In contrast, for developing countries both a u-shape relation and an inverse u-shape
relation should be observed. The former should be observed for developing countries
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for which the agrarian population is still the majority, while the latter should be
observed for developing countries with an agrarian population share below 50%.
Please note that the impact of electoral rules on agricultural protection levels
across country types is generally independent from the absolute level of protection.
As explained within our theory, the absolute level, in particular if a net-tax or net-
subsidy regime results, depends on the relative importance of ideological voting,
i.e. Yn < 0 if KA > KM and vice-versa Yn > 0 if KA > KM . Lohmann (1998)
already state that ideological voting is correlated with demographic compositions.
That is we assume KA > KM , if and only if POP = 0. According to our theory, it
follows that the probability to observe a net-taxation of agriculture is comparatively
higher for developing countries with an agrarian population share above 50%, while
it continuously decreases with the share of the non-agricultural population and hence
net-subsidization is the dominant regime for industrialized countries.
Second, it exists a strong interaction between the impact of electoral rules on the
one hand and formal and informal organization of legislature as well as lobbying on
the other hand, where these interaction eﬀect, at least partly, diﬀer systematically
for developing when compared to industrialized countries.
In particular, a constant relation, i.e. no impact of electoral rules on protection,
can only be expected for a presidential system, while for parliamentary systems
agricultural protection should always vary with district size, though eﬀects might be
rather small, if party discipline is low, but not zero. Interestingly, gridlock occurs
in developing countries only if the agricultural committee is dominated by urban
interests, while on the contrary gridlock occurs in industrialized countries only if the
agricultural committee is dominated by rural interest. Following the seminal contri-
bution of Weingast and Marshall (1988) to the political exchange theory, it follows
that gridlock only results if legislators engage in political exchange implying that
in developing countries urban legislators have a relative higher interest to control
agricultural protection when compared to rural legislators and hence have higher
incentives to sit in the agricultural committee. Vice-versa in industrialized coun-
tries rural legislators have a relative higher interest to subsidize agriculture when
compared to their urban colleagues and hence have higher incentives to control the
agricultural committee. For example, for the USA there is convincing empirical
evidence that the agricultural committee is dominated by rural interests (see Wein-
gast and Marshall, 1988; Krehbiel, 1991). Therefore, a gridlock situation implying
no impact of district size on agricultural protection can only occur in presidential
systems where legislators engage in an informal non-market organization of polit-
ical exchange as described by Weingast and Marshall (1988). Since an informal
non-market organization of political exchange implies a speciﬁc level of trust among
legislators, one would expect this form of cooperation to oocur with a higher prob-
ability within older democracies. Accordingly, if empirically a gridlock and hence
no impact of electoral rules on agricultural protection levels will be observed, this
should be especially the case in industrialized countries, but far less in developing
countries.
If we exclude informal political exchange, the committee and the ﬂoor median are
both elected in the same type of district, which will be a rural district in developing
and an urban district in industrialized countries. Therefore, in both country types
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policy preferences of the ﬂoor and committee medians will have the same contour
with regard to district size. The relation is monotonically increasing for industrial-
ized and monotonically decreasing for developing countries14.
Thus, excluding political exchange and regardless of the concrete governmental
system, we derive from theory for industrialized that the agricultural sector is less
protected in countries with pure majority systems when compared to countries with
a pure PR-system and for developing countries with an agrarian population share
above 50% that agricultural protection levels are c.p. higher under a pure majority
when compared to a pure PR-system.
Further, strong non-monotonic relations between district size and agricultural
protection only result if legislative organization is characterized by informal polit-
ical exchange. For parliamentary systems, a non-market organization of political
exchange, as suggested by Weingast and Marshall (1988) for the presidential system
of the USA, corresponds to the so-called principle of departmental responsibility.
Departmental responsibility describes the fact that decisions within the cabinet are
transferred to the cabinet member who is mainly responsible for a particular policy.
Including the principle of departmental responsibility as a non-market mechanism to
implement political exchange in our model implies assuming that the PM is reelected
in a rural district for POP = 1, and in an urban district for POP = 0. Under these
assumptions it follows that regardless of the governmental system informal political
exchange implies a strong u-shape relation in developing countries, while it implies
a strong inverse u-shape relation in industrialized countries. Please note, however,
that strong monotonic relations only result from political exchange if we assume
that either the agenda setting power of the committee in presidential regimes or the
party discipline in parliamentary regimes is perfect.
Finally, please note that according to our theory, lobbying has no impact on the
speciﬁc relation between district size and agricultural protection levels in develop-
ing and industrialized countries, respectively.15 Lobbying has, however, a signiﬁcant
14Please note that as long as we exclude lobbying activities, policy preferences of the ﬂoor and
committee median are the same if we assume both are reelected in the same district type. Of
course, it is conceivable that lobbying groups inﬂuence directly individual legislators. In fact,
there is convincing empirical evidence for lobbying activities on individual legislators for the
United States. However, including lobbying of individual legislators would only imply that
legislators reelected in the same district type have diﬀerent ideal points, but the change of ideal
points induced by a diﬀerent district size would still be the same. Therefore, the fact that we
de facto excluded lobbying inﬂuence on agricultural policy for presidential systems to simplify
our analysis has no impact on our main results regarding the relation between district size
and protection levels. It has of course an impact on the absolute protection levels resulting in
equilibrium. But here our main argument is that compared to parliamentary systems lobbying
is less eﬀective in presidential systems due to the fact that individual legislators have no party
discipline as a mechanism to reduce free-riding among legislators.
15This basically follows from our assumption that the relative strength of agrarian and non-agrarian
lobbying groups is determined by the relative size of these groups. If we drop this assumption,
lobbying would also have an impact on the regime implied for the relation between electoral
rules and agricultural protection. Interestingly, also other non-monotonic regimes beyond u-
shape and inverse u-shape relations could result. Given the unique theoretical support (Olson,
1965; Becker, 1983) and the strong empirical evidence (Tyers and Anderson, 1992; Swinnen
et al., 2000a) for the strong correlation of relative group size and relative strength of lobbying,
we do not present these results here. These are available from the authors up-on request.
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impact on the absolute level of protection following our theory. This result has
a positive implication for the empirical testing of our theory, because the relative
strength of lobbying groups can hardly be observed. Hence, testing our main the-
oretical implications regarding the impact of district size on agricultural protection
levels, the problem of unobservable heterogeneity due to imperfectly observed lob-
bying strength becomes far less severe. The latter follows from the fact that our
main hypotheses apply to the contour how protection levels vary with district size
and this contour is independent from lobbying activities.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
3.3.1 Data
Since our theory is based on democratic institutions, we select a sample of countries
with clear democratic status for our empirical analysis. To judge about the demo-
cratic status of a country, Freedom House (2008) and Eckstein and Gurr (1975)
provide two diﬀerent but highly correlated measures of democracy. As the latter
data set provides for a consistent measure for more years and countries than the
ﬁrst, we choose the measures polity and polity2 of Eckstein and Gurr (1975) to
select our country-year observations. Both indicators measure the net-authority
quality of a country on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 to +10. Thus, these mea-
sures summarize autocratic and democratic characteristics of governing institutions
to one index with higher values indicating better democracies. In a ﬁrst step, we
deﬁne a democratic country by a polity2 -score above zero according to the deﬁnition
given by Eckstein and Gurr (1975). However, as this deﬁnition would also include
countries in our sample that are relatively unstable democracies, we use further a
combination of a smoothed ﬁve-year average of polity and the polity2 -score to ﬁlter
unstable democratic countries. Countries are included into our sample if the ﬁve-
year average is greater or at least equal to 1 and if polity2 is greater than zero.16
In addition to autocratic countries and unstable democracies, the sample excludes
countries belonging to the European Union, because the European Common Agri-
cultural Policy (CAP) is negotiated at the supranational level by EU institutions
thus not meeting the prerequisites of our theoretical approach (see e.g. Henning and
Krampe 2012). Member states are dropped from the sample even one year before
accession to consider policy decisions due to the approaching EU accession. Further,
countries that just control one agricultural sector, in this case their cotton sector,
by policy interventions are not considered for analyzing the impacts of political in-
stitutions on general agricultural policy, i.e. Benin, Togo, Burkina Faso, Chad and
Mali are excluded from our analysis.
We use the Nominal Rate of Assistance to Agriculture (NRA), which is an ad-
vanced measure of agricultural protection provided by Anderson and Valenzuela
(2008), as dependent variable. The NRA is calculated as a weighted average of
commodity-speciﬁc NRAs using the undistorted production values of the commodi-
ties as weights. In general, the NRA is the unit value of production at the distorted
16As polity2 is not reported for Iceland, we refer to the Gastil-Index by Freedom House (2008)
that deﬁnes Iceland as a democracy.
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price less its value at the undistorted price expressed as a fraction of the undistorted
price. Analogously to the commonly used Producer Support Estimate (PSE) pub-
lished yearly by the OECD, the NRA includes indirect market interventions such as
direct transfer payments. Further it considers exchange rates distortions. This new
data set allows for expanding the analysis of the ﬁrst published paper by Henning
(2008), because the data set by Anderson (2008) covers about 75 countries since
1955.
Related to our main theoretical conclusions, we deﬁne the following three electoral
systems based on the principle of district size: (1) a majoritarian system where only
one legislator gets elected in a district, (2) a mixed system where on average 2 up to
9.9 legislators are elected per district and (3) a proportional representation system
where 10 or more legislators get elected per district on average in a country. This
results in three binary indicator variables maj,mix, and prop, where maj=1 indi-
cates a majoritarian, mix = 1 a mixed system and prop=1 proportional electoral
rule. Note that maj = prop=0 if mix=1. Information on district size is taken from
data sets of Lundell and Karvonen (2003) and of Beck et al. (2001). The data sets
are supplemented by data of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2008). Such a classiﬁ-
cation particularly allows analyzing the impact of an intermediate system between a
pure majoritarian and a pure proportional representation system on special interest
politics. As the form of government is another determinant of agricultural protec-
tion due to our theory, formgov is used to indicate whether a country's constitution
provides for a presidential system (formgov=1) or not. Again we use data provided
by Beck et al. (2001) and Lundell and Karvonen (2003).
Further, as our theory predicts that agricultural protection will depend on unob-
served latent policy regimes, we use two variables for estimating the probability that
agricultural policy decisions in a country are inﬂuenced by a speciﬁc latent policy
regime. Such a latent regime is determined by the strength of agricultural interest
groups. Thereby we follow Olson (1965) and use the logarithm of agricultural share
in employment (emplln) to account for ability of farmers in diﬀerent countries to
organize and to lobby for political support. In addition to this, we employ a variable
indicating the agricultural share in value-added (agrivalue) to reﬂect the farmer's
incentive to organize for income redistribution. Data on these selection variables
is provided by the database of World Development Indicators and by the database
of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAOSTAT, 2008;
World Bank, 2008).
We follow the standard literature on the political economy of agricultural pro-
tection for selecting interesting controls (see Beghin and Kherallah, 1994; Swinnen
et al., 2000a; Swinnen, 1994; Balisacan and Roumasset, 1987; Olper, 2001; Tyers
and Anderson, 1992; Anderson, 2008). Data on economic and sociodemographic
controls are taken from the database of World Development Indicators by the World
Bank and from the database of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAOSTAT, 2008; World Bank, 2008). Thus, our set of controls includes
the initial gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (initialgdppc) and the real GDP
per capita growth (gdppcgrowth) to capture in combination the state of economic
development, the ratio of agricultural share in value-added and agricultural share in
employment (compad) to proxy comparative advantages in agriculture and arable
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land and land under permanent crops per farm worker (factorend) to take the rel-
ative incomes of agricultural farmers into account. We further include the share
of agricultural exports in total merchandise exports (tax_agri) to consider the tax
collection constraints that governments face especially in developing countries to
provide e.g. public goods. Following Beghin and Kherallah (1994) we deﬁne bud-
get as the net agricultural export per capita in order to account for governmental
budget constraints that depend on the country's agricultural net trade position.
Furthermore we use the logarithm of agricultural share in employment (emplln) to
account for diﬀerences in economic structure and industrialization that reﬂect the
ability of farmers to organize and to lobby for political support. To account for in-
ternational agreements inﬂuencing domestic producer support, we include a period
dummy urround. urround is one for high income countries after 1994 with high in-
come countries deﬁned by an Human Development Index above 0.8 (United Nations
Development Program, 2008) and zero otherwise.
Overall, our sample corresponds to unbalanced time-series cross-section data in-
cluding 52 countries with an average time period of 20 years per country. Summary
statistics of all variables are presented in Table 2.2.
Table 3.1: List of variables
Variable Mean Std. dev. Deﬁnition
NRA 0.365 0.737 Nominal rate of assistance
formgov 0.393 0.489 Form of government
maj 0.364 0.481 Electoral system: single-member districts
mix 0.384 0.487 Electoral system: 2-9.9 members/district
prop 0.254 0.435 Electoral system: ≥ 10 members/district
gdppcgrowth 2.427 3.696 Annual growth of real GDP per capita
initialgdppc 10.011 8.459 GDP in ﬁrst available period for country i
emplln -1.756 0.947 Log. of agr. share in eco. active population
compad 0.600 0.289 Comparative advantage of agr. sector
budget 0.023 0.262 Netto agricultural trade position to GDP
factorend 0.119 0.240 Relative income of farmers
tax_agri 23.699 24.195 Agr. exports in total merchandise exports
urround 0.384 0.487 Post-Uruguay round dummy
agrivalue 13.195 11.130 Agr. share in value added
Source: Summary statistics are calculated by authors based on diﬀerent data sets.
3.3.2 Estimation Strategy
We use the following static regression model for testing the prediction of theory
concerning the inﬂuence of institutions with respect to agricultural protection,
pit = βxit + γyit + it, i = 1, . . . , N, t = S(i), . . . , T (i), (3.32)
where pit denotes the measure of agricultural protection, xit denotes the set of in-
stitutional variables, yit a set of macroeconomic control variables. The indexation
refers to an unbalanced panel, where S(i) denotes the ﬁrst observation available for
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country i and T (i) denotes the last. Since the correct assessment of the inﬂuence of
the institutional variables on the policy outcome critically depends on the dynamic
speciﬁcation of the regression model as noted by Beck and Katz (1996), we provide
speciﬁcation tests on issues of dynamics within the more general framework
pit = βxit + γyit + ϕpit−1 + κyit−1 + it, i = 1, . . . , N, t = S(i), . . . , T (i),(3.33)
where the inclusion of the lagged dependent and the lagged control variables allow
for a general form of ﬁrst order dynamics as to be necessarily model in the context of
cross-section-time-series data. On the basis of this regression framework, we test for
the dynamic speciﬁcation providing the best representation for the analysis under
consideration. As discussed by Achen (2000) and Beck and Katz (1996), several
dynamic speciﬁcations arise from the general regression model given in Equation
(3.33). Under the restriction
ϕγ + κ = 0 (3.34)
the dynamic speciﬁcation is terms of a common factor approach. The common factor
dynamics can also be modeled via serially correlated errors
it = ρit−1 + uit, where uit ∼ N (0, σ2). (3.35)
Testing for this common factor approach is performed via generalized Wald test of
the restriction given in Equation (3.34), described in Harvey (1992). Given the test
indicates the validity of the common factor approach, we performed estimation of
this dynamic speciﬁcation on the basis of the Praist-Whinston transformation using
ordinary least squares. Given the common factor approach is rejected, we resort to
modeling dynamics via the lagged dependent variable and test furthermore, whether
a more parsimonious representation is preferred via testing via a F-test for joint
signiﬁcance of the parameters summarized within κ.
The theoretical considerations given above imply for the institutional impact to
depend on an unobserved regime R interpreted as level of agricultural protection.
We consider up to six protection regimes, hence Rit = {0, . . . , L} with L ≤ L¯. As
regimes are unobserved, we model the regression as follows
p
(Rit)
it = α + β(Rit)xit + γyit + it, (3.36)
where Rit is the state variable indicating what kind of protection regime prevails in
country i at time t. Since the current state is not observed, it has to be integrated
out. Hence, assumptions concerning the process of regime states have to be made.17
We assume a time and country speciﬁc mixture. The probability to be in either
17Assuming a Markov process for regime states would be reasonable too, since state dependence
is likely to be present, since a country will not change incidentally among institutional regimes.
This speciﬁcation of latent regimes has been extensively used in the empirical literature on busi-
ness cycle dynamics, see the seminal papers of Hamilton (1989) and Hamilton (1990). However
modeling and estimation of higher number of regimes with Markovian state probabilities is
cumbersome as it runs into a curse of dimensionality since the number of parameters ruling the
transition probabilities is then quadratic in the number of regimes.
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regime is likely to depend on country speciﬁc characteristics captured via variables
zit. The state probabilities are hence modeled to depend on variables zit and take
the form
Pr(Rit = `|zit) = v(`)it , ` = 1, . . . , L. (3.37)
This modeling of state probabilities has been introduced by Diebold et al. (1994).18
To incorporate country speciﬁc characteristics zit explicitly, v
(`)
it is parameterized as
a logit type probabilities
v
(`)
it =
exp{zitφ`}∑L
`=1 exp{zitϕ`}
, ` = 1, . . . , L, (3.38)
where φL is restricted to zero for identiﬁcation reasons. The model is estimated
via Maximum Likelihood on the basis of assuming normally distributed errors it.
Summarizing all parameter as θ = {{β(`)}L`=1, γ, σ, {φ`}L−1`=1 } and all available data
as P,X, Y, Z, the likelihood of the considered model can be written as
L(θ;P,X, Y, Z) =
N∏
i=1
T (i)∏
t=S(i)
f(pit|Pit−1, Xit, Yit, Zit, θ), (3.39)
where Pit denotes the set of all observations {piw}tw=S(i) up to period t for country i
(deﬁne Xit, Yit, and Zit accordingly). Thereby each likelihood contribution at time
t of country i has the form of a ﬁnite mixture with L components
f(pit|Pit−1, Xit, Yit, Zit, θ) = (3.40)
L∑
`=1
exp{zitφ`}∑L
`=1 exp{zitφ`}
1√
2piσ
exp
{
− 1
2σ2
(pit − β`xit − γyit)2
}
,
where φL0 is set for identiﬁcation to a vector of zeros.
As an approach to assess the robustness of estimation results furthermore, we
adapt the strategy described in Beck (2001). Via a cross section experiment, where
estimation is performed N times on the basis of shortened subsample containing
N −1 cross-section members, where one country is dropped, the homogeneity of the
sample is assessed via the in-sample mean squared forecast error (MSFE). Thereby,
the MSFE of the dropped country is compared to the mean of the MSFE's of the
countries employed within the estimation, where approximation conﬁdence bands are
based to multiple of the standard deviation of the MSFE for the countries employed
within estimation. This cross validation experiment allows to investigate, to what
extent the estimation results are possibly driven by single observations or countries.
18Note that this formulation of a mixture is a restricted version of the considered regime switching
model considered within the business cycle literature, which implies state dependence of regime
probabilities.
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3.3.3 Endogeneity of political institutions
There is a consensus among scholars of comparative political economy that polit-
ical institutions and economic performance might be aﬀected by the same factors
(e.g. Acemoglu, 2005; Persson and Tabellini, 2003). Accordingly, the literature
stresses the importance to control for potential endogeneity of political institutions
if the goal is the identiﬁcation of causal eﬀects (see Persson and Tabellini, 2003; Ace-
moglu et al., 2001; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). Especially Persson and Tabellini
(2003) have promoted to solve the endogeneity problem and to identify the causal
eﬀects of political institutions on economic performance via appropriate economet-
ric strategies. A common approach in micro-econometrics to solve endogeneity is
the instrument variable estimation (see Angrist and Krueger, 2001). The critical
part within an IV estimation is to ﬁnd variables that on the one hand are suﬃ-
ciently correlated with the endogenous variable, but not with the error term of the
explained variable, i.e. valid instruments. Otherwise the IV strategy will not solve
the endogeneity problem.
We use the age of democracy, an ethnic fragmentation index by Alesina et al.
(2003) and colonial history as instrument variables. For including an ethnic frag-
mentation index into our instrument variable set, we follow Aghion et al. (2004)
suggesting that social cleavages mainly determine the choice of electoral rules. We
include the age of a democracy, because the choice of political institutions is at least
partly also an epoch phenomenon. The inclusion of colonial history relates to the
fact that colonial rulers highly inﬂuenced the design of constitutions after countries
became independent. To calculate the age of democracy (age) for a speciﬁc country,
we deﬁne the ﬁrst year of democratic rule as the ﬁrst year with a positive smoothed
average of the polity and a positive value of polity2 given that the country stays
continuously in our sample. Then, age is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the ﬁrst
year, where a country is deﬁned as democracy and the year 2008 standardized by
the oldest democracy in our sample, i.e. the United States. Ethnic fragmentation,
ethnic is provided by Alesina et al. (2003). ethnic basically leans on the concept
of a Herﬁndahl index, with greater values referring to a more fragmented popula-
tion. col_uk denotes with 1 British colonial origin, col_espp deﬁnes Spanish or
Portuguese colonial origin with 1.
Table 3.2: Summary statistics: Instrument variables
Variable Mean Std. dev. Deﬁnition
age 0.336 0.263 Age of democracy in a country
col_uk 0.356 0.479 British colonial history
col_espp 0.149 0.356 Spanish/Portuguese colonial history
ethnic 0.377 0.247 Ethnic fragmentation in a country
Source: Calculated by authors based on diﬀerent data sets.
To resolve the problem of endogenous institutions, we consider a two-step ap-
proach.19 Consider xit = {fit, dit}, where fit denotes a binary variable (form of
19Since the macroeconomic character of the data asks for speciﬁcation of (latent) serial correlation
structures, a one-step approach would require the numerical solution of a high dimensional
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government) and dit denotes a ordered categorical variable taking values {0, 1, 2}.
We set up a two equation model given as
g1(fit) = 1x
∗
it = 1zitδ1 + νit, (3.41)
g2(dit) = 2x
∗
it = 2zitδ2 + ξit, (3.42)
with g1(·) and g2(·) being functions of the observed variables given as
1xit =

0, if 1x∗it < 0,
1, if 0 ≤ 1y∗it ≤ %,
2, if 1x∗it > %,
(3.43)
2xit =
{
0, if 2x∗it < 0,
1, if 2x∗it ≥ 0 (3.44)
and (
νit
ξit
)
∼ N
((
0
0
)
,Σ =
(
1 ψ
ψ 1
))
.
Thereby, the range of the errors νit and ξit is restricted as follows
A1 = {(νit, ξit) : − 1zitδ1 ≤ νit,− 2zitδ2 ≥ ξit} if fit = 1, dit = 0,
A2 = {(νit, ξit) : − 1zitδ1 ≥ νit,− 2zitδ2 ≥ ξit} if fit = 0, dit = 0,
A3 = {(νit, ξit) : − 1zitδ1 ≤ νit,− 2zitδ2 ≤ ξit ≤ − 2zitδ2 + %} if fit = 1, dit = 1,
A4 = {(νit, ξit) : − 1zitδ1 ≥ νit,− 2zitδ2 ≤ ξit ≤ − 2zitδ2 + %} if fit = 0, dit = 1,
A5 = {(νit, ξit) : − 1zitδ1 ≤ νit, ξit ≥ 2zitδ2 + κ} if fit = 1, dit = 2,
A6 = {(νit, ξit) : − 1zitδ1 ≥ νit, ξit ≥ 2zitδ2 + κ} if fit = 0, dit = 2.
integration problem within the likelihood. Furthermore, strategies for checking robustness of
estimates are not directly at hand within an one-step approach, or become computationally
burdensome.
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Based on maximum likelihood estimation, where the likelihood function is
L =
N∏
i=1
∏
{t:fit=1,dit=0}
∫∫
A1
1
2pi
|Σ|−.5 exp{−1
2
(
ξit
νit
)
Σ−1
(
ξit νit
)}
∏
{t:fit=0,dit=0}
∫∫
A2
1
2pi
|Σ|−.5 exp{−1
2
(
ξit
νit
)
Σ−1
(
ξit νit
)}
∏
{t:fit=1,dit=1}
∫∫
A3
1
2pi
|Σ|−.5 exp{−1
2
(
ξit
νit
)
Σ−1
(
ξit νit
)}
∏
{t:fit=0,dit=1}
∫∫
A4
1
2pi
|Σ|−.5 exp{−1
2
(
ξit
νit
)
Σ−1
(
ξit νit
)}
∏
{t:fit=1,dit=2}
∫∫
A5
1
2pi
|Σ|−.5 exp{−1
2
(
ξit
νit
)
Σ−1
(
ξit νit
)}
∏
{t:fit=0,dit=2}
∫∫
A6
1
2pi
|Σ|−.5 exp{−1
2
(
ξit
νit
)
Σ−1
(
ξit νit
)}
we calculate expectations of errors as further explaining variables (extended Mills'
ratios) (see Appendix 3.A.5). The probabilities of the bivariate normal distribution
involved within the likelihood function and the expectations are calculated via the
GHK-simulator of Geweke (1989), Hajivassiliou (1990), and Keane (1994) using
trajectories for involved common random numbers (CRN) of size 100, see Greene
(2003) for an introductive review.
3.4 Empirical results
3.4.1 Controlling for endogeneity of political institutions
The estimation results point at signiﬁcant relationships for several determinants of
political institutions. The electoral system as described by district size in this case is
negatively related to British colonial origin and positively to Spanish and Portuguese
colonial origin. This result is line with expectation, because British colonial rulers
installed the electoral system used in their home country, i.e. the majority system, in
their colonies. Ethnic fragmentation and age of democracy are negatively related to
district size. The higher these variables are, the smaller are the district sizes. That is
old democracies choose more frequently majority systems than younger democracies
who tend to adopt mixed or proportional representation systems. In terms of ethnic
fragmentation, countries, which are ethnically diverse, are more likely to choose
single-member district systems than ethnically homogenous countries. This ﬁnding
is in line with Aghion et al. (2004).
With respect to form of government, a Spanish colonial history, ethnic heterogene-
ity, and a great age of democracy increase the likelihood of adopting a presidential
system. An English colonial history decreases the likelihood of a presidential system.
These results are in line with the results by Persson et al. (2003).
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Table 3.3: Results: Endogeneity of political institutions
dit fit
c 1.3292
(12.5649)
−1.1695
(−11.0578)
colonial history (UK) −1.9602
(−17.9853)
−0.1885
(−1.6673)
colonial history (ESP) 0.0570
(0.5308)
4.3178
(3.2654)
ethnic −0.4787
(−2.6094)
1.8334
(9.3927)
age of democracy −0.2614
(−1.3538)
0.0509
(0.2654)
%1 1.2760
(20.5489)

ρ 0.2510
(5.0763)
` -1314.4
Notes: Asymptotic t-statistics are given in parentheses. Source: Authors.
3.4.2 Political institutions and latent protection regimes
Table 3.4 provides the maximum likelihood estimates for the preferred model speci-
ﬁcation containing 6 regimes. Figure 3.4.2 shows the ﬁtted regimes, while Table 3.8
gives the estimated classiﬁcation of each country and time period into the considered
clusters. With respect to factors inﬂuencing the latent class membership, Table 3.6
provides the parameter estimates for logit type state probabilities and corresponding
marginal eﬀects.
We choose the number of latent regimes to describe the inﬂuence of the insti-
tutional settings on the level of agricultural protection via comparing information
criteria providing measures of model ﬁt. Table 3.7 shows the model ﬁtness criteria
for 1 to 7 regimes. Models speciﬁcations are compared using the information cri-
terion of Akaike (AIC), the Schwarz criterion (BIC) and the information criterion
developed by Smith et al. (2006) in the context of Markov-switching models, which
uses the informational content of state probabilities to construct a penalty term to
gauge against overparameterization. The results suggest the use of six latent regimes
to model the inﬂuence of institutions on protection level, where no further latent
regimes where considered as the information criteria do not prefer uniquely more
than 6 regimes.20
The selection in regimes II and IV , which are the two most frequently observed
regimes and correspond to the theoretically predicted u and inverse u shaped inﬂu-
ence of institutional settings, are adversely aﬀected by the employment share and
the value added in agriculture. Thereby, the higher the value added in agriculture
the higher (lower) is the probability to be in regime II (IV ). An opposing relation-
ship is estimated for emplln, where a higher employment share reduces (increases)
the probability for a country to be classiﬁed in regime II (IV ).
The dynamic speciﬁcation testing is solved within the linear regression framework
ignoring the cluster structure.21 The Wald test statistic for testing the common
20Note that the AIC criterion tends to overparametrization as noted by Smith et al. (2006).
21This is due to the analytical intractability of the common factor approach within the mixture
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factor restriction is 18.61 with a corresponding p-value of 0.0049. Hence, the model
contains dynamics, which cannot be adequately represented via autocorrelated resid-
uals. Next issue is to test whether the dynamics can be represented via a lagged
dependent variable alone via testing for joint signiﬁcance of the lagged explanatory
control variables. The corresponding F -test (test statistic 1.6346 with correspond-
ing p-value 0.1343 with F (6, 970)) cannot reject the joint insigniﬁcance of the lagged
explanatory variables. Hence, modeling of the dynamics within the level of agri-
cultural protection is pursued via inclusion of the lagged nominal rate of assistance
(pt−1).
We start with interpreting the standard controls. In particular, following the
development-paradox hypothesis a positive parameter for both initialgdppc and gdp-
pcgrowth is expected. As can be seen from Table 3.4, our model speciﬁcation displays
a positive and signiﬁcant sign for gdppcgrowth and inititalgdppc, which is in line with
the development paradox by Tyers and Anderson (1992). Analogously, the negative
coeﬃcient of factorend corresponds to the relative income hypothesis of Tyers and
Anderson (1992) and de Gorter and Tsur (1991), predicting decreasing rates of assis-
tance with increasing relative income of the agricultural sector. This variable turns
out to be highly statistically signiﬁcant. The estimated budget parameter displays
the correct negative sign following Beghin and Kherallah (1994), who state that
increasing budget expenditures to ﬁnance agricultural protection c.p. reduce protec-
tion levels. The negative sign for the variable compad is in line with the theory and
empirical ﬁnding of Honma and Hayami (1986), where lower comparative advan-
tages in agriculture increase the demand for agricultural protection. However, this
parameter is not statistically signiﬁcant. As predicted by Olson's theory, we ﬁnd a
negative but not signiﬁcant impact of the agricultural employment share, emplln,
on agricultural protection. A low share of employment in agriculture indicates low
costs of collective action for agricultural voter groups due to a decreasing free-riding
problem and, thus, implies ceteris paribus higher agricultural protection. The nega-
tive sign of tax_agri supports the theory that highly export oriented countries will
not protect their agricultural sector. The estimated parameter is highly signiﬁcant.
Finally, we ﬁnd that the Uruguay round negotiations lowered agricultural protection.
But the negative eﬀect is not signiﬁcant.
Now, we turn to our central theory about the impact of political institutions on
agricultural protection. According to our theory, we estimated the impact of the form
of government independently from the underlying latent regimes. Results reveal a
signiﬁcant negative impact of presidential systems on agricultural protection. That
is independent from the latent protection regime and electoral system, presidential
systems favor farmers less than other forms of government. Further results suggest
that the form of government is endogenous, while we found no endogeneity for
electoral rules. For results on the ﬁrst step that controls for this endogeneity, see
Table 3.3.
For the eﬀect of electoral systems on protection rates, we obtain results in line
with our theory. An inverse u-shape is documented for latent regimes III and IV ,
while an u-shaped relationship is estimated for regime II. However, the relationship
is not signiﬁcant for regime II. Inverse u-shapes follow if protection rates under
model.
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Table 3.4: Results: Inﬂuence of political institutions on agricultural protection
variable θ s.e. t-stat. Sandwich s.e. panel rob. t-stat.
pit−1 0.8261∗∗∗ 0.0114 72.6915 0.0312 26.4869
initialgdppc 0.5969∗ 0.1476 4.0445 0.3155 1.8918
gdppcgrowth 0.3460∗∗∗ 0.1069 3.2357 0.1414 2.4475
factorend -0.0812∗∗∗ 0.0310 -2.6150 0.0294 -2.7629
budget -0.0636∗∗ 0.0209 -3.0424 0.0285 -2.2317
compad 0.5170 0.2314 2.2347 0.5605 0.9225
emplln -0.0719 0.1019 -0.7054 0.1507 -0.4769
tax_agri -0.9422∗∗∗ 0.2212 -4.2600 0.1992 -4.7304
formgov -0.1902 0.0984 -1.9324 0.1202 -1.5824
uuround -0.0554 0.0906 -0.6120 0.1306 -0.4244
E[νit] 0.1076
∗ 0.0431 2.4949 0.0566 1.8998
E[ξit] -0.1408 0.0927 -1.5196 0.1160 -1.2137
Regime I (dark blue) # observations in Regime I: 19
maj1I -0.0160 0.0594 -0.2692 0.0447 -0.3579
mix2I 1.0708
∗∗∗ 0.0718 14.9080 0.1196 8.9501
prop3I -0.2766
∗∗∗ 0.0819 -3.3778 0.0919 -3.0108
Regime II (light blue) # observations in Regime II: 182
maj1II -0.0326 0.0303 -1.0769 0.0429 -0.7606
mix2II -0.1090 0.0378 -2.8837 0.0823 -1.3242
prop3II -0.0534 0.0516 -1.0347 0.0576 -0.9271
Regime III (red) # observations in Regime III: 78
maj1III -0.0229 0.0359 -0.6366 0.0389 -0.5876
mix2III 0.3795
∗∗∗ 0.0474 8.0120 0.0766 4.9521
prop3III 0.0895 0.0551 1.6252 0.0788 1.1358
Regime IV (green) # observations in Regime IV : 748
maj1IV -0.0161 0.0167 -0.9601 0.0255 -0.6303
mix2IV 0.0251
∗∗∗ 0.0118 2.1290 0.0121 2.0794
prop3IV 0.0168 0.0209 0.8016 0.0291 0.5756
Regime V (black) # observations in Regime V : 8
maj1V 0.4084
∗∗∗ 0.1371 2.9779 0.0393 10.3827
mix2V 2.0321
∗∗∗ 0.1494 13.6012 0.2531 8.0303
prop3V 0.4571
∗∗∗ 0.1520 3.0080 0.0463 9.8712
Regime V I (yellow) # observations in Regime V I: 6
maj1V I -0.0259 0.0751 -0.3455 0.0418 -0.6211
mix2V I -0.6735
∗∗∗ 0.1041 -6.4675 0.1815 -3.7107
prop3V I 0.3226
∗∗∗ 0.1345 2.3985 0.0935 3.4497
σ 1.1362 0.0305 37.3052 0.0982 11.5730
# observations 1041
AIC 3.5269
BIC 3.6410
MSC 4.2854
log lik -1811.3
Notes: ∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level, ∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 5
percent level, and ∗∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level. Cluster-robust
standard errors are used to indicate signiﬁcance. Source: Authors.Source: Authors.
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a mixed electoral system signiﬁcantly exceed protection levels under majority rule
and proportional representation. u-shaped regimes form if protection rates under a
mixed electoral system are signiﬁcantly lower to protection levels under majority rule
and proportional representation. Interpreting the estimated parameters for regime
IV implies that a shift from majority rule to mixed rule increases protection rates by
0.04 percentage points, while a shift from mixed rule to proportional representation
decreases protection rates by 0.01 percentage points c.p. in the short run. Note that
the regimes I, V and V I provide some kind of outlier detection. Countries with
high and relatively volatile agricultural protection rates predominantly constitute
these regimes. In fact, these countries are Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and
Switzerland (see Table 3.8) . Figure 3.4.2 plots the pseudoresiduals of each coun-
try with colors indicating the speciﬁc latent policy regime. Pseudoresiduals denote
the part of the observed NRA of a country that cannot be explained by standard
polit-economic controls. The Figure nicely depicts the u− and inverse u− shaped
relations between agricultural protection and electoral system. Note that horizon-
tal line denote the regime dependent parameter estimates of the dummy variables
indicating the electoral system.
Our results reveal that a simple majoritarian-proportional dichotomy is not suﬃ-
cient to explain agricultural protection as done by previous studies. On contrary, we
observe that agricultural protection rates predominantly diﬀer between mixed and
majority rule and between mixed rule and proportional representation, while pro-
tection rates do often not signiﬁcantly vary between majority rule and proportional
representation. Overall, results suggest, that protection rates ﬁrst increase and then
decrease with district magnitude if we control for the impact of standard control
variables given a speciﬁc latent inverse u-shaped protection regime. In case of an
u-shaped relationship, protection rates ﬁrst decrease and then increase with district
magnitude, if we control for the impact of standard control variables.
Results are derived by controlling for the endogeneity of political institutions,
latent policy regimes and the dynamic structure of data. In order to check the
results against possible underlying latent heterogeneity, we perform an out-of-sample
experiment as suggested by Beck (2001). Hence, we reestimate the preferred model
speciﬁcation leaving out a single country each. Based on the estimates obtained
from the remaining sample of 51 countries we compute the mean absolute forecasting
error for the dropped country. The results are shown in Table (3.5) and indicate
homogeneity of the regression relationship. Notable exception are Iceland, Korea,
Norway and Switzerland. Leaving out these countries however does not alter the
recognized pattern of agricultural protection in relation to political institutions.
Consideration of relative mean absolute errors suggest the presence of diﬀerences in
the country speciﬁc volatility. Therefore, we resort to panel robust standard errors
to gauge signiﬁcance of estimates.
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Figure 3.1: Latent policy regimes and electoral systems
Source: Authors
3.5 Conclusion
Nowadays agricultural protection is certainly still one of the prominent examples
of special interest politics biases. Moreover, it is not a trivial one giving the high
global welfare beneﬁts calculated assuming agricultural policy is liberalized around
the world. Understanding the political economy of agricultural protection, however,
is still a theoretical and empirical challenge.
In this regard, this paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the im-
pact of formal and informal constitutional rules as well as lobbying on agricultural
protection level in developing and industrialized countries. We especially focus our
analyses on the question how this impact is inﬂuenced by the speciﬁc legislative
organization in presidential versus parliamentary systems as well as by lobbying
and the demographic composition of a society. Overall, this paper makes the fol-
lowing theoretical and empirical contributions to the understanding of agricultural
protection patterns around the world.
First, we develop a micro-political founded theory to understand the interaction
of formal and informal political institutions in determining the level of agricultural
protection or taxation, respectively. In our theory, we explicitly derive legislators'
policy preferences from electoral competition and ﬁnal policy outcomes from post-
election bargaining in legislatures. Further, we show that legislators' preferences
vary with district size.
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In detail, our model derives legislators' policy preferences within a probabilistic
voting environment. We assume, following Lohmann (1998), that, depending on
their relative group size, agrarian and non-agrarian voters diﬀer in their ideological
commitment. This implies heterogeneous agricultural policy preferences between
two legisators, if one is elected in an urban district and the other one in an rural
constituency. Accordingly, in bargaining at the legislature, the diﬀerences in pre-
ferred policies generate a conﬂict between legislators. In a parliamentary system,
the conﬂict is generated between the prime minister, who will tend to favor rural
or urban districts, and her parliamentary majority, that will be dominated by the
opposite urban or rural concerns. Legislative bargaining in presidential system is
characterized by a conﬂict between the median of the agricultural committee, who
will tend to favor rural (urban) districts and the ﬂoor median, who tends to favor the
opposite urban (rural) districts in industrialized (developing) countries, respectively.
At the election stage, asymmetric lobbying activities amplify preference hetero-
geneity. Heterogeneity is attenuated, when district size grows and the electoral
system converges to pure proportional representation, because district populations
become more homogenous. With regard to legislative bargaining, political exchange
translates legislators' preference heterogeneity in more extreme policy results.
Based on our theory, we are able to identify interaction eﬀects between district
size and speciﬁc political as well as demographic framework constellations. Two
basic regimes are detected: an u-shape and an inverse u-shape relation between
district size and the level of agricultural protection. Moreover, we identify mono-
tonically decreasing or increasing as well as constant relations as special cases of
these two regimes. Further, we show that the political, economic and demographic
framework conditions found in developing and industrialized countries, respectively,
imply diﬀerent patterns of how the interaction of electoral rules, formal and informal
legislative norms and lobbying impact on agricultural protection levels in these two
country types.
Second, we provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of our theoretical hypothe-
ses regarding the quantitative relationship between political institutions and agri-
cultural protection. The theoretical considerations imply for the impact of electoral
rules to depend on an unobserved policy regime induced by the strength of agricul-
tural interest groups. Therefore we apply a switching regression model to account
for diﬀerent latent policy regimes. Information criteria suggest the modeling of six
latent policy regimes. Further, based on theoretical concerns about the endogeneity
of political institutions with regard to the decision on the level of agricultural pro-
tection, the estimation strategy is extended in order to control for such endogeneity
of political institutions via an instrument variable approach. Our results conﬁrm
the theoretically derived non-linear relationship between agricultural protection and
district size. However, we mainly ﬁnd signiﬁcant inverse u-shaped relationships.
Signiﬁcance is assessed using panel robust standard errors. Besides endogeneity, our
results are also robust against the speciﬁcation of dynamics.
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3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Proof of proposition 1
By assumption legislators' preferences are strict single-peaked which already implies
that utility functions of all legislators are strict quasi concave. Hence, all sets Sg are
compact and convex subsets of S and accordingly the intersection set
⋂
g
Sg is also
a compact and convex subset of S. Accordingly, it follows directly from well-known
theorem of quasi-concave programming Arrow et al. (1961) that the maximization
of the PM's policy preferences has a unique solution, since UPM(s) is strictly quasi
concave.
q.e.d.
3.A.2 Proof of proposition 2
From proposition 1 we know that the utility functions of all legislators are strict quasi
concave. Therefore, the set SF is compact and convex subsets of S. Accordingly, it
follows directly from well-known theorem of quasi-concave programming Arrow et al.
(1961) that the maximization of the committee median's policy preferences has an
unique solution since UCA(s) is strictly quasi concave.
q.e.d.
3.A.3 Proof of proposition 3
(i): Single-peakedness of Ugd(s) follows directly from the fact the weighted social
welfare function SWFd(s) is strict quasi-concave in s, while the latter follows
from the fact that by assumption Γ˜S is strictly convex in sA and Γ˜T is strictly
concave in tA.
(ii): and (iii) Applying the implicit function theorem to the ﬁrst order condition of
the maximization of the social welfare function SWFd results:
∂Y(gd)
∂βAd
= − 1
∂2W inc
∂s2
=
1
∂2ΓS
∂s2
A
> 0 , for s > 0
− 1
∂2ΓT
∂t2
A
> 0 , for s < 0
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Thus, ∂β
A
d
∂αAd
= φA > implies (ii), while ∂β
J
d
∂KJ
= − βJd
KJ
< 0 implies (iii).
iv and (v): It follows from the FOC of the maximization of the SWFd :
(∗)
∂Γ˜S
∂s
=
βAd α
M
(βMd α
A)
> 1, if Ygd > 0
∂Γ˜T
∂s
=
βAd α
M
(βMd α
A)
< 1, if Ygd < 0
The ﬁrst part of (*) follows from the strict convexity of Γ˜S and the property
Γ˜S(sA) > sA, which implies for some 0 < ψs < 1:
1 <
Γ˜S(s)
sA
=
∂Γ˜S(ψssA)
∂sA
<
∂Γ˜S(sA)
∂sA
, for sA = s ≥ 0
while the second part follows from the strict concavity of Γ˜T and the property
Γ˜T (tA) > tA, which implies for some 0 ≤ ψt ≤ 1:
1 >
Γ˜T (T )
tA
=
∂Γ˜T (ψtA)
∂tA
>
∂Γ˜T (tA)
∂tA
, for tA = −s ≥ 0
(iv) and (v) follow directly from (*).
q.e.d.
3.A.4 Proof of proposition 4
Let Y tyki denote the ideal point of a legislator reelected in a district of type ty.
Proposition 1 implies:
Y Mk1 < Y
M
k2
< .... < Y Mki < Y
M
k(i+1
< Y Mkl = Yn
Y Ak1 > Y
A
k2
> .... > Y Aki > Y
A
k(i+1
> Y Akl = Yn
(3.45)
where Yn is the unique common ideal position of all legislators under proportional
representation.
Case 1: Parliamentary systems, (PS = 0.
By proposition 2 it holds for the equilibrium outcome s∗k in a parliamentary
system:
s∗ki = max
{
s−ki , Y
PM
ki
} ≤ s¯ki if Y PMki ≤ s¯ki (3.46)
s∗ki = min
{
s+ki , Y
PM
ki
} ≥ s¯ki if Y PMki ≥ s¯ki
If POP = 0 it follows s¯ki = Y
A
ki
. Hence, s¯ki and thus also s
+
ki
and s−ki
decreases with ki, while from proposition ?? we have Y PMki increases with
ki if the PM is reelected in an urban districts and decreases with ki if the
PM is reelected in an urban district. Moreover, by assumption it holds
frA < frM implying Y PMki ≤ s¯ki . Therefore, it already follows s∗ki =
max
{
s−ki , Y
PM
ki
}
. s∗ki obviously decreases with ki if the PM is reelected in
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an rural district since in this case both s−ki and Y
PM
ki
, respectively, decrease
with ki. If, however, the PM is reelected in a urban district it follows
from proposition ?? that Y PMki increases with ki. Therefore, we have the
following three cases: (1) Y PMn < s
−
n or (2) Y
PM
1 > s
−
1 or (3) neither (1)
nor (2). In the ﬁrst case it follows that s∗ki = s
−
ki
, ∀i = 1, .., l. Thus,
a monotonically decreasing relation results. In the second case it follows
that s∗ki = Y
PM
ki
, ∀i = 1, .., l, i.e. a monotonically decreasing relation
results. In the third case we deﬁne K## as a set of all 1 ≤ k## ≤
n for which the following relation holds: s−ki ≤ Y PMki , forki ≥ k##.
Obviously, since (1) does not hold it follows kl ∈ K##, i.e. K## is
always not empty. Therefore, there always exists a minimal ki that is an
element of K##. It is straightforward to show that this minimal ki just
corresponds to a k# for which R1 holds.
If POP = 1 it follows s¯ki = Y
M
ki
. Hence, s¯ki and thus also s
+
ki
and s−ki
increase with ki, while from proposition ?? we have Y PMki increases with
ki if the PM is reelected in an urban districts and decreases with ki if
the PM is reelected in an urban district. Moreover, by assumption it
holds frA > frM implying Y PMki ≥ s¯ki∀i = 1, .., l. Therefore, it already
follows s∗ki = min
{
s+ki , Y
PM
ki
}
. s∗ki obviously increases with ki if the PM
is reelected in an urban district since in this case both s+ki and Y
PM
ki
,
respectively, increase with ki.
If, however, the PM is reelected in a rural district it follows from propo-
sition ?? that Y PMki deceases with ki. Therefore, we have the following
three cases: (1) Y PMn > s
+
n or (2) Y
PM
1 < s
+
1 or (3) neither (1) nor (2)
holds. In the ﬁrst case it follows that s∗ki = s
+
ki
, ∀i = 1, .., l. Thus,
an monotonically increasing relation. In the second case it follows that
s∗ki = Y
PM
ki
, ∀i = 1, .., l, i.e. a monotonically decreasing relation results.
In the third case we deﬁne K## as a set of all 1 ≤ k## ≤ n for which
the following relation holds:s+ki ≥ Y PMki , forki ≥ k##. Obviously, since
(1) does not hold it follows kl ∈ K##, i.e. K## is always not empty.
Therefore, there always exists a minimal ki that is an element of K##.
It straightforwardly follows that this minimal ki just corresponds to a k#
for which R2 holds.
Case 2: Presidential systems, PS = 1.
By proposition 3 it holds for the equilibrium outcome s∗k in a presidential
system:
s∗ki = max
{
s−ki , Y
CA
ki
} ≤ SQ if Y CAki ≤ SQ (3.47)
s∗ki = min
{
s+ki , Y
CA
ki
} ≥ SQ if Y CAki ≥ SQ
If POP = 0 it follows Y Fki = Y
A
ki
. Hence, Y Fki decreases with ki, while
from proposition 1 we have Y CAki decreases with ki if the median of the
agricultural committee, CA, is reelected in a rural district and increases
with ki if CA is reelected in an urban district. Therefore, it already follows
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s∗ki = Y
A
ki
and therefore monotonically decreasing in ki if the committee
median is reelected in an rural district.
If, however, the the committee median is reelected in an urban district
it follows from proposition 1 that Y CAki = Y
M
ki
≤ Yn increases with ki.
Therefore, assuming SQ is suﬃciently large implies perfect agenda set-
ting power of the urban committee and hence s∗ki = Y
M
ki
and a monoton-
ically increasing relation follows. If, however, SQ > Yn, but SQ is not
suﬃciently large implies the urban committee median has only imperfect
agenda setting power vis-a-vis the rural dominated ﬂoor, i.e. it holds:
Y M1 < s
−
1 , while it also holds: Y
M
n > s
−
n . Further, by deﬁnition s
−
ki
is
decreasing in ki. Therefore, by the same argumentation as above we de-
ﬁne K## as a set of all 1 ≤ k## ≤ n for which the following relation
holds:s−ki ≤ Y Mki , forki ≥ k##. It straightforwardly follows that a min-
imal ki of this set always exists and corresponds to a k# for which R1
holds. Finally, if SQ > Yn, but SQ approximates Yn from above implies
that there exist an , such that s−ki = SQ∀ki ≤ kn − (SQ− Yn). Hence,
for SQ suﬃciently close to Yn the u-shape relation approximates a con-
stant relation in the sense that for all district sizes ki < n the status quo
prevails, i.e. only for a pure PR-system legislators are able to circumvent
a gridlock situation, while for SQ = Yn a gridlock results for all election
systems.
If POP = 1 it follows Y Fki = Y
M
ki
. Hence, Y Fki increases with ki, while
from proposition 1 we have Y CAki decreases with ki if the median of the
agricultural committee, CA, is reelected in a rural district and increases
with ki if CA is reelected in an urban district. Therefore, it already follows
s∗ki = Y
M
ki
and is therefore monotonically increasing in ki if the committee
median is reelected in an urban district.
If, however, the the committee median is reelected in a rural district it
follows from proposition 1 that Y CAki = Y
A
ki
≥ Yn increases with ki. There-
fore, assuming SQ is suﬃciently lower than Yn implies perfect agenda
setting power of the rural committee and hence s∗ki = Y
A
ki
and a monoton-
ically decreasing relation follows. If, however, SQ < Yn, but SQ is not
suﬃciently lower than Yn implies the rural committee median has only
imperfect agenda setting power vis-a-vis the urban dominated ﬂoor, i.e. it
holds: Y A1 > s
+
1 , while it also holds: Y
A
n < s
+
n . Further, by deﬁnition s
+
ki
is weak monotonically increasing in ki. Therefore, by the same argumen-
tation as above we deﬁne K## as a set of all 1 ≤ k## ≤ n for which the
following relation holds:s+ki ≥ Y Aki , forki ≥ k##. It straightforwardly
follows that a minimal ki of this set always exists and corresponds to a k#
for which R2 holds. Finally, if SQ < Yn, but SQ approximates Yn from be-
low implies that there exist an , such that s+ki = SQ∀ki ≤ kn−(Yn−SQ).
Hence, for SQ suﬃciently close to Yn the inverse u-shape relation approx-
imates a constant relation in the sense that for all district sizes ki < n
the status quo prevails, i.e. only for a pure PR-system legislators are able
to circumvent a gridlock situation, while for SQ = Yn a gridlock results
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for all election systems.
q.e.d.
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3.A.5 Derivation of extended Mill's ratios
The expectations of errors have to be considered for six cases. Deﬁne h1 = − 2zitδ2
, h2 = − 2zitδ2 + %, h3 = − 1zitδ1. Following Rosenbaum (1961) the expectations
are hence given as
E
[(
νit
ξit
)
|fit = 0, 0 = dit
]
=

{
−φ(h1)−ψφ(h3)+φ(h1)[1−Φ(h1−ψh3√
1−ψ2
)]+ψφ(h3)[1−Φ(h1−ψh3√
1−ψ2
)]
}
Pr(R1){
−ψφ(h1)−φ(h3)+φ(h3)[1−Φ(h1−ψh3√
1−ψ2
)]+ψφ(h1)[1−Φ(h3−ψh1√
1−ψ2
)]
}
Pr(R1)
 ,
E
[(
νit
ξit
)
|fit = 1, 0 = dit
]
=

{
ψφ(h3)−φ(h3)[1−Φ(h3−ψh1√
1−ψ2
)]−ψφ(h3)[1−Φ(h3−ψh1√
1−ψ2
)]
}
Pr(R2){
φ(h3)−φ(h2)[1−Φ(h1−ψh3√
1−ψ2
)]−ψφ(h1)[1−Φ(h3−ψh1√
1−ψ2
)]
}
Pr(R2)
 ,
E
[(
νit
ξit
)
|fit = 0, dit = 1
]
=
{
−φ(h3)[1−Φ(h1−ψh3√
1−ψ2
)]+ψφ(h1)[Φ(
h3−ψh1√
1−ψ2
)]+φ(h3)[1−Φ(h2−ψh3√
1−ψ2
)]−ψφ(h2)[Φ(h3−ψh2√
1−ψ2
)]
}
Pr(R3){
−ψφ(h3)[1−Φ(h1−ψh3√
1−ψ2
)]+φ(h1)[Φ(
h3−ψh1√
1−ψ2
)]+ψφ(h3)[1−Φ(h2−ψh3√
1−ψ2
)]−φ(h2)[Φ(h3−ψh2√
1−ψ2
)]
}
Pr(R3)
 ,
E
[(
νit
ξit
)
|fit = 1, dit = 1
]
=
{
φ(h1)[1−Φ(h3−ψh1√
1−ψ2
)]+ψφ(h3)[1−Φ(h1−ψh3√
1−ψ2
)]−φ(h2)[1−Φ(h3−ψh2√
1−ψ2
)]−ψφ(h3)[1−Φ(h2−ψh3√
1−ψ2
)]
}
Pr(R4){
φ(h3)[1−Φ(h1−ψh3√
1−ψ2
)+ψφ(h1)[1−Φ(h3−ψh1√
1−ψ2
)]−φ(h3)[1−Φ(h2−ψh3√
1−ψ2
)]−ψφ(h2)[1−Φ(h3−ψh2√
1−ψ2
)]
}
Pr(R4)
 ,
E
[(
νit
ξit
)
|fit = 0, dit = 2
]
=

{
φ(h2)[Φ(
h3−ψh2√
1−ψ2
)]+ψφ(h3)[1−Φ(h2−ψh3√
1−ψ2
)]
}
Pr(R5){
φ(h3)[1−Φ(h2−ψh3√
1−ψ2
)]+ψφ(h2)[Φ(
h3−ψh2√
1−ψ2
)]
}
Pr(R5)
 ,
E
[(
νit
ξit
)
|fit = 1, dit = 2
]
=

{
φ(h2)[1−Φ(h3−ψh2√
1−ψ2
)]+ψφ(h3)[1−Φ(h2−ψh3√
1−ψ2
)]
}
Pr(R6){
φ(h3)[1−Φ(h2−ψh3√
1−ψ2
)]+ψφ(h2)[1−Φ(h3−ψh2√
1−ψ2
)]
}
Pr(R6)
 .
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3.A.6 Empirical Analysis
Table 3.5: List of countries and available time periods
Number Country First period Last period # periods MAE
1 Argentina 1984 2006 23 0.2458
2 Australia 1972 2006 35 0.1669
3 Austria 1972 1994 23 0.4411
4 Bangladesh 1992 2005 14 0.3422
5 Brazil 1986 2006 21 0.2751
6 Bulgaria 1993 2006 14 1.0171
7 Canada 1962 2006 45 0.3920
8 Chile 1990 2006 17 0.4742
9 Colombia 1966 2006 41 0.4656
10 Czech Rep. 1994 2003 10 0.5511
11 Denmark 1967 1972 6 0.1006
12 Dominican Rep. 1979 2006 28 0.7229
13 Ecuador 1980 2004 25 0.5212
14 Estonia 1993 2003 11 0.7749
15 Ethiopia 1996 2006 11 0.5635
16 Finland 1962 1994 33 0.8816
17 Ghana 1998 2005 8 0.2215
18 Hungary 1993 2003 11 0.4024
19 Iceland 1980 2006 27 1.5348
20 India 1966 2005 40 0.9672
21 Indonesia 2000 2005 6 0.2119
22 Japan 1966 2006 41 0.8590
23 Korea, Rep. 1990 2006 17 1.8649
24 Latvia 1994 2003 10 0.2556
25 Lithuania 1993 2003 11 0.5272
26 Madagascar 1994 2006 13 0.4064
27 Malaysia 1962 2005 44 0.2707
28 Mexico 1995 2006 12 0.2761
29 Mozambique 1995 2006 12 0.2671
30 New Zealand 1972 2006 35 0.8616
31 Nicaragua 1995 2005 11 0.3252
32 Nigeria 2001 2005 5 0.4133
33 Norway 1972 2006 35 1.6181
34 Pakistan 1989 1999 11 0.4628
35 Philippines 1988 2005 18 0.7099
36 Poland 1993 2003 11 0.3173
37 Portugal 1977 1985 9 0.2347
38 Romania 1993 2006 14 0.7116
39 Russia 1995 2006 12 0.2873
40 Senegal 2001 2005 5 0.2882
continued on next page
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Number Country First period Last period # periods MAE
41 Slovak Rep. 1998 2003 6 0.4927
42 Slovenia 1993 2003 11 0.6931
43 South Africa 1962 2006 45 0.5488
44 Spain 1979 1985 7 0.4088
45 Sri Lanka 1962 2005 44 0.6486
46 Sweden 1972 1994 23 0.7910
47 Switzerland 1991 2006 16 2.0813
48 Thailand 1989 2005 17 0.3547
49 Turkey 1970 2006 37 0.6031
50 Ukraine 1995 2006 12 1.0913
51 United States 1972 2006 35 0.6124
52 Zambia 1993 2005 13 1.0037
Source: Authors.
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Table 3.7: Information Criteria for Model Selection
Regime Information criteria / Log-Likelihood
AIC 4.5637
1 BIC 4.6777
MSC 5.5156
log lik -2351.4
AIC 4.0837
2 BIC 4.1987
MSC 5.1021
log lik -2101.6
AIC 3.9719
3 BIC 4.0859
MSC 5.0987
log lik -2043.4
AIC 3.6970
4 BIC 3.8110
MSC 4.8519
log lik -1864.0
AIC 3.5807
5 BIC 3.6948
MSC 4.6437
log lik -1839.8
AIC 3.5269
6 BIC 3.6410
MSC 4.2854
log lik -1811.3
AIC 3.5341
7 BIC 3.6482
MSC 4.5896
log lik -1810.2
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Table 3.8: Latent regime classiﬁcation of countries and periods
Year Countries numbered according to Table 3.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1961 4 5
1962 4 4
1963 4 4
1964 4 4
1965 4 4 4
1966 4 4 4 4
1967 4 4 4 4
1968 4 4 4 4
1969 4 4 4 4
1970 4 4 4 4
1971 3 4 3 4 4 4
1972 2 4 3 4 4
1973 2 1 3 4 4
1974 2 4 3 4 4
1975 2 4 3 4 4
1976 2 4 3 4 4
1977 3 4 3 4 4
1978 2 4 3 4 4 4
1979 2 4 3 4 4 4 4
1980 2 4 3 4 4 4 1
1981 2 4 3 4 4 4 4
1982 3 4 3 4 4 4 4
1983 4 2 4 3 4 4 4 4
1984 4 2 4 3 4 4 4 4
1985 4 2 4 4 3 4 4 4 6
1986 4 2 4 4 2 4 4 4 5
1987 4 2 4 4 2 4 4 4 3
1988 4 2 4 4 2 4 4 4 4
1989 4 2 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4
1990 4 3 3 4 2 4 4 4 4 6
1991 4 3 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 3
1992 4 3 3 4 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 2 4
1993 4 2 3 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 3
1994 4 3 4 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4
1995 4 2 4 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 2
1996 4 2 4 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 2
1997 4 2 4 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4
1998 4 2 4 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4
1999 4 2 4 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4
2000 4 2 4 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4
2001 4 2 4 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4
2002 2 2 4 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
2003 2 2 4 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4
2004 2 2 4 4 2 2 4 4 4 2 2
2005 2 2 4 2 2 4 4 4 2
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to continue table 3.8
Year 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35
1961 4
1962 4
1963 4
1964 4
1965 4 4 4
1966 2 4 4
1967 2 4 4
1968 2 4 4
1969 2 4 4
1970 2 4 4
1971 4 4 4 4 5
1972 4 4 4 2 4
1973 2 4 4 4 4
1974 4 4 4 4 4
1975 4 4 4 4 4
1976 4 4 4 4 4
1977 4 4 4 4 4
1978 4 4 4 4 4
1979 5 4 4 4 4 5
1980 3 4 4 4 4 4
1981 2 4 4 4 4 3
1982 1 4 4 4 4 3
1983 4 4 4 4 4 3
1984 3 4 4 4 4 3
1985 1 4 4 4 4 1
1986 2 4 3 4 4 2
1987 1 4 4 4 4 3 4
1988 2 4 4 4 4 2 4 4
1989 2 4 4 1 4 4 2 4 4
1990 1 4 4 4 4 4 1 4 4
1991 1 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4
1992 4 2 4 3 4 1 4 4 2 4 4
1993 4 6 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 4 3 4 4
1994 4 2 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4
1995 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4
1996 4 2 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 4
1997 4 2 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 4 4
1998 4 1 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4
1999 4 3 4 4 3 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4
2000 4 6 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 2 4
2001 4 2 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 2 2 4
2002 4 3 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 1 4
2003 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4
2004 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 2 4
2005 3 2 2 4 4 4 3 3
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to continue table 3.8
Year 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52
1961 4 4
1962 4 4
1963 4 4
1964 4 4
1965 4 4
1966 4 4
1967 4 4
1968 4 4
1969 4 4 2
1970 4 4 4
1971 4 4 5 4 2
1972 4 4 2 4 2
1973 4 4 1 4 2
1974 4 4 2 4 2
1975 4 4 3 4 2
1976 4 4 4 3 4 2
1977 4 4 4 3 4 2
1978 4 4 4 4 3 4 2
1979 4 4 4 4 3 4 2
1980 4 4 4 4 1 4 2
1981 4 4 4 4 3 4 2
1982 4 4 4 4 3 4 2
1983 4 4 4 4 3 4 2
1984 4 4 4 4 2 4 2
1985 4 4 3 4 2
1986 4 4 3 4 2
1987 4 4 3 4 2
1988 4 4 2 4 4 2
1989 4 4 2 4 4 2
1990 4 4 3 5 4 4 2
1991 4 4 3 3 4 4 2
1992 4 4 3 4 4 2 6 4 4 2 4
1993 4 4 2 4 4 2 1 4 4 2 4
1994 4 2 4 2 4 4 3 4 4 4 2 4
1995 4 2 4 2 4 4 6 4 4 4 2 4
1996 4 2 4 2 4 4 3 4 4 4 2 4
1997 4 2 4 4 2 4 4 3 4 4 4 2 4
1998 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 2 4
1999 4 2 1 4 2 4 4 3 4 4 4 2 4
2000 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 2 4 4 2 2 4
2001 4 3 4 4 1 2 4 4 2 4 4 2 2 4
2002 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 3 4 4 2 2 4
2003 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 2 4
2004 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 2 4
2005 4 4 4 2 4 4 2
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Abstract
In this paper we propose a spatial model of political decision-making in the European Union
that primarily explains why agricultural protection in EU member countries is systemat-
ically higher when compared to their counterfactual unobserved protection level under
national forms of government. The center-pieces of our model are cooperative legislative
bargaining procedures that inﬂuence highly the level of agricultural protection in a suprana-
tional system like the European Union. Further, we show that outcomes under the diﬀerent
procedures vary with increasing number of member states. Accordingly, EU enlargements
drive legislators' incentives to adopt speciﬁc cooperative legislative bargaining procedures,
if the rule in practice would lead to ineﬃcient agricultural policy decisions. Hence, we
derive secondly the institutional foundation of radical reforms of the CAP. Historically,
we observe a strong incentive for these institutional rearrangements due to the increasing
ineﬃciency and costs of the Luxembourg Compromise, the ﬁrst cooperative rule in prac-
tice. We argue that after 1987 Council members prefer to decide CAP under Weingast's
universalism. A dynamic panel estimation based on time-series cross-country data for 58
democracies since 1961 conﬁrms our theoretical conclusions.
Keywords: comparative political economy; agricultural protection; legislative norms; po-
litical exchange; time-series cross-country data; dynamic ﬁxed eﬀect model
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4.1 Introduction
In the literature of comparative politics the European Union (EU) is generally de-
scribed as a unique political system (see for example Hix, 1999). The uniqueness of
the system does not only apply to its emergence out of a process of voluntary eco-
nomic and political integration between nation-states of Western Europe, but also
or even especially to the European political system. Obviously the European way of
governance does not compare to standard democratic political systems like parlia-
mentary systems. Accordingly, scholars of comparative politics as well as politicians
around the world are interested in "How the European Union works". But to the
best of our knowledge present, studies in comparative politics mainly describe funda-
mental features of the EU constitution and political phenomena neglecting to study
how constitutional rules shape economic policies (Hix, 1999; Napel, 2006; Tsebelis,
1994). Even if the latter is also of particular interest for political economists, polit-
economic studies that systematically consider political institutions as determinants
of EU policy choices are rare.
A good case in point to study the speciﬁc impact of the EU-system on policy out-
comes is certainly the Common European Agricultural Policy (CAP), which until to-
day is the most important EU-policy covering roughly 40% of the EU-budget. Since
its establishment in the 60tees the CAP has been criticized as an extremely protec-
tionist policy. Empirical analyses also underline that agricultural protection is higher
in the European Union compared to non European countries reporting a signiﬁcant
and positive EU-dummy in their econometric analyses of cross-country agricultural
protection rates (Honma and Hayami, 1986; Thies and Porche, 2007). While the
pro-agricultural bias exists until today, several reforms, e.g. the MacSharry-Reform
in 1992, have cut down the assistance to the agricultural sector.
Nevertheless there does hardly exist a comprehensive political economy theory
that explains the empirically observed high protection level and that analyzes insti-
tutional conditions allowing for radical reforms of the CAP. Most scholars intuitively
regard high EU protection levels as a consequence of the so called restaurant table
eﬀect, a political phenomenon of supranational policy formulation with ﬁnancial
solidarity (de Gorter et al., 1998; Bilal, 2000; Thies and Porche, 2007). But this
concept is not able to explain the observed diﬀerences in protection levels between
the United States and the European Union (compare Figure 4.1), as it would also
apply to policy formulation in the United States. Further they refer to external
factors like a budget crisis to explain the reforms of the CAP failing to analyze
institutional conditions that enable political actors to reform the status quo.
Hence, we develop a spatial model of policy decision-making in the EU below
that includes endogenous policy preferences. The center-piece of our model is in-
formal political exchange that is often neglected by political economists, when they
try to explain pork-barrel politics. In particular, we identify diﬀerent cooperative
legislative bargaining procedures that facilitate informal political exchange. Tech-
nically, self-enforcing cooperative legislative decision-making procedures correspond
to Weingast's concept of legislative norms. These norms promote, at least from the
viewpoint of legislators, collective eﬃciency of legislative decision-making (Wein-
gast, 1979). Our legislative norms reﬂect diﬀerent degrees of cooperation among
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an ex ante ﬁxed majority coalition that might or might not include the European
Commission. In case the European Commission does not belong to the coalition,
the Council of Agricultural Ministers unanimously determines agricultural policy.
This norm corresponds to the so-called Luxembourg Compromise which is the leg-
islative norm in practice for agricultural policy-making until 1987. But provided
that the ﬁxed ex ante coalition includes the European Commission, decisions are
made by the Council under qualiﬁed majority with granting agenda setting power
to the European Commission. We argue that this norm corresponds to Weingast's
universalism.
Our model allows determining the eﬀect of joining the EU, which is in fact an in-
stitutional regime switch in a country, on redistributive politics. We show that agri-
cultural protection rates observed for member countries will signiﬁcantly diﬀer from
their counterfactual levels under parliamentary or presidential systems, respectively.
Further, we argue that agricultural policy outcomes vary systematically across in-
formal legislative bargaining procedures and for each bargaining procedure with the
number of EU member states. Consequently, our model also delivers insights into
institutional conditions that enable legislators to reform the CAP as observed after
1987.
To complete our paper, we prove the theoretical implications using time-series
cross-section data of 58 countries for the time period 1961-2005. We analyze the
treatment eﬀect of institutional change due to joining the EU and due to rearrange-
ments within the Council. In both cases, we use a dynamic ﬁxed eﬀect model that
controls for time- and country-speciﬁc heterogeneity. In addition to this, cross-
section estimations deliver the impact of EU decision-making rules compared to
diﬀerent national political systems on the level of agricultural protection.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we brieﬂy describe the
logic and history of agricultural policy-making in the EU in Section 4.2. In Section
4.3, we present theoretical models of legislative decision-making in parliamentary,
presidential and the supranational system, i.e. the EU system. Further, we derive
legislator's policy preferences. We end the theoretical part with comparing the policy
outcomes across political systems and legislative norms in Section 4.4. The empirical
assessment of the theoretical hypotheses is done in Section 4.5. We conclude and
discuss future research in Section 4.6.
4.2 The logic of legislative decision-making of the CAP
Since the establishment of the CAP in the early 60tees, the CAP has been always de-
cided according to the same constitutional rule laid down by the Treaty of Rome, the
so-called consultation procedure (Hix, 1999). In essence, the Council decides under
qualiﬁed majority on a policy proposal of the European Commission. If a qualiﬁed
majority of Council members accepts the Commission's proposal, it is the new policy,
otherwise the Council can unanimously accept any amendment of the Commission's
proposal. If no proposal is approved, the status quo policy remains. Although the
European Parliament formally also participates in CAP decision-making under the
consultation procedure, members of parliament are dummy players in legislative
bargaining. As their comments on the proposal are not binding for the Council,
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they are never a decisive member of a winning coalition. Thus, legislative bargain-
ing over CAP only involves the Council of Agricultural Ministers and the European
Commission.
However, scholars of EU-politics agree that European policies are often decided ap-
plying informal legislative bargaining rules. Analogously to parliamentary regimes,
informal legislative procedures in the EU are best deﬁned via identifying ex ante
ﬁxed winning coalitions that commonly agree on a cooperative decision procedure.
For an unanimous acceptance, a procedure must assure a higher pay-oﬀ for all coali-
tion members in comparison to the default outcome that would be derived under
non-cooperative legislative decision-making. The Luxembourg Compromise, a leg-
islative rule for CAP decision making until 1987, is such a cooperative legislative
bargaining procedure. Under the Luxembourg Compromise, the Council of Agri-
cultural Ministers excluding the Commission decide on political intervention prices
for all agricultural commodities applying unanimity rule (de Gorter and Swinnen,
2002; Runge and v. Witzke, 1987). Overall, this informal procedure results in time-
consuming negotiations to reach consensus about complex package deals. Such pack-
age deals satisfy in turn member countries' diverse interests, which are determined
by the heterogeneous structure of agricultural production among them. France, for
example, tends to demand high levels of support for wheat and accepts, in return,
demands from Greece for substantial support on olives. The ﬁnal result is extremely
high protection under the Luxembourg Compromise.
Well-known literature about the CAP explains these high protection levels solely
with the restaurant table eﬀect, an immanent eﬀect of supranational policy formula-
tion with ﬁnancial solidarity. In essence, the restaurant table eﬀect can be explained
as follows. Consider that sharing the bill in a restaurant while allowing individual
meals to be ordered creates strong incentives to consume too much. Translating this
example to policy decision making in the EU leads to the following argument. The
principle of ﬁnancial solidarity among member countries creates individual incentives
to prefer levels of agricultural support that are much higher than the levels preferred
under a system of national policy formulation with national ﬁnancial solidarity. Net
beneﬁciaries of policies will demand high support for their "pet commodity" that is
ﬁnanced by a common pool of resources. Since Ministers of Agriculture are usually
more interested in receiving support on commodities for which they are net beneﬁcia-
ries than in restraining support to commodities for which they are net contributors,
package deals are commonly observed. Thereby each member state receives the
support demanded. Note that one can assume that every member country is a net
beneﬁciary for at least one agricultural commodity during the time of the Luxem-
bourg Compromise. For empirical evidence look at the protection rates in Figure
4.1 before 1987. However, Figure 4.1 depicts also that the protection level in the
United States is clearly lower compared to the EU, although the United States also
have a supranational system of policy formulation with ﬁnancial solidarity. Hence,
we motivate our theoretical model that contradicts the assumption of the restau-
rant table eﬀect as a suﬃcient explanation for the observed protection levels in the
European Union, by this picture.
Furthermore, Figure 4.1 confronts us with the fact that although formal consti-
tutional rules remain unchanged, protection rates signiﬁcantly decrease after 1986.
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Figure 4.1: Nominal rate of assistance to agriculture (NRA) in the EU and the
United States from 1961-2005.
Source: Calculated by authors using data by Anderson et al. (2008).
In this context, Hix (1999) have already mentioned that informal bargaining rules
in the EU vary over time. Further, Runge and v. Witzke (1987) argue that eco-
nomic and political forces will drive demand for institutional change after 1986. In
case of the CAP, they consider the increased costs, i.e. decision and budget costs,
of the unanimity rule due to increasing divergence of national interest with EU en-
largement as primary drivers of ineﬃcient CAP policies. Ineﬃcient policy choices in
turn lead Council members to unanimously demand for institutional rearrangement.
Hence, we derive theoretically a legislative norm replacing the Luxembourg Com-
promise that will promote more eﬃcient policy decisions due to informal legislative
bargaining rules. Not surprisingly, the inclusion of the moderate Commission into
the decision-making process, as even laid by the constitution, is favored by Council
members. In our view, the new legislative decision-making procedure corresponds
to Weingast's universalism. Universalism stands for deciding policy by a universal
coalition instead of a minimum-winning coalition. Here, the coalition of all Coun-
cil members and the Commission, where Council members grant the Commission
some limited agenda setting power, is such an universal coalition. Finally the new
legislative norm would result in lower agricultural protection when compared to
the Luxembourg Compromise due to the inclusion of the moderate Commission.
Consider the decreasing rates of protection after 1986 as empirical support of this
informal institutional change.
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4.3 Modeling agricultural policy decision-making
4.3.1 The legislative process in democracies
A legislative system of a country consists of a ﬁnite set of political agents (N) where
i = 1, . . . , n denotes a generic element of the legislative system. According to the
constitution we can deﬁne speciﬁc institutions as subsets of N that have formal
legislative power. In democratic regimes subsets of the legislative systems N are
the government (G) and parliament (P ). Furthermore, government and parliament
are separated into further subunits, the governmental departments or ministries and
committee systems, respectively. According to the division-of-labor argument, diﬀer-
ent committees and governmental departments are usually responsible for diﬀerent
policy domains (Shepsle, 1979). In particular, we denote CA as the agricultural
committee and GA as the agricultural department, respectively.
The legislative process in democratic systems typically begins when the govern-
ment submits a bill to parliament.1 Then the responsible committee works on the
bill to present parliament the government proposal including their recommended
amendments. On the ﬂoor, there is a ﬁnal vote on the entire bill, where additional
amendments might be submitted or not. Thus, to analyze the impact of the organi-
zation of legislative decision-making on agricultural protection, we can focus on the
interaction between the government (G), the agricultural committee (CA), and the
ﬂoor (F ).2
For our formal analysis we denote s ∈ S as the agricultural policy outcome. S is
a convex compact subset of the m-dimensional cube (0, 1)m, where m is the number
of agricultural commodities. sr is the r's component of s and denotes the protection
level of the commodity r. sr = 0 implies no protection, while sr = 1 corresponds to
some maximal protection level for commodity r. Agents' policy preferences can be
represented by the following separable spatial utility function Ui(s):
Ui(s) = −
∑
r
βir(Yir − sr)2, (4.1)
where Yir denotes the ideal point of legislator i. Yir is the maximum of Ui(sr, s¯−r).
For simplicity we assume that according to formal constitutional rules protection
levels are separately decided for each agricultural commodity r.3
4.3.2 Decision-making in national systems
4.3.2.1 Parliamentary systems
For our theoretical model of legislative bargaining in parliamentary systems, we
suggest a rather simple legislative majority bargaining game that is based on the
1Although in most democratic systems members of the parliament can initiate legislation if there
is no proposal of the government.
2Note that in general government, ﬂoor and the agricultural committee consist of multiple mem-
bers.
3Please note that as matter of fact in most countries including the EU agricultural protection
levels are decided in separate legislative acts for each commodity. However, this assumption is
not essential for our theoretical results, but rather make analyses more traceable.
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existence of a stable ex ante majority coalition and on the principle of proposal
power of the government. As has been demonstrated by Huber (1996) and Dier-
meier and Feddersen (1998), stable ex ante majority coalition built among legisla-
tors essentially characterize parliamentary systems. Legislators who are members
of this majority coalition make legislative decisions exclusively. The rational of ex
ante majority coalition building corresponds to the fact that this coalition at least
weakly increases the utility of all majority members when compared to their utili-
ties derived under a default policy outcome that would result from non-cooperative
behavior of legislators. In particular, ex ante ﬁxed parliamentary majorities are able
to guarantee their members higher utilities due to additional rent legislators realize
from being part of a stable majority (Huber, 1996).
For the parliamentary legislative system, we deﬁne the following speciﬁc insti-
tutions as subsets of N : the prime minister (PM), the majority (Pinc) and the
opposition (Popp). In general, Pinc could correspond to a multi-party coalition or a
single majority party. Further, Pinc is a ﬁnite subset of legislators i ∈ N . Moreover,
we assume that the party leader of the majority party coincides with the PM . Fol-
lowing Huber (1996) as well as Diermeier and Feddersen (1998), we can concentrate
on the prime minister and her parliamentary majority that is ex ante identiﬁable
for modeling legislative decisions in parliamentary systems.
The model has two stages. At the ﬁrst stage, we model the default policy outcome
s¯r. For simplicity we assume that agricultural policy is m-dimensional and that
parliament decides about agricultural policy by simple majority voting dimension
by dimension.4 Obviously, under these assumptions the well-known median voter
theorem applies. The unique equilibrium outcome of the non-cooperative legislative
decision-making game neglecting any ex ante coalition building is the ideal point of
the ﬂoor median (Black, 1958).
At the second stage, legislators, who are members of the majority Pinc, and the
PM bargain over policy to improve their utility derived under the default outcome.
In detail, they proceed in two steps. First, the PM proposes a policy sPMr to her
parliamentary majority and announces side payments γ being paid to the major-
ity in case it admits the governmental proposal. Regarding content we interpret
these side payments as rent the PM can pay to the majority due to speciﬁc formal
legislative procedures like issuing a vote of conﬁdence, or informal procedures like
promising political career for party members. We are not speciﬁcally interested in
modeling exactly how the PM can generate rent valuable to her majority, but gen-
erally subsume this under the term party (coalition) discipline that is exerted by the
PM .5
At the second step each individual majority member i ∈ PInc can decide whether
or not to accept the proposal of the PM . For their decision, legislators maximize
the sum of actual rent γ and the utility derived from policy Ui(sr, s
par∗
−r ). If all
4Of course we could also assume more complex legislative decision-making procedures including
agenda setting power of the parliamentary committees or the government. However, this would
not change our major results and therefore we keep analyses as simple as possible at this point
and leave the analysis of more complex legislative institutions for future work.
5Note further that we assume that at this stage the PM can commit to paying the rent. However,
this assumption is not necessary; in a richer modeling set-up including the speciﬁc procedures
it is possible to get essentially the same result without assuming this kind of commitment.
108
Chapter 4 How the European Union Works: Theory and Empirical Evidence from
EU Agricultural Policy
majority members agree to the proposal, the proposed policy sPMr passes parliament
and all majority members receive the announced rent. Otherwise, the default policy
s¯r becomes the legislative decision and no rent is paid.
Proposition 1. Assuming an m-dimensional agricultural policy choice s, there ex-
ists a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for our legislative majority bargaining
game deﬁned above. The equilibrium outcome spar∗ depends on the rent γ the default
policy outcome s¯ and the policy preferences of the PM and the majority members,
i ∈ PInc.
1. In equilibrium agricultural policy choice spar∗r results from the following maxi-
mization:6
spar∗r = arg max
sr
UPM(sr, s
par∗
−r ) s.t. sr ∈
⋂
i
Sir, (4.2)
with Sir = {sr ∈ S|Ui(sr, spar∗−r ) + γ ≥ Ui(s¯r, spar∗−r ) ∀ i ∈ PInc} . (4.3)
2. In particular, it holds that the outcome of the legislative bargaining game cor-
responds to the minimal distance between the ideal point of the PM and the
interval [s−r , s
+
r ]:
spar∗r = arg min
sr
‖YPMr − sr‖ s.t. sr ∈
[
s−r , s
+
r
]
, (4.4)
where s−r = min
⋂
i
Sir and s
+
r = max
⋂
i
Sir and i ∈ PInc. (4.5)
3. Obviously given the equilibrium policy choices spar∗r of the subgames overall
policy choice in parliamentary systems results in: spar∗ = {spar∗r }.
If the rent γ is suﬃciently large or if legislators' preferences are suﬃciently ho-
mogeneous, the ﬁnal agricultural policy outcome corresponds to the ideal point of
the prime minister. Under this condition our model corresponds to pre-election po-
litical models, which generally assume that governmental policy simply corresponds
to political preferences of the party leader who becomes the omnipotent head of
government after elections. If party discipline, i.e. the rent γ, is not suﬃciently
high or analogous, policy preferences of the PM and her parliamentary majority are
suﬃciently heterogeneous, agricultural policy outcome is no more fully determined
by the PM 's policy preferences. Under this assumption policy outcome is also de-
termined by the intersection set of the subsets Sir that is determined by the policy
preferences of the majority members i ∈ PInc, the rent γ and the default policy s¯r.
4.3.2.2 Presidential systems
In contrast to parliamentary systems presidential systems are not characterized by a
stable ex ante coalition or legislative cohesion, respectively. Presidential systems are
6Note that the maximization problem always has a unique solution, as long as the utility functions
of legislators are strictly concave. Note that all sets Sir are compact and convex subsets of S.
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characterized by more dispersed proposal powers, where proposal power over speciﬁc
policy domains resides with corresponding parliamentary committees (Persson and
Tabellini, 2002). In particular, we assume that the agricultural committee exerts
agenda setting power for agricultural policies sr. Accordingly, to model agricultural
legislative bargaining in presidential systems we focus on the commodity speciﬁc
medians of the ﬂoor Fr and of the agricultural committee CAr (Weingast et al., 1981;
Krehbiel, 1991; Henning et al., 2004). Let UFr(sr, s¯−r) denote the policy preferences
of the ﬂoor median regarding subsidization of the agriculture commodity r and
UCAr(sr, s¯−r) the policy preferences of the agricultural committee.
Legislative procedure starts with the committee submitting a policy proposal sCAr
to the ﬂoor and the ﬂoor chooses the ﬁnal policy based on the committee proposal.
Policy choice in the ﬂoor can be regulated by diﬀerent rules granting diﬀerent agenda
setting power to the committee vis-à-vis the ﬂoor. For example, in the US-system
the ﬂoor can operate under the closed or open rule. Under the closed rule the ﬂoor
can only choose between the committee proposal and the status quo, while under the
open rule the ﬂoor can make an amendment to the committee proposal and select
among amended proposals. We assume in the following that the ﬂoor operates under
the closed rule granting maximal agenda setting power to the ﬂoor. Thus, if the ﬂoor
disagrees on the proposal, the status quo policy SQr remains.
By our constitutional assumptions the decisions on subsidizing agriculture com-
modities can be considered as separate legislative bargaining games. As we show
in proposition 2 below each game has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
spre∗.
Proposition 2. Assuming an m-dimensional policy choice s, there exists a unique
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for our legislative bargaining game in a presiden-
tial system as deﬁned above. The equilibrium outcome spre∗ depends on the status
quo SQ = (SQ1, .., SQr, .., SQm) and the policy preferences of the corresponding
commodity speciﬁc committee (CAr) and ﬂoor medians (Fr).
1. In equilibrium policy choice spre∗r results from the following maximization:
7
spre∗r = arg max
sr
UCAr(sr, s
pre∗
−r ) s.t. sr ∈ SFr (4.6)
with SFr = {sr ∈ S|UFr(sr, spre∗−r ) ≥ UFr(SQr, spre∗−r )} (4.7)
2. Obviously given the equilibrium policy choices spre∗r of the subgames overall
policy choice in presidential systems results in: spre∗ = {spre∗r }.
Given the assumption of separable preferences the proof of proposition 2 is straight-
forward and thus is omitted here.
7Note that for each commodity the maximization problem is independent of the solution of the
other commodities, since we assume separable policy preferences. Note further that even re-
laxing the assumption of separable policy preferences a solution of the supergame still exists.
However, this might not be unique (Shepsle, 1979). Given the policy choices for other com-
modities the maximization problem always has a unique solution for each commodity, as long
as the utility functions of legislators are strictly quasi concave. Note that all sets SFr , SCr are
compact and convex subsets of S.
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4.3.3 Supranational systems: The case of the EU
4.3.3.1 The consultation procedure
To understand the logic of the consultation procedure as laid down by the Treaty
of Rome, we deﬁne the following extended open rule procedure. The legislative
process starts with the Commission GEU formulating a proposal sG
EU
r and presenting
this proposal to the Council of Agricultural Ministers. Based on the proposal of
the Commission each member of the Council can propose an individual proposal
sir i ∈ CA. The committee then selects one proposal out of the set of these individual
proposals. The selection is done according to the following voting procedure:
i. The set of individual proposals is randomly ordered. According to this random
order, the committee votes pairwise on made proposals. Within a vote, the
lower ordered proposal wins if no qualiﬁed majorityM1 exists that prefers the
higher ordered proposal. The winner of a pairwise vote will be put against the
next ordered proposal until no proposal is left.
ii. In a second step, the selected proposal is put vis-à-vis the governmental pro-
posal sG
EU
r in a majority vote M2. If a majority M2 prefers this proposal,
it is the winner proposal, otherwise the government proposal is the winner
proposal.
iii. Finally the winner proposal of the second step is put vis-à-vis the status quo
under a majority vote M1. The winner proposal will be the ﬁnal committee
proposal, if it defeats the status quo under M1, otherwise the status quo will
be the ﬁnal committee proposal.
Please note that under the consultation procedure the majority M2 always cor-
responded to unanimity, while the qualiﬁed majority M1 has been changed with
EU-enlargement. Roughly qualiﬁed majority M1 corresponds to 71 percent of total
votes in the Council. However, member countries have diﬀerent votes. In the EU-15
total sum of Council votes was 87, where national votes ranged from 2 (Luxembourg)
to 10 (Germany, France, United Kingdom and Italy) and a qualiﬁed majority needs
at least 62 votes. In the EU-25 total sum of Council votes are 321 ranging from
3 (Malta) to 29 (Germany) and a qualiﬁed majority is deﬁned by more than 232
votes.8 Consider further, that although the European Parliament formally partic-
ipates in CAP decision-making under the consultation procedure, members of the
parliament are dummy players in legislative bargaining. The Council is not bound
by Parliament's position and in practice ignores suggestions of Parliament.
As we show in proposition 3 below each commodity speciﬁc EU-game has a unique
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium sEU∗r .
Proposition 3. Assuming an m-dimensional policy choice s, there exists a unique
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for our legislative bargaining game in the EU-
system under the consultation procedure as deﬁned above. The equilibrium outcome
8According to the Treaty the consultation procedure is in fact more complex than described above,
e.g. speciﬁc additional rules like a speciﬁc threshold of member states apply to characterize a
qualiﬁed majority. However, in essence qualiﬁed majority results from national Council weights
as described above.
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sEU∗ depends on the status quo SQ = (SQ1, .., SQr, .., SQm) and the policy prefer-
ences of the Council members and the Commission, respectively.
1. In equilibrium policy choice sEU∗ results from the following maximization:9
sEU∗r = arg max
sr
UGEU (sr, s
EU∗
−r ) s.t. sr ∈ WSCAr
⋂
PSCAr (4.8)
with
WSCAr =
{
sr ∈ S|Ui(sr, sEU∗−r ) ≥ Ui(SQr, SQ−r) ∀ i ∈ CA
}
and (4.9)
PSCAr =
{
sr ∈ S|@ s#r : Ui(s#r , sEU∗−r ) ≥ Ui(sr, sEU∗−r ) ∀ i ∈ CA
}
2. Obviously given the equilibrium policy choices of the subgames sEU∗r overall
policy choice in the EU system results as: sEU∗ =
{
sEU∗r
}
.
Given the assumption of separable preferences the proof of proposition 3 is straight-
forward and thus is omitted here.10
4.3.3.2 Cooperative legislative bargaining in the EU-system
To give an intuitive explanation how the Luxembourg Compromise as well as the
EU-universalism works consider that the Agricultural Council consists of members
from two perfectly homogeneous groups W and B. Farmers supporting Council
members of group W are specialized in crop production, while Council members
of group B get their support from farmers specialized in animal production (see
section 4.3.4 for detailed information on deriving preferences of legislators). Thus,
the European Commission and the Council have to decide upon subsidy payments
paid for two agricultural commodities, cereals W and animal B. In particular, let
sB and sW denote the level of subsidy payments for animal and crop production,
respectively.
Under the assumption of spatial policy preferences (see eq. 4.1) group B prefers
a high subsidy level for animal and a low subsidy level for crop production and vice
versa groupW prefers a high subsidy level for crop and a low for animal production.
Without loss of generality we assume that the common ideal point of group B is
YB = (1, 0) and the common ideal point of group W is YW = (0, 1). The European
Commission prefers a moderate subsidy level for both commodities, say YGEU =
(0.5, 0.5). Here, we neither analyze why the preferences of the European Commission
diverge from preferences of Council members nor how much they diﬀer in their policy
preferences, but see section 4.3.4 for further information on policy preferences of
legislators and the Commission. Assuming further that the status quo policy SQ
just equals (0, 0). We derive directly from proposition 3 the policy outcome of
non-cooperative legislative bargaining under the consultation procedure. The policy
outcome corresponds to the ideal point of the Commission, i.e. sEU∗ = (0.5, 0.5).
9Note again that for each commodity the maximization problem is independent of the solution of
the other commodities, since we assume separable policy preferences. Moreover, there always
has a unique solution, as long as the utility functions of legislators are strictly quasi concave.
Note that all sets PSCAr ,WS
CA
r are compact and convex subsets of S.
10All proofs are available from the authors upon request.
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Figure 4.2: Legislative bargaining in the EU
Source: Authors.
This outcome is ex ante rather ineﬃcient from the perspective of both groups
of Council members W and B if we further consider that preferences for commod-
ity speciﬁc high protection involves also high interests in the respective subsidy,
i.e. βWW >> βWB and βBB >> βBW . Thus, elipsoide indiﬀerence curves result
for the Council members, while legislator GEU puts the same weight on both poli-
cies and hence indiﬀerence curves are circles. Given the set of winning coalitions
Council members W and B could cooperate and signiﬁcantly improve their utility
derived from the policy outcome by forming an ex ante coalition. But they face
the problem to ﬁnd a procedure that is incentive compatible and guarantees for all
Council members a collectively Pareto dominant outcome vis-à-vis the outcome of
the non-cooperative legislative bargaining game.
A simple and incentive compatible procedure would be that Council members
grant each other mutual agenda setting power over the policy dimension they prefer
most. This procedure is known as the Luxembourg Compromise that institutional-
ized unanimity rule for agricultural policy decisions. Providing agenda setting power
to both Council groups legislators would suggest their ideal position for the subsidy
level of the commodity they are highly concerned about. The equilibrium policy
outcome in our example results in sLC∗ = (1, 1) under perfect knowledge of policy
preferences. In essence this procedure of granting mutual agenda setting power cor-
responds to the political exchange of rights as suggested by Weingast and Marshall
(1988).
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Proposition 4. Assuming an m-dimensional agricultural policy choice s, there ex-
ists a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for our legislative majority bargaining
game under the Luxembourg Compromise as deﬁned above. The equilibrium outcome
sLC∗ depends on the non-cooperative policy outcome under the consultation procedure
sEU∗ and the policy preferences of the Council members.
1. In equilibrium agricultural policy choice sLC∗r results from the following maxi-
mization:
sLC∗r = arg max
sr
Udr(sr, s
LC∗
−r ) s.t. s ∈
⋂
i
SLCi (4.10)
with SLCi =
{
s ∈ S|Ui(sr, sLC∗−r ) ≥ Ui(sEU∗) ∀ i ∈ CA
}
and
dr = arg max
i
{i ∈ CA|Yir}
2. Obviously given the equilibrium policy choices, sLC∗r , of the subgames overall
policy choice in the EU system results as: sLC∗ =
{
sLC∗r
}
.
As long as preferences intensities of Council members are suﬃciently high the
outcome of the cooperative bargaining procedure is collectively preferable to all
Council members, that is group W and B in our simple example. If legislators'
preferences are less intense, for example assume that the Pareto frontier of legislators
W and B corresponds to PS2WB instead of PS
1
WB in ﬁgure 4.2, cooperation among
Council members via granting mutual agenda setting power is less attractive as it
implies an overshooting of subsidies, while non-cooperative legislative bargaining
implies an undershooting. Please note that in Figure 4.2 there exists a non-empty
winset of the point (1,1), where the set is the larger the less preferences intensity
are biased, i.e. the more indiﬀerence curves are circles.
For this situation, the question arises again how a bargaining procedure, that is
incentive compatible, leads to more eﬃcient outcomes. Here we suggest the following
two step direction-distance procedure which corresponds to Weingast's universalism.
Like the Luxembourg Compromise this bargaining procedure relies upon cooperative
behavior of actors involved in proposal formulation. In contrast to the Luxemburg
Compromise, this procedure includes the Commission into the ex ante ﬁxed majority
coalition as follows.
At a ﬁrst step the direction towards which the status quo is going to be shifted
is determined. In detail, under this procedure legislators agree that the status quo
is shifted along the line between the status quo SQ and the outcome of the Luxem-
bourg Compromise sLC∗ (as indicated in Figure 4.2). Given the direction sLC∗−SQ
legislators vote at a second step on the distance λ to which the status quo will be
shifted. This voting procedure corresponds to the formal voting procedure deﬁned
under the consultation procedure. The Commission suggests a distance, which can
be accepted by a qualiﬁed majority in the Council or any other distance can be
unanimously accepted by the Council.
As regards content the two step common proposal procedure implies that deter-
mining the direction at the ﬁrst step corresponds to legislators common choice of
the relative subsidy level of crop and animal production. Determining the distance
at the second step Council members decide upon the total budget allocated for
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subsidy payments. Note that once the direction is ﬁxed each legislator has single
peaked preferences regarding the distance. Therefore, majority voting at the second
stage always delivers a unique solution (see Figure 4.2). To see this please note that
legislator i's preferred distance, λi, results as:
λi = arg max
λ
Ui(SQ+ λi(s
LC∗ − SQ)) (4.11)
= arg max
λ
−
∑
r=W,B
βir(Yir − λisLC∗)2
⇒ λ∗i =
∑
r
βirYirs
LC∗∑
r
βir (sLC∗)
2
As long as we assume that the Commission prefers the lowest distance compared to
all Council members, the equilibrium outcome at the second stage will be the lowest
preferred distance of the Council member who is pivot under qualiﬁed majority. In
Figure 4.2 this is Council member W .
Please note that in general the Council members could also apply the two stage
direction-distance proposal procedure excluding the Commission. But ﬁrst it would
be unclear how Council member would unanimously agree/vote on a speciﬁc distance
at the second stage. Second, obviously comparing policy outcomes under these two
procedures neither would be Pareto dominant vis-à-vis the other. Third, the less
preferences of legislators are biased towards a speciﬁc agricultural commodity the
higher are c.p. temptations of Council members to break mutual agreements with
other Council members and struck a deal with the Commission. Thus, overall the
less policy preferences are biased the less stable are any cooperative procedures
among Council members excluding the Commission, thus the only stable cooperative
procedures are the one which are ex ante Pareto dominant for all Council members
when compared to non-cooperative bargaining outcomes, i.e. the ones that explicitly
include the Commission.
Proposition 5. 11 Assuming an m-dimensional agricultural policy choice s, there
exists a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for our legislative majority bar-
gaining game under the EU-Universalism as deﬁned above. The equilibrium outcome
sUNI∗ depends on the non-cooperative policy outcome under the consultation proce-
dure sEU∗ and the policy preferences of the Council members and the Commission.
In equilibrium agricultural policy choice sUNI∗ results from the following maxi-
mization:
sUNI∗ = arg max
s
UGEU (s) s.t. s ∈
⋂
i
SUNIi (4.12)
with SUNIi =
{
s ∈ SUNI∣∣Ui(s) ≥ Ui(sEU∗) ∀ i ∈ CA} and
SUNI =
{
s ∈ S and λi ∈ R|SQ+ λi(sLC∗ − SQ)
}
11The proofs of proposition 4 and 5 are straightforward and therefore also omitted here. Of course,
the proofs are available from the authors upon request.
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4.3.4 Deriving endogenous policy preferences
We derive legislator's preferences in two settings. First we model the preferences
of legislators if their country is part of the European Union. Note here that the
preferences of the European Commission will diﬀer from the preferences of Council
members. Secondly we show how legislator's preferences emerge under national
political systems.
In the European Union legislators' policy preferences can be represented by the
net gain of policies in their member country c:
Ui(s) = Si(s)− ωc
∑
r=W,B
κc(sr), (4.13)
where Si(s) denotes the political support received from subsidizing crop and animal
production. κc(sr) denotes the costs of subsidizing crop (r = W ) or animal pro-
duction (r = B). ωc denotes the cost share of the member country c of legislator
i. This cost share corresponds to the member country's share in EU-budget, which
is determined, according to the ﬁnancial rules of the CAP, by the share of member
country's GDP in total EU-GDP. For simplicity we assume the following support
and cost functions for each member country:
Si(s) =
∑
r=W,B
Trcδcs
σ
r with σ ≤ 1 (4.14)
κc(s) =
∑
r=W,B
∑
c
Trcs
η
r with η > 1. (4.15)
Trc denotes the size of the crop and animal production sector in country c, e.g. Trc
could correspond to agricultural land used for crop and animal production, respec-
tively. δc covers speciﬁc characteristics of member countries that also have an impact
on generation of political support. For example, these characteristics include insti-
tutional settings of the electoral system, average national farm size, the organization
of farm and non-farm interest, etc..12
In contrast to national Council members the relevant constituency of a supra-
national institution, i.e. the European Commission, corresponds to the set of all
member countries. Accordingly, the policy preferences of a supranational legislator
i = GEU are represented as follows:
UGEU (s) =
∑
r
∑
c
Trcδcs
σ
r −
∑
r
∑
c
Trcs
η
r (4.16)
Hence, we assume that a supranational legislator gets political support from all mem-
ber countries, i.e. from any subsidies paid to national farmers, but also bears total
cost of subsidization, i.e. has a cost share of 1. As local approximation legislators
12A detailed theoretical and empirical analysis of economic and institutional factors determining
political support of rural and urban population is provided for example by Henning et al. (2007);
Henning (2008) or Thies and Porche (2007); Hee Park and Jensen (2007); Olper and Raimondi
(2009).
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preferences can be equivalently expressed by the following spatial utility function:
Ui(s) = −
∑
r
βir(Yir − sr)2, (4.17)
where agents' i ideal points Yir correspond to the policy implying maximal support,
i.e. it holds:
Yir =
[
σ
η
δc
trc
ωc
] 1
η−σ
, (4.18)
where trc is the production share of constituency c in production of the agricultural
commodity r. Obviously, legislator i's preferred subsidy level for an agricultural
commodity r increases with a high production share, trc, of this commodity in his
total agricultural production and declines with an increasing cost share ωc of his
constituency c. Thus, if a country is specialized in crop production it prefers high
subsidy for crops and relatively low subsidies for animal production. This holds
vice versa for countries specialized in animal production. Note further that for
the Commission cost and production shares equal 1. Thus, for both agricultural
commodities the Commission takes a middle ground between the high subsidy level
preferred by specialized member countries and the low subsidy level preferred by
less or not specialized member countries. Further, we assume that all members of
the crop group prefer the status quo subsidies for animal production and vice versa
all members of the animal group prefer status quo subsidies for crops. Moreover, we
assume without loss of generality that the original status quo SQ equals (0, 0).
Interpreting the spatial utility function as a second order Taylor approximation
of the original net political support function developed at the maximum results in:
βir =
∂2Si
∂s2r
− ∂
2κc
∂s2r
= −
[
σ (1− σ) δcTcrsσ−2r + η (η − 1)
∑
c
Tcrωcs
η−2
r
]
. (4.19)
Assuming without loss of generality that for all legislators the β-parameters are
normalized to one, the size of βir determines how national legislators evaluate sub-
sidy payments according to the specialization of their country's agricultural sector.
Overall they compare subsidy payments for the agricultural commodity their con-
stituency is specialized in to budgetary outlays for subsidies paid to agricultural
commodities their constituency is not specialized in. Here, it holds for sr = Yir:
βiB
βiW
=
(
siB
siW
)σ−2 [ (1−σ)(η−1) σ2η2 δ2c ( ωcsiB )2 + 1
]
[
(1−σ)
(η−1)
σ2
η2
δ2c
(
ωc
siW
)2
+ 1
] . (4.20)
Please note that for the Commission the relative interest in crop and animal
subsidies is always 0.5 as long as we assume that the relative electoral bias in favor
of farmers is in average of all EU-member countries the same for crop and animal
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farmers, i.e. it holds:
δGEUB =
∑
c
δctcB∑
c
tcB
=
∑
c
δctcW∑
c
tcW
= δGEUW (4.21)
Next we derive the policy preferences of members of the parliament in national
political systems, i.e. i ∈ P . In general legislators represent national agricultural
interest to a diﬀerent degree depending on their election in urban versus rural con-
stituencies. A common feature of industrialized countries like EU member countries
is the advanced urbanization. Thus the majority of parliamentary seats are elected
in urban districts and only a minority of parliamentary seats are elected in rural
districts (Henning et al., 2007). Accordingly, the commodity speciﬁc ﬂoor median
in regard to any agricultural policy Fr will always represent urban interests. But
in terms of the representation of special interests in parliament (Krehbiel, 1991) ar-
gued that preference outliers hold positions in speciﬁc partitions of the parliament,
the governmental departments as well the parliamentary committees. Further the
political exchange theory of Weingast and Marshall (1988) suggests that legislators
representing rural interest have higher incentives to control the agricultural depart-
ment of government GA as well as the parliamentary committee of agriculture CA.
It follows:
δFr ≤ δi∀i ∈ CA and ∀i ∈ GA. (4.22)
Consider now that all member countries build one parliament. Introducing national
partitions of ﬂoor members Fc, then a speciﬁc subset Fc includes all members of
the parliament belonging to the member country c. Since member countries are
specialized in the production of at least one commodity, Fc is a preference outlier
for this particular commodity. As the ﬂoor median Fr represents the median con-
stituency across all member countries which will not be specialized in production of
commodity r, it holds:
δFr ≤ δi∀i ∈ Fc, (4.23)
if c is specialized in the production of r. Hence, the ﬂoor median prefers a sig-
niﬁcantly lower protection level for commodity r when compared to the preferred
protection level of specialized member country.
In terms of the Commission, we assume that the Commission represents the in-
terest of an average constituency across all member countries. It also follows that
the commodity speciﬁc ﬂoor median prefers also signiﬁcantly lower protection levels
when compared to the European Commission.
δFr < δGEUr ∀r (4.24)
Accordingly, political support maximization according to eq. 4.17 results in:
YFr < YGEUr ∀r, (4.25)
YFr < YFc ∀r and (4.26)
YFr < Yi∀i ∈ CA and ∀i ∈ GA. (4.27)
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4.4 Comparison of policy outcomes under diﬀerent
governmental regimes
Using propositions 1-5 and derived policy preferences of legislators, we are now able
to compare policy outcomes under the EU-system, parliamentary and presidential
systems. The comparison is summarized in proposition 6.
Proposition 6. Assuming an m-dimensional agricultural policy space and assuming
(spatial) policy preferences of agents are derived from political support maximization
as speciﬁed above, the following statements hold true:
i. The policy outcome under the formal consultation procedure is always higher or
equal when compared to the outcome under a parliamentary system, i.e. sEU∗ ≥
spar∗. Moreover the absolute diﬀerence between policy outcomes is higher the
more heterogeneous policy preferences among member countries are.
ii. Comparing outcomes under the formal consultation procedure and presiden-
tial system, the outcome depends on the relative agenda setting power of the
agricultural committee vis-à-vis the ﬂoor. If and only if it holds YFr − SQr ≤
YrGEU−YFr , then sEU∗r ≥ spre∗r . Moreover, the diﬀerence sEU∗ ≥ spre∗ increases
with the heterogeneity of policy preferences among member countries.
iii. Comparing outcomes under the formal consultation procedure and the informal
Luxembourg Compromise it directly follows that: sEU∗ − sLC∗ ≤ 0, where this
diﬀerence increases with the heterogeneity of policy preferences among national
Council members.
iv. Comparing outcomes under the formal consultation procedure and the informal
EU-universalism it directly follows that: sEU∗− sUNI∗ ≤ 0, where this absolute
diﬀerence decreases with heterogeneity of national Council members.
v. Comparing outcomes under the Luxembourg Compromise and EU-universalism
it directly follows that: sUNI∗ − sLC∗ ≤ 0, where this absolute diﬀerence in-
creases with heterogeneity of national Council members.
Part (i) and (ii) follow directly from proposition 1-3 and derived policy preferences
of member countries, the Commission and the ﬂoor assuming some heterogeneity in
the agricultural structure across member countries, e.g. siB > siW ∀ i ∈ B and
siW > siB ∀ i ∈ W . Analogously, the ﬁrst statements of parts (iii), (iv) and (v) fol-
low directly from proposition 3-5 assuming again heterogeneous preferences of mem-
ber countries and a status quo policy of (0, 0). Only the second statements of parts
(iii)-(v) regarding the absolute diﬀerence of policy outcomes remain to be proven.
Generally, this can be done by using comparative static results for the model de-
scribed above. However, instead of deriving these comparative statics explicitly, we
provide a graphical representation of equilibrium outcomes under diﬀerent regimes
assuming diﬀerent degrees of heterogeneity in Figure 4.3.
In terms of the inﬂuence of heterogeneous preferences on policy outcomes consider
that in general heterogeneous policy preferences result from diversiﬁed agricultural
sector structures according to eq. 4.18. The variance or span of preferred policy
positions Yir across member countries gets c.p. larger with a larger variance or span
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of the relation tir
wc
across member countries. Thus, the maximal preferred protection
level within the Council of Agricultural Ministers Ydr increases with increasing het-
erogeneity. However, assuming a mean preserving increase of heterogeneity implies
that the policy position of the European Commission YGEUr remains constant, while
the position of the commodity speciﬁc ﬂoor median YFr decreases. Thus, four major
points already follow for the equilibrium policy outcomes.
First assuming a constant coalition discipline implies that the equilibrium out-
comes under parliamentarism decrease c.p. with increasing heterogeneity. Note that
it is impossible for the Commission as a supranational government to perfectly disci-
pline her coalition under high heterogeneity. Hence the Commission has to compro-
mise by accepting a lower protection level than preferred. It holds that the outcomes
under a parliamentary regime are always lower or equal to the preferred position of
the government, where the latter just results as the outcome under the consulta-
tion procedure. Second, in contrast to the parliamentary regime the consultation
procedure provides the Commission suﬃcient agenda setter power vis-à-vis a hetero-
geneous Council as the agricultural committee to vote its preferred protection levels
through (see Figure 4.3). Third, equilibrium outcomes also decrease with increasing
heterogeneity in presidential regimes because the impact of the agenda setter power
of the agricultural Council as the agricultural committee vis-à-vis the ﬂoor on the ﬁ-
nal policy decision decreases with more heterogeneous policy preferences. The latter
results from the fact that the commodity speciﬁc ﬂoor medians tend to move towards
the corresponding status-quo levels with increasing heterogeneity while the power of
the committee is limited. However, please note that in contrast to a parliamentary
regime policy outcomes under presidentialism can result in higher protection lev-
els than preferred by the Commission as the supranational government (see Figure
4.3). Fourth, it also follows straightforward from comparative statics of eq.4.18 and
proposition 5 that equilibrium policy outcomes under the Luxembourg Compromise
increase with more heterogeneous policy preferences of Council members.
In summary, equilibrium outcomes under both parliamentary and presidential
regimes decrease ceteris paribus with more heterogeneous policy preferences, while
the equilibrium outcome of cooperative legislative bargaining under the Luxembourg
Compromise increases. However equilibrium outcome of non-cooperative legislative
bargaining under the consultation procedure remains unchanged.
Until now we left out to discuss equilibrium outcomes of the EU-universalism.
Please note that under universalism the linear relation between the heterogeneity of
policy preferences and agricultural protection levels in equilibrium as observed in the
other governmental regimes does not hold. In fact an inverse u-shape relation results
from comparative statics. If the preferences among national Council members are
relatively homogeneous, an increase of heterogeneity implies an increase of equilib-
rium agricultural protection levels, while high heterogeneity at the start leads to the
opposite comparative static eﬀect (see Figure 4.3). To understand this relationship
intuitively note that increased heterogeneity has an eﬀect on both, the preferred
protection level regarding the country speciﬁc agricultural commodity, Yirc , and the
relative intensity to receive own high protection levels vis-à-vis the intensity to keep
protection levels of other member countries commodities at a bay, βirc
(1−βirc ) . Accord-
ingly, the more heterogeneous policy preferences, the larger is c.p. agents incentive
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Figure 4.3: Agricultural policy outcomes under diﬀerent governmental regimes
Source: Authors.
to keep overall protection at a bay. Formally, this follows from the comparative
statics of λi∗ with regard to increased heterogeneity, which is positive for low levels
of heterogeneity, but negative for high levels of heterogeneity.
Finally, please note that if heterogeneity is suﬃciently high, Council members
unanimously prefer lower protection levels resulting under universalism when com-
pared to extreme high protection levels received under the Luxembourg Compromise
(see Figure 4.3). Note further that the latter becomes extremely ineﬃcient for high
heterogeneity, e.g. equilibrium outcome under the Luxembourg Compromise are ex-
tremely distant from the Pareto-frontier of the Council, while policy outcomes under
universalism always lie on the Pareto-frontier of the Council. (q.e.d.)
Overall, it follows from proposition 1-6 that Council members of the EU-6 initially
preferred policy outcomes derived under the Luxembourg Compromise when com-
pared to the formal consultation procedure. Further, under the application of the
Luxembourg Compromise EU agricultural protection levels are signiﬁcantly higher,
when compared to protection levels that would have been derived under a parliamen-
tary or presidential regime, respectively. Since agricultural structures of EU-member
countries become more heterogeneous in an enlarged EU, agricultural protection in-
creases in an enlarged EU under the Luxembourg Compromise. However, assuming
increasing heterogeneity of member countries through continuing enlargements im-
plies that Council members unanimously prefer lower protection levels derived under
universalism when compared to extremely high protection levels resulting under the
Luxembourg Compromise. Thus, a regime switch from the Luxembourg Compro-
mise to the EU-universalism occurred, since this switch is a Pareto-dominant move
from the viewpoint of all relevant political agents (Council members and Commis-
sion) and hence corresponds to a unanimous constitutional preference. Note that it
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directly follows that this regime switch implies a signiﬁcant reduction in EU agri-
cultural protection levels. However, it still follows from proposition 1-3 that even
under EU-universalism protection levels remain signiﬁcantly higher when compared
to protection levels resulting under a parliamentary or presidential regime.
In essence the legislative bargaining procedures in the EU permit higher agri-
cultural protection levels when compared to standard national procedures. Due to
the constitutional rules speciﬁed under the consultation procedure the agricultural
Council, i.e. the agricultural committee, has an extremely high agenda setting power
vis-à-vis the ﬂoor available. Therefore, agricultural preference outliers which natu-
rally are members of the agricultural committee in all governmental regimes have
the political power to bias policies in favor of rural and at the expense of urban
interest.
4.5 Empirical evidence
4.5.1 Data description
Data for a comprehensive analysis of the eﬀect of political institutions on agricultural
protection were scarce, until Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) published recently
agricultural protection measures for about 75 countries since 1955. Until then re-
searchers could not empirically validate theories concerned with events before 1986.
The broadly used Producer Support Estimate (PSE) by the OECD does simply not
provide protection measures for these years. The time-series of protection rates as
reported by Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), the Nominal Rates of Assistance to
the agricultural sector (NRA), are calculated as a weighted average of commodity-
speciﬁc NRAs using the undistorted production values of the commodities as weights.
In contrast to the concept of the PSE, the unit value diﬀerence of production be-
tween the world and domestic market is expressed as a fraction of the undistorted
product value and not as a fraction of the distorted product value. Analogously to
the PSE, the NRA considers indirect market interventions, e.g. direct transfer pay-
ments. Furthermore, the NRA is corrected for exchange rates distortions. By far
Anderson and Valenzuela (2008)'s data set is the most encompassing data collection
of agricultural protection rates we know.
Given the fact that our theory focuses on the impact of political institutions
on agricultural protection in democracies, we select country years out of available
observations according to a country's democratic performance in the speciﬁc year. To
judge about the democratic status of a country, Freedom House (2008) and Eckstein
and Gurr (1975) provide two diﬀerent but highly correlated measures of democracy.
As the latter data set provides for a consistent measure for more years and countries
than the ﬁrst, we choose the measures polity and polity2 of Eckstein and Gurr
(1975) to select our country-year observations. Both indicators measure the net-
authority quality of a country on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 to +10. Thus,
these measures summarize autocratic and democratic characteristics of governing
institutions to one index with higher values indicating better democracies. In a ﬁrst
step, we deﬁne a democratic country by a polity2 -score above zero according to the
deﬁnition given by Eckstein and Gurr (1975). However, as this deﬁnition would
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also include countries in our sample that are relatively unstable democracies, we use
further a combination of a smoothed ﬁve-year average of polity and the polity2 -score
to ﬁlter unstable democratic countries. Countries are included into our sample if
the ﬁve-year average is greater or at least equal to 1 and if polity2 is greater than
zero.13
Further, we deﬁne a dummy variable EU indicating EU membership. EU switches
from 0 to 1 if a country joins the European Union. Since countries might be antici-
pating the accession in their policy decisions on protection, the dummy even codes
the year before accession with 1. This dummy reﬂects the institutional regime switch
experienced by new member states when joining the European Union. To analyze
the eﬀect of institutional rearrangements within the European Union, we deﬁne an-
other dummy variable LC. The dummy codes country-years with 1, if the country is
a member of the EU after 1987, and with zero for non member countries after 1987
and for all countries before 1987, respectively. Hence, LC captures the eﬀect of the
new informal legislative bargaining procedure in practice for CAP decision-making
after 1987 compared to the eﬀect of the Luxembourg Compromise.
We follow the standard literature on the political economy of agricultural pro-
tection for selecting interesting controls (see Beghin and Kherallah, 1994; Swinnen
et al., 2000; Swinnen, 1994; Balisacan and Roumasset, 1987; Olper, 2001; Tyers and
Anderson, 1992; Anderson, 2008). Data on economic and sociodemographic controls
are taken from the database of World Development Indicators by the World Bank
and from the database of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAOSTAT, 2008; World Bank, 2008). Our set of controls includes the
logarithm of real GDP per capita (gdppcln) to capture the state of economic de-
velopment, the ratio of agricultural share in value-added and agricultural share in
employment (compad) to proxy comparative advantages in agriculture and arable
land, and land under permanent crops per farm worker (factorend) to take the rel-
ative incomes of agricultural farmers into account. We further include the share
of agricultural exports in total merchandise exports (tax_agri) to consider the tax
collection constraints that governments face especially in developing countries to
provide e.g. public goods. Following Beghin and Kherallah (1994), we deﬁne bud-
get as the net agricultural export value per GDP per capita in order to account for
governmental budget constraints to protect the agricultural sector. Furthermore, we
use the logarithm of agricultural share in employment (emplln) to account for diﬀer-
ences in economic structure and industrialization that reﬂect the ability of farmers
to organize and to lobby for political support. To account for international agree-
ments inﬂuencing domestic producer support, we include a period dummy urround.
Here, urround considers the impact of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agricul-
tural on agricultural protection in high developed countries. We code the dummy
with one for high income countries after 1994 with high income countries deﬁned by
an Human Development Index above 0.8 (United Nations Development Program,
2008) and zero otherwise.
Finally, our sample covers 58 countries from 1961-2005 due to scarcity of data for
some of the polit-economic controls and non-democratic status.
13As polity2 is not reported for Iceland, we refer to the Gastil-Index by Freedom House (2008)
that deﬁnes Iceland as a democracy.
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4.5.2 Estimation strategy
To ensure a valid analysis of our hypotheses concerning the impact of legislative orga-
nization in the European Union on agricultural protection, we need to address some
problems inherent to time-series cross-section data: i. country speciﬁc unobserved
heterogeneity, ii. time shocks common to all countries and iii. the dynamics of polit-
ical decision-making. Thus, we employ a dynamic two-way ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation
(DFE):
NRAi,t = α + ρNRAi,t−1 + βxi,t + υzi,t + ϕt + ξi + i,t, (4.28)
i = 1, ..., N ; t = 1, ..., T
with the subscripts i denoting countries and t years. NRAi,t denotes the measure of
agricultural protection and xi,t denotes a set demographic and economic controls that
are well-known to impact agricultural policies. zit is a set of our dummy variables
that indicate EU membership and institutional settings speciﬁc to the European
Union. α is a constant and it is an error term.
In terms of the above described methodological aspects, this speciﬁcation ad-
dresses the issue of country speciﬁc heterogeneity via consideration of country spe-
ciﬁc eﬀects ξi (estimated by N − 1 countries dummies). In fact ξi includes local
time-invariant factors like political institutions. Consequently, this approach would
hinder analyzing the impact of diﬀerent constitutional settings on agricultural pro-
tection if political institutions show no time variance in countries. But in our case the
ﬁxed eﬀect approach allows for assessing the impact of constitutional change, which
is indeed joining the European Union and the informal institutional rearrangement,
while controlling correctly for unobserved country heterogeneity. Further, consider
that our set of dummy variables indicating EU membership or institutional settings
speciﬁc to the European Union, respectively, is allowed to be systematically corre-
lated with the ﬁxed eﬀects ξi without rendering the model in eq. 4.28 inconsistent
(see Wooldridge, 2002). Hence, the proposed ﬁxed eﬀect model enables us to esti-
mate the eﬀect of an institutional regime switch consistently, even if time-invariant,
unobserved characteristics would aﬀect the regime switch as well as the endogenous
variable.
For the case of country-invariant time-speciﬁc shocks, we include time ﬁxed eﬀects
ϕt (estimated by T − 1 time dummies). By further including a period dummy for
high income countriesi.e. urround, the speciﬁcation picks up time trends that will
diﬀer among countries due to their economic characteristics.
Further, the model includes the lagged endogenous variable NRAi,t−1 to capture
that governments do not reform policies in democracies immediately, if conditions
change. Policy processes can rather be seen as partial adjustment processes over
time. As noted above instant political interventions due to crisis are modeled via
the inclusion of time dummies. In fact, past socio-economic conditions explicitly
inﬂuence contemporary policy decisions because they drive the incentives and pos-
sibilities for groups, i.e. farmers in our case, to organize and to lobby for income
redistribution. Moreover, the lagged dependent variable appears in the model to
remove autocorrelation in the error terms. We test serial correlation in the error
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terms via a Lagrange multiplier test proposed by Baltagi (2005, p. 93ﬀ.).14
However, estimating eq. 4.28 by OLS renders the estimators biased and inconsis-
tent, although the common within-transformation to estimate ﬁxed eﬀect models will
solve the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable caused by its correlation with
the country ﬁxed eﬀect. But demeaning introduces a new correlation between the
demeaned lagged dependent variable and the demeaned error term. Nickell (1981)
has shown that the resulting bias in dynamic ﬁxed models is decreasing in T . Thus,
we might dismiss this bias as insigniﬁcant in our sample. Further, the application of
corrected ﬁxed eﬀect estimators or GMM estimation procedures, respectively, when
T is large, is discussed by Beck and Katz (2009), Beck and Katz (2011) and Judson
and Owen (1999). Monte-Carlo simulations presented by these authors compare
the eﬃciency and consistency of alternative estimators to the standard OLS estima-
tor. They conclude that standard LSDV estimation should be used with unbalanced
time-series cross-section data. Nevertheless, we run robustness checks on our data
using diﬀerent approaches to correct for the bias (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Bruno,
2005).15
Note that inference is based on cluster-robust standard errors with countries de-
ﬁned as clusters (see White, 1980).
While the model in eq. 4.28 delivers the treatment eﬀect of EU institutions on
agricultural protection, we turn to a pure cross-section approach to analyze their
impact on the level of agricultural protection compared to non member countries:
NRAi = α + βxi + υEUi + λProtec
+
i + i, (4.29)
where NRAi denotes the mean of agricultural protection over a speciﬁc period,
xi denotes the set of the same controls as above averaged over a speciﬁc period,
EUi is a dummy variable that indicates EU membership, Protec
+
i is a set of country
dummy variables and i is an error term. The speciﬁc periods are deﬁned by the time
periods between the enlargements. This approach ensures a consistent sample of EU
countries for which agricultural protection is decided by supranational institutions
for the whole period under observation. We average our yearly available data over
the periods 1961-1972 (EU-6), 1973-1984 (EU-9), 1985-1993 (EU-12), 1994-2002
(EU-15) and 2003-2005 (EU-25).16
We further care for unobserved country heterogeneity that is not captured by
our independent variables by countries dummies Protec+i . Information on countries
for which a pooled model predicts agricultural protection rates poorly is derived
from a cross-validation experiment with pooled dynamic OLS regressions (Stone,
1974; Beck et al., 2001). In detail we estimate the speciﬁcation of eq. 4.28 N -times
14The LM test statistic for ﬁrst order serial correlation in the ﬁxed eﬀects model is 27.02. The test
statistic is asymptotically distributed as χ21. That is we have serially correlated error terms,
even if the ﬁxed eﬀects might solve a substantial share of serial correlation due to time-invariant
omitted variables.
15Results are available from the authors upon request. In fact, we used the Arellano-Bond estimator
and the Kiviet's corrected LSDV estimator extended for unbalanced panels by Bruno (2005).
Our main results remain unchanged.
16Note that we cannot diﬀerentiate between the EU-9 and EU-10 because data is not available for
Greece.
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with N − 1 countries and without country-ﬁxed eﬀects. Then we predict the NRA
of the left out country with the estimated coeﬃcients and compute mean squared
forecast errors (MSFE) to identify country speciﬁc heterogeneity. In particular,
we compare country speciﬁc MSFEs with average MSFE (0.036) plus one standard
deviation (0.073). Following our analyses, we employ a group dummy for Iceland
(MSFE=0.359), Norway (MSFE=0.206) and Switzerland (MSFE=0.418). Inference
relies again upon corrected standard errors as suggested byWhite (1980) but without
clustering at the country level.
4.5.3 Results
Table 4.1 reports the results applying the estimation strategies outlined above to
our data set. Model 1 estimates the impact of supranational decision-making on
agricultural protection within a dynamic ﬁxed eﬀect model. Models 2-6 show the
results of the cross-section estimations.
4.5.3.1 Dynamic ﬁxed eﬀect model
Focusing ﬁrstly on model 1 the explanatory power of the model (within R2) is 0.604.
This suggests that our model reﬂects determinants of agricultural protection within
a country quite well. Regarding model dynamics, the lagged dependent variable has
an estimated coeﬃcient of 0.630, which signals a moderate time persistence of agri-
cultural protection rates.17 Further, F tests on the joint signiﬁcance of country- or
time-ﬁxed eﬀects, respectively, recommend the use of both to estimate determinants
of agricultural protection rates.
For model 1, we notice that the estimation results for the standard political econ-
omy factors determining agricultural protection are consistent with the results of
well-known studies (for an overview on these studies see Swinnen et al., 2001)).
All classical variables enter the model with the expected signs, if they are statis-
tically signiﬁcant at a 10 percent level or higher. In detail, the negative estimate
of emplln conﬁrms Olson's theory that lower cost of collective action due to a de-
creasing free-riding problem for smaller farm groups implies c.p. higher agricultural
protection. Similarly the positive estimate of gdppcln supports the hypothesis of
the so-called development paradox (Tyers and Anderson, 1992). The development
paradox describes the phenomenon that countries increase domestic protection for
their agricultural sector with upward economic development to reduce rising income
disparities among the agricultural and industrial sector. Another ﬁnding that is in
line with literature is the negative coeﬃcient of tax_agri. That is an increasing
share of agricultural exports in merchandise exports decreases domestic support of
the agricultural sector c.p.. This ﬁnding is in line with the theoretical expectation
that developing countries will tax their agricultural sector with increasing export
orientation of the sector to generate government revenue. Further, with regard to
17Note that we run robustness checks on our data using diﬀerent approaches to correct for the
Nickell bias (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Bruno, 2005). Results are available from the authors
upon request. In fact, we used the Arellano-Bond estimator and the Kiviet's corrected LSDV
estimator extended for unbalanced panels by Bruno (2005). Our main results remain unchanged,
if we apply these models.
126
Chapter 4 How the European Union Works: Theory and Empirical Evidence from
EU Agricultural Policy
Table 4.1: Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DFE EU-6 EU-9 EU-12 EU-15 EU-25
α -.466∗∗ -.156 .229 .040 .024 .047
(.237) (.242) (.178) (.130) (.109) (.107)
NRAt−1 .630∗∗∗
(.040)
gdppcln .125∗∗ .267∗∗ .015 .159 .044 .047
(.058) (.131) (.069) (.100) (.077) (.080)
compad -.048 .890∗ -.014 -.063 -.206 -.105
(.046) (.530) (.299) (.188) (.130) (.120)
factorend .016 -.558∗∗ -.423∗∗ -.417∗∗ -.436∗∗ -.324∗∗
(.093) (.247) (.196) (.186) (.184) (.160)
budget .001 -.756 .640∗∗∗ .024 -.052 -.069
(.040) (.977) (.239) (.180) (.126) (.098)
tax_agri -.001∗∗∗ -.007∗∗ -.008∗∗∗ -.007∗∗ -.004 -.005∗∗
(.0005) (.003) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.003)
empl -.121∗∗ .186 -.097 -.061 -.183∗ -.139
(.058) (.210) (.101) (.106) (.096) (.090)
EU .137∗∗∗ .173 .324∗∗ .228 .085 .020
(.032) (.185) (.144) (.145) (.103) (.093)
LC -.090∗∗
(.037)
urround -.086∗
(.045)
Protec+ 2.485∗∗∗ 2.580∗∗∗ 1.688∗∗∗ 1.473∗∗∗
(.244) (.241) (.174) (.186)
# obs. 1487 21 30 49 57 57
# countries 58 21 30 49 57 57
R2 .604 .716 .955 .867 .843 .817
C-FE (F (57,1475)) 4.876∗∗∗
T-FE (F (44,1475)) 7.212∗∗∗
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors are given in parentheses for model 1, robust
standard errors are given in parentheses for model 2-6, ∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 10
percent level, ∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level, and ∗∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance
at the 1 percent level. Source: Authors.
developed countries protecting agriculture, agricultural protection of agricultural ex-
ports will threaten budgetary solvency and is thereby reduced with increasing export
orientation. The eﬀect of the WTO negotiations is, as expected, negative but just
signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Overall the Agreement on Agriculture of the Uruguay
Round reduces protection in high income countries by 8.6 percentage points.
All other classical determinants of agricultural protection remain insigniﬁcant in
our model. With regard to the variable budget, Beghin and Kherallah (1994) have
still mentioned the diﬃculty in previous studies to ﬁnd strong empirical evidence on
the revenue motive of government.
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So far we have dealt with the general theory of the political economy of agri-
cultural protection to show that our model ﬁts well-known studies. Next we turn
to the interpretation of the coeﬃcients we are most interested in. Concerning the
impact of supranational decision-making on agricultural protection, our estimation
predicts that joining the EU signiﬁcantly increases agricultural protection levels by
13.7 percentage points c.p.. The impact of joining the EU in the long-run is even
about 37 percentage points.18 Thus, our theoretical prediction that the institutional
change immanent to joining the EU increases agricultural protection is empirically
supported. Regarding our second hypothesis that informal institutional decision-
making rules have changed over time, the negative sign of LC supports our theory.
Institutional rearrangements after 1987 aﬀect signiﬁcantly agricultural protection.
Indeed, the new legislative norm in practice for the Common Agricultural Policy is
the starting point for a cutback of agricultural protection. The institutional reform
leads to a decrease of protection of about 24.3 percentage points in the long-run.
Further, joining the EU after 1987 will increase domestic support for agriculture by
4.7 percentage points in the short-run and 12.7 percentage points in the long-run.
4.5.3.2 Evidence from cross-country estimations
Although results of model 1 clearly argue for a treatment eﬀect of the EU decision-
making process on agricultural protection, the DFE does not reveal the level impact
of the EU institution in comparison to all other countries. Therefore we extend our
empirical analysis by running pure cross-section estimations. Consider as motiva-
tion for these estimations, studies that argue for the European Union as an outlier
regarding agricultural protection (Thies and Porche, 2007; Bilal, 2000). However,
our theoretical model does not provide a well-founded theory that argues for the in-
crease of protection compared to other countries due to EU institutions. The model
solely predicts the treatment eﬀect of joining the EU inducing an institutional regime
switch for a country and a time-political regime interaction eﬀect that corresponds
to a switch in informal legislative decision-making rules over time in the EU. Thus,
the following empirical analysis delivers just empirical evidence on determinants of
agricultural protection across countries during speciﬁc periods. Overall, the explana-
tory power of the cross-country estimations according to eq. 4.29 is always quite well
with an R-squared above 0.7 for each of the regressions. The cross-section estimation
rely on country-time observations available for the ﬁve periods 1961-1972 (EU-6),
1973-1984 (EU-9), 1985-1993 (EU-12), 1994-2002 (EU-15) and 2003-2005 (EU-25).
Starting with the controls, the overall picture is relatively robust and in line with
theory. Independent from the time period under analysis, we ﬁnd that an increase in
the relative income of farmers (factorend) and in the share of agricultural exports in
total merchandise exports (tax_agri) lowers agricultural protection. The coeﬃcients
for these factors are highly signiﬁcant except for tax_agri in model 5. Regarding the
impact of the gross domestic product, an increase in economic development increases
protection rates but signiﬁcantly solely in model 2. Concerning the ability to lobby,
represented by emplln, model 2 argues for a positive relation between small groups
and agricultural support but this eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant. For all other
18Long-run estimates are calculated by υ(1−ρ) .
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models Olson's theory holds.
For some of the variables, we observe a counter-theoretical sign, if they are statis-
tically signiﬁcant. In model 2 an increase in the comparative advantage (compad)
is associated with an increase in protection. Theory would suggest that the higher
the comparative advantages in agriculture the lower is the demand for protection.
Similarly, an increase in budget costs due to a net-export situation (budget) boosts
agricultural support in model 3. Note that the EU subsidized the agricultural sector
during this period highly although facing an agricultural netto-export situation.
Focusing now on the dummy indicating EU membership, the picture is clear-
cut: agricultural protection exceeds always protection levels of other countries as
indicated by the positive EU dummy across all models while controlling for polit-
economic determinants of agricultural protection. However, agricultural protection
increases until the third enlargement and decreases afterwards. Hence, results again
suggest that the informal Luxembourg Compromise raised agricultural protection
in the EU signiﬁcantly and even above levels in other countries. See also model
1, where we estimated explicitly the time-political regime interaction eﬀect in EU
member countries. Hence, although our theory solely predicts an individual level
treatment eﬀect, results argue also for a positive eﬀect of the supranational system
compared to other national political systems.
Figure 4.4: Nominal rates of assistance to the agricultural sector (NRA) over time
in selected countries
Notes: Lines plot the smoothed average of NRA using the Stata command lpoly with
bandwith 5 and degree 0. High income countries are countries deﬁned by an Human
Development Index above 0.8. NRA is not available for Iceland, Norway and Switzerland
before 1979. Source: Calculated by authors using data by Anderson et al. (2008).
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The regressions also include a dummy for a set of countries -Iceland, Norway and
Switzerland- that are well-known protection outliers. We used an out-of-sample pre-
diction experiment described in Section 4.5.2 to determine outliers in our sample.
In addition to the experiment, we plot agricultural protection rates for the Euro-
pean Union, the United States, the Protec+-countries and high income countries
excluding the EU member and Protec+-countries in Figure 4.5.3.2 to depict graphi-
cally patterns of agricultural protection across these countries and time. The ﬁgure
shows clearly that the Protec+ countries highly subsidize their agricultural sector
even compared to other high income countries. This pattern of agricultural protec-
tion explains the highly positive sign of the dummy coeﬃcient. Hence the dummy
enables us to capture local unobserved factors boosting the demand for agricultural
protection, for which we do not control with the explaining variables.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper provides a theoretical model of political decision-making for explaining
agricultural protection in the supranational political system of the European Union.
The model compares policy outcomes under the EU-system with the counterfactual
policy outcomes that would be observed under a parliamentary and a presidential
regime, respectively. Further, we demonstrate that agricultural policy outcomes
depend systematically on informal legislative bargaining procedures and vary for
each bargaining procedure with the number of EU member countries. Accordingly,
EU enlargements drive legislators' incentives to adopt speciﬁc cooperative legislative
bargaining procedures. Thus, our theory not only explains higher protection levels
for countries, if they join the EU, but furthermore the speciﬁc dynamic development
of agricultural protection in the EU as shown in Figure 4.1.
In particular, member countries of the EU-6 have a strong incentive to formulate
CAP under the so-called Luxembourg Compromise. Under this procedure, they
form a stable ex-ante coalition in the Council excluding the European Commission
and grant each other agenda setting power over policies, if a member country has a
particular interest in a speciﬁc agricultural commodity. Consequently, government
ﬁnances protection for all member countries' "pet commodities". We observe ex-
tremely high agricultural protection levels, if the Luxembourg Compromise is the
legislative rule in practice for agricultural policy decision-making. Further, we show
that this situation generates incentives to change the informal bargaining procedure
with an increasing number of member countries. Accordingly, member countries of
the EU-15 and especially the EU-25 agree on an informal legislative decision-making
rule ensuring lower domestic support. In fact, granting agenda setting power to the
Commission would result in lower protection rates, because the Commission sup-
ports moderate protection levels according to their political support function. Thus,
Council members agree on a new legislative norm that includes the Commission into
an ex ante ﬁxed majority coalition. That is the new legislative norm corresponds to
Weingast's universalism. Finally, this norm enables Council members to reform agri-
cultural policy signiﬁcantly resulting in a sharp decline of protection levels compared
to the levels under the Luxembourg Compromise. However, this new legislative norm
does still not correspond to the formal consultation as laid down in the constitu-
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tion but relies upon cooperative behavior of Council members. In addition to this,
we also show that universalism as well as the formal consultation procedure imply
signiﬁcantly higher protection levels when compared to counterfactual agricultural
protection levels derived under parliamentary or presidential regimes, respectively.
Our theoretical work is also empirically tested with a dynamic ﬁxed eﬀect model
using data of 58 countries over the period 1961-2005. Estimation results nicely
support our theory. Controlling for standard economic and demographic factors as
well as for unobserved country- and time-speciﬁc heterogeneity, a highly signiﬁcant
positive impact of the EU-system on agricultural protection results. Hence, an
institutional regime switch from national forms of government to a supranational
system increases support of the agricultural sector in a country c.p. signiﬁcantly.
Moreover, a time-regime interaction dummy variable that discriminates the peri-
ods under Luxembourg Compromise and Universalism has a highly signiﬁcant and
negative coeﬃcient. As suggested by theory, this indicates a decrease in protection
rates due to institutional rearrangements within the Council. In detail, including the
moderate Commission into an ex ante ﬁxed majority coalition enabled the Council
to reform the CAP towards lower protection rates. We further provide empirical in-
sights for the level impact of the EU decision-making system when compared to non
EU countries. Again, these cross-section estimations argue for decrease in protec-
tion due to an institutional regime switch. More important is that we also observe
a cross-country eﬀect of the EU regime when controlling for standard controls and
unobserved heterogeneity. But we see clearly that the diﬀerence in protection de-
creases after the informal institutional change in 1987. Nevertheless, these results
motivate for future research on cross-country eﬀect of the EU system on agricultural
protection.
Finally, we admit that the EU dummy will also capture other characteristics of
the European Union than the unique institutional system. That is agricultural
protection and the EU dummy will be aﬀected by the same factors for which we
do not control here. In particular, the dummy might also cover the agricultural
lobby system of the EU. Hence, the dummy is just a proxy for the supranational
institutional system of EU. However, while adequate econometric techniques, for
instance an instrument variable approach, are known to eﬃciently disentangle the
eﬀect of the lobby system from the institutional system, variables that would allow
for an instrument variable estimation are still missing. In detail, to the best of our
knowledge, data about the strength of national agricultural lobby groups are not
available. So far the dummy is the best approach to estimate the impact of the EU
political decision-making system on agricultural protection keeping in mind that the
estimated coeﬃcients cannot be interpreted as true causal eﬀects. Nevertheless, in
combination with our theory we state that the informal legislative bargaining rules
induce high agricultural protection in EU member countries that clearly diﬀer from
their unobserved counterfactual protection levels in parliamentary or presidential
systems, respectively.
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4.A Appendix
Table 4.2: List of countries included into analysis
DFE EU-6 EU-9 EU-12 EU-15/-25
Argentina Australia Argentina Argentina Argentina
Australia Austria Australia Australia Australia
Austria Canada Austria Austria Austria
Bangladesh Colombia Canada Bangladesh Bangladesh
Brazil Denmark Colombia Brazil Brazil
Bulgaria Finland Denmark Bulgaria Bulgaria
Canada France Dominican Rep. Canada Canada
Chile Germany Ecuador Chile Chile
Colombia India Finland Colombia Colombia
Czech Rep. Ireland France Czech Rep. Czech Rep.
Denmark Italy Germany Denmark Denmark
Dominican Rep. Japan Iceland Dominican Rep. Dominican Rep.
Ecuador Malaysia India Ecuador Ecuador
Estonia Netherlands Ireland Estonia Estonia
Ethiopia New Zealand Italy Ethiopia Ethiopia
Finland South Africa Japan Finland Finland
France Sri Lanka Malaysia France France
Germany Sweden Netherlands Germany Germany
Ghana Turkey New Zealand Hungary Ghana
Hungary United
Kingdom
Norway Iceland Hungary
Iceland United States Portugal India Iceland
India South Africa Ireland India
Indonesia Spain Italy Indonesia
Ireland Sri Lanka Japan Ireland
Italy Sweden Korea, Rep. Italy
Japan Switzerland Latvia Japan
Korea, Rep. Thailand Lithuania Korea, Rep.
Latvia Turkey Madagascar Latvia
Lithuania United
Kingdom
Malaysia Lithuania
Madagascar United States Netherlands Madagascar
Malaysia New Zealand Malaysia
Mexico Norway Mexico
Mozambique Pakistan Mozambique
Netherlands Philippines Netherlands
New Zealand Poland New Zealand
Nicaragua Portugal Nicaragua
Nigeria Romania Nigeria
Norway Slovenia Norway
Pakistan South Africa Philippines
Philippines Spain Poland
Poland Sri Lanka Portugal
Portugal Sweden Romania
Romania Switzerland Russia
continued on next page
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DFE EU-6 EU-9 EU-12 EU-15/-25
Russia Thailand Senegal
Senegal Turkey Slovak Rep.
Slovak Rep. Ukraine Slovenia
Slovenia United
Kingdom
South Africa
South Africa United States Spain
Spain Zambia Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka Sweden
Sweden Switzerland
Switzerland Thailand
Thailand Turkey
Turkey Ukraine
Ukraine United
Kingdom
United
Kingdom
United States
United States Zambia
Zambia
Source: Authors.
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Abstract
International organizations like the African Union or The World Bank increasingly pro-
mote participatory policy processes as a tool in order to design eﬃcient policy programs for
pro-poor growth. A good case in point for this development is the Comprehensive Africa
Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) initiated by the African Union. Besides
fostering agriculture-led development, this programs aims at increasing the involvement of
stakeholder organizations into the political decision-making process. Participatory policy
processes are justiﬁed as a mechanism to increase ownership and commitment to pol-
icy programs, while neither a quantitative assessment nor a comprehensive micro-political
foundation of participatory policy processes has been provided in the literature, yet. In this
context, we introduce a theoretical framework to evaluate policy processes involving govern-
mental, international and local stakeholder organizations. Basically our model incorporates
the process of policy belief formation in communication networks into a legislative decision-
making model. This approach allows for a quantitative evaluation of participatory policy
processes as well as of the resulting political inﬂuence of non-governmental organizations
on national policy decisions. Based on this framework, we analyze the participatory policy
process in Malawi leading to the adoption of an agricultural sector investment program
based on the principles of CAADP empirically. A network study collecting quantitative
network data and policy positions via face-to-face interviews in Malawi in 2010 provides
the empirical database for the evaluation.
Keywords: participatory policy processes; policy networks; belief formation; informal po-
litical institutions; quantitative network analysis
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5.1 Introduction
Donor organizations recently engaged in promoting participatory policy processes
as a tool for designing eﬃcient policy programs. Participatory policy-making is a
process through which stakeholder inﬂuence and share control over priority setting
and policy-making (World Bank, 2011). The implementation of these processes in
developing countries is promoted in order to guarantee that local non-governmental
and governmental organizations feel responsible for formulating and implementing
eﬃcient development programs. Further, it is widely assumed that the ownership
and commitment to programs due to participation in the formulation will lead to
the adoption of pro-poor growth policy programs in countries. Hence, understanding
the nature of participatory policy processes is key for international organizations to
eﬃciently support partner countries in formulating eﬀective policy programs.
For the agricultural sector, the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development
Programme (CAADP) initiated by the African Union is a good case in point for
these new developments. A key principle of the program is the inclusion of local
stakeholder organizations into planning, formulating and evaluating sector speciﬁc
growth policies (see NEPAD, 2010). However, a CAADP working group on non
state actor participation critically assesses the ability of stakeholders to use the
newly created opportunities of participation. Using information gathered by a qual-
itative stakeholder survey and desk research, they point out that CAADP has not
consistently achieved high quality inclusion of non-state actors at national, regional
and local levels (see Randall, 2011, p.2).
While this presented case study provides insights into participatory policy pro-
cesses, a quantitative evaluation of participatory policy processes and a compre-
hensive policy process framework based on micro-political theories is still missing.
Nevertheless, at the methodological level, one policy analysis framework -the Advo-
cacy Coalition Framework by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993)- has gained wide
attention by political scientist. This framework explicitly identiﬁes beliefs as drivers
of policy-making and especially of advocacy coalitions and provides a systematic ap-
proach for a stakeholder analysis. But the framework provides neither a theoretical
model how actors of a policy subsystem agree on a mutually accepted policy decision
nor a theoretical model of belief formation among actors involved in policy-making.
Hence, we introduce a theoretically founded framework to analyze participatory
policy processes. Basically our framework enables us to consider the impact of po-
litical institutions as well as of policy networks on the ﬁnal policy decision. Political
institutions can be either formal or informal. A case in point for informal politi-
cal institutions in Africa is the "Big Man" presidentialism (Bratton, 2007; van der
Walle, 2003). Political institutions determine especially the procedure which shapes
legislative bargaining and thereby, the result of the bargaining process. Policy net-
works enable actors to provide valuable information on policy impacts to political
agents. That is non-governmental actors acquire political inﬂuence by providing
expert information that changes policy beliefs of powerful actors in line with their
own interests. Overall, we embed a belief formation model based on policy networks
into a theoretical model reﬂecting political bargaining in the legislative system. The
framework enables us to evaluate, on the one hand, the quality and nature of policy
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processes, and, on the other hand, the inﬂuence of stakeholder organizations on ﬁnal
policy decisions.
Turning to the theoretical basis of our model, consider ﬁrst the strand of social
inﬂuence theory. Regarding these theories, our policy process framework builds
upon a theoretical model of belief formation suggested by Friedkin and Johnsen
(1990) and Friedkin and Johnsen (1997). Independently, Pappi et al. (1995) used
a very similar model to empirically analyze political decision-making in national
labor policy of USA, Germany and Japan. In summary, individuals form their
policy belief in our model by taking weighted averages of the beliefs of individuals
with whom they communicate about impacts of policy decisions on the state of the
world and their own belief. For modeling the legislative bargaining process, that
leads to the ﬁnal policy decision, we use the mean voter rule developed by Henning
(2000) as theoretical legislative decision-making model. The mean voter rule is a
cooperative legislative bargaining procedure where ﬁnal decisions result from package
deals among political agents.
We apply our framework to the policy process of agricultural policy reform in
Malawi. Malawi approved a policy reform based on the principles of CAADP -
the sector investment program "Agricultural Sector Wide Approach" (ASWAp)- in
2010. A Network study collecting quantitative network data and policy positions
via face-to-face interviews in Malawi in 2010 provides the empirical database for
the application of the framework to Malawi's policy processes. Interviews were con-
ducted with relevant local stakeholder organizations, donors and politicians. Final
results suggest that our proposed framework is able to reﬂect participatory policy
processes in Malawi. Hence, the framework can be used as a theoretical basis for fu-
ture research on policy processes in diﬀerent countries. With regard to Malawi, the
policy network facilitates consensus building on agricultural policy issues. However,
the participatory policy process resembles a top-down instead of a bottom-up policy
process as government highly inﬂuences the beliefs of stakeholders and vice-versa
according to our results.
The Paper proceeds as follows. In Section 5.2 we brieﬂy introduce the theoret-
ical framework for modeling participatory policy processes. The network study is
described in detail in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 presents the results from applying our
framework to policy processes in Malawi. We conclude in Section 5.5.
5.2 A theoretical framework to model policy processes
A policy decision α is the result of a bargaining process about policy strategies
to reach a speciﬁc state of the world z. This bargaining process is determined
by linked formal and informal political institutions and policy networks. Formal
institutions correspond to rules of policy games as deﬁned in the constitution, while
informal institutions enable agents to play political games within the oﬃcial rules
of the game. Such games determine either an agent's formal or informal political
power over legislation. Policy networks extend political games by permitting actors
to inﬂuence policy decision via information provision on policy impacts. Therefore
a valid theoretical model of policy processes consists of modules that capture the
eﬀects of both components of the policy process on policy decisions.
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Figure 5.1: Overview about the framework.
Source: Authors.
We consider mainly two strands of literature to build a policy process framework
that combines all essential features of participatory policy processes (see Figure
5.1). First, we use the workhorse model for legislative decision-making, the non-
cooperative legislative bargaining model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989), as basis for
our model of legislative decision-making. Our model, the mean voter rule, is given by
the equation in the rectangle in Figure 5.1. In essence the mean voter rule reproduces
ﬁnal policy decisions as the result of a voting power distribution among agents with
individual ideal positions Y . Second, we integrate a belief formation model into
our framework to reﬂect the inﬂuence of policy networks on policy decisions and
to enable non-governmental organizations to inﬂuence ﬁnal policy decisions (lower
triangle in Figure 5.1). In summary, our model considers the policy process as an
aggregation mechanism for diﬀerent policy positions according to voting procedures
in parliament and to belief formation in networks. These voting procedures, either
determined by formal or informal institutions, constitute the political power C of
a legislator g (upper triangle in Figure 5.1) and determine to what extent ﬁnal
legislation represents an agent's individual preferences.
5.2.1 Legislative bargaining
The legislative decision-making module of the framework bases upon the mean voter
decision rule developed by Henning (2000). This theoretical model corresponds to
a Baron-Ferejohn-game extended by the rational cooperative behavior of political
agents. According to the mean voter rule, ﬁnal policy choices result from package
deals among agents that are determined by agents' ideal positions (Yg) and agents'
political power (Cg). Agent-speciﬁc ideal policy positions correspond to the gov-
ernmental policy the agent likes to be implemented. Political power results from
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an agent's probability to succeed in forming a winning coalition. Agents need the
support of such winning coalitions to vote their ideal policy position through. The
probability to be member of a coalition depends on constitutional rules and the
embeddedness of an actor in the institutional system. Indeed, political bargaining
corresponds to a competition in the formation of winning coalitions among polit-
ical agents. Non-cooperative political bargaining would result in uncertain policy
choices as it corresponds to a lottery over agents' ideal positions. Assuming risk
averse politicians, non-cooperative legislative bargaining is rather ineﬃcient. Hence,
agents have an incentive to agree ex ante on cooperative policy formulation mech-
anisms -the mean voter rule- that guarantee each political agent a higher pay-oﬀ.
The mean voter decision rule is self-enforcing as long as legislators do not discount
future gains from cooperation too much.
In detail, the ﬁnal policy decision corresponds to the weighted mean of legislators'
ideal positions Yg:
α =
∑
g
CgYg with
∑
g
Cg = 1. (5.1)
The weight Cg of agent's g ideal position correspond to her voting power which
is determined by political institutions. Technically, under speciﬁc assumptions Cg
equals the ratio of the number of winning coalitions of which an agent g is a member
and the sum of all winning coalitions all relevant political agents are members of.
Please note that under this assumption political power Cg is quite similar to the
classical Coleman-Banzhaf voting power index, which measures the ability of an
actor to change a vote (Banzhaf, 1965; Coleman, 1971).
By deﬁning the threshold of votes to be met for a collective decision and identifying
whose vote is compulsory for a ﬁnal decision, voting power indices can be calculated
that reﬂect diﬀerent power distributions in policy-making. In general, either formal
or informal voting power games can be deﬁned. Formal power games reﬂect the
usual legislative process in democratic systems. This process typically begins with
government submitting a bill to parliament. Then the responsible committee works
on the bill to present parliament the government proposal including recommended
amendments. At last, there is a ﬁnal vote on the entire bill on the ﬂoor. Here,
additional amendments might be submitted or not. In general, agenda setting power
within government lies with the ministry responsible for the speciﬁc sector policy.
Informal political power distributions relate to the concept of internally enforced
standards of legislative power. Shepsle and Weingast (1987) already stated that
observed power distributions cannot be explained by formal institutional rules. Fur-
ther, Bratton (2007) argues that the rule of law is often weakly developed, even if
it is not completely absent in developing countries. One major informal institution
that inﬂuences political life in Africa heavily is "Big Man" presidentialism. That
is political power is intensely concentrated around the president which leads to an
increase in power of his cabinet (see also van der Walle, 2003). In summary, these in-
ternally enforced standards grant all political power to the cabinet and the president
and exclude the ﬁnal vote on the ﬂoor.
While this model captures the essential eﬀects of legislative bargaining, it does
not characterize the ideal policy positions of political agents. Hence, we explain how
political agents form their ideal policy position in the next Section.
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5.2.2 Belief formation
To understand how agents form their ideal positions, consider three processes. First,
it is widely recognized that legislators maximize their political support when deciding
on policy programs that impact on the state of the world z in a country. The
state of the world determines the utility Us(z(α)) of a member of society s. Then,
Sg(Us(z(α))) denotes the political support function of a speciﬁc political agent g,
which relates the welfare of a society's member to the political support an agent
receives from this member. Second, the political technology T (z, α) determines the
relation between α and the state of the world z. Thus, an agent's ideal policy position
Yg results from political support maximization given a speciﬁc political technology:
Yg = arg max
α
Sg(Us(z(α))), s.t. T (z, α) = 0. (5.2)
Thirdly, agents have no perfect information about the true impact of a speciﬁc
policy decision on the state of the world, i.e. the political technology T (z, α), but
form policy beliefs about this relation. To maximize now their political support,
they try to increase their knowledge about the relation by exchanging information
with members of their communication network. That is they update their policy
beliefs according to some speciﬁc process that provides them information on policy
positions of other agents and that ﬁnally leads them to form one speciﬁc own policy
position.1
One approach to model belief formation in networks that is highlighted by litera-
ture is a non-Bayesian model. Non-Bayesian approaches specify that belief formation
processes follow simple rules of thumb. We suggest a non-Bayesian model similar to
the model of Friedkin and Johnsen (1990). Independent from the work of Friedkin
and Johnsen, Pappi et al. (1995) have developed a social inﬂuence model to analyze
political decision-making in the USA, Germany and Japan. Summarizing our model
with a few words, individuals form their ﬁnal policy position by taking weighted
averages of the policy positions of individuals from whom they receive information
about impacts of policy decisions via communication and their own initial policy
position.
The theoretical model More speciﬁcally, belief formation has three key compo-
nents. The ﬁrst component is the communication network that is the channel of
information through which senders provide new information. We denote the deﬁned
set of actors that provides information about policy impacts and that constitutes
thereby the relevant network, as the country's political elite (E) where i denotes a
generic element of E. The political elite comprises political agents g, who by con-
stitution collectively determine national policy, and a subset of non-governmental
actors, who by constitution have no legislative power but who are linked with agents
endowed with political power in the network. Whether non-governmental actors are
members of such a network relies upon overcoming the collective action problem
1How individuals form their beliefs is discussed and analyzed by several scholars from sociology,
mathematics and economics (Friedkin and Johnsen, 1990; Acemoglu and Ozdaglar, 2010; Golub
and Jackson, 2009; Jackson, 2008; Knoke et al., 1996; Laumann and Knoke, 1987)
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determined by socio-economic framework conditions (Olson, 1965). It follows, that
rarely each actor is able to form ties with inﬂuential actors but that the set of actors,
whose policy positions inﬂuence the ﬁnal policy decision, is restricted.
Then, we deﬁne the overall communication network as a binary network T , where
Tij = 1 indicates that actor i and actor j have an established communication tie. In
addition, we deﬁne the subset Ei = j ∈ E, Tij = 1 as the neighborhood of actor i,
where it holds: ∑
j∈Ei
tij = 1 with tij =
Tij∑
j∈Ei
Tij′
. (5.3)
Accordingly, T = [tij] denotes the communication network, where tij > 0 indicates
that actor i pays attention to actor j. T is a stochastic matrix, i.e. for each actor
the sum of total weights equals 1.
The second component is the initial position Y 0i of an actor i which reﬂects all
exogenous inﬂuences on his position but not the inﬂuence of the political commu-
nication process. Political agents form their initial position according to eq. 5.2.
Non-governmental actors, i.e. interest groups, build here a special case. They also
maximize a political support function given a speciﬁc political technology to develop
their initial policy position. However, they do not want to gain votes but want to
attract members with their policy position. If they are also not perfectly informed
about policy impacts, better information on policy impacts would enable them to
lobby more eﬃciently. In consequence, their number of members and thereby their
budget available for providing information in line with an organization's own inter-
ests to political agents increases. Hence, information gathering via communication
with elite members is rational for them.
Finally, we must specify the rule how individuals combine their own positions with
positions communicated by others to form their ﬁnal policy position. We suggest
that individuals update their political position Y 0i via taking weighted averages of
their neighbors' positions Y 0j with tij being the weight or trust that actor i places
on the current position of actor j and tii being the weight of actor's own position
(see Jackson, 2005):2
Y ∗i = tiiY
0
i +
∑
j 6=i
tijY
0
j (5.4)
⇒ Y ∗i = tiiY 0i + (1− tii)
∑
j
tˆijY
0
j with tˆij =
tij
(1− tii) .
Y ∗i denotes the position of agent i after communication. Own control describes to
what extent an actor relies upon own information on policy impacts while forming
his ﬁnal position. As T is row normalized to one, (1− tii) is the aggregated weight
for all neighbors' positions on actor i′s position. Let γ denote the diagonal matrix
with diagonal elements tii than writing eq. 5.4 in matrix notation results after further
2Friedkin and Johnsen (1997) assume that all actors attribute the same weight to their own initial
position. However, we make no prior assumptions about the weight that actors place on beliefs
of others in our belief formation module but ascertain their own control empirically. Note, that
heterogeneous weights among actors will still deliver an unambiguous ﬁnal policy decision.
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rearrangements in:
y∗ =
[
I − (1− γ) Tˆ
]−1
γy0, (5.5)
with M = [I − (1− γ)T ]−1γ being the network multiplier matrix which is similar
to the Hubbell index (Hubbell, 1965). An element of the multiplier matrix mij
deﬁnes the ﬁeld strength of actor j′s initial position operating on actor i′s ﬁnal
position. If i = j, the element mii of the multiplier matrix M equals the weight
that an actor i puts on his own initial position. That is the ﬁnal network multiplier
matrix is denoted by M = [mij]i,j∈E. Note that a network multiplier includes all
communication loops among actors, i.e. all direct and all indirect eﬀects of j′s initial
position on i′s position resulting from communication.
For any row stochastic matrix the belief formation process described in eq. 5.5
delivers an unambiguous ﬁnal policy position y∗ as an weighted average of the initial
position of all agents before communication y0, where the weight of actor j′s initial
position for actor i′s ﬁnal position just equals the element mij of the multiplier
matrix M .3
Belief formation, ﬁnal policy decision and generalized political power Based
on the above described belief formation among actors and the mean voter rule from
eq. 5.1, the ﬁnal policy decision α∗ after elite members have communicated with
each other follows from:
α∗ =
∑
g
Cg(
∑
j
mgjY
0
j +mggY
0
g ), withj 6= g, (5.6)
where mgj is the weight that agent g puts in the initial position of actor j and
mgg denotes the weight that he puts in his own initial position. Eq. 5.6 constitutes
the theoretical model of our policy process framework which reﬂects now the policy
process as an aggregation mechanism for diﬀerent policy positions Yi according to
belief formation in networks and to voting power distributions in parliament Cg.
Further, the belief formation model enables us to introduce a new concept of po-
litical power, the generalized power index. This power index results from combining
the model of belief formation with (in)formal political power indices as described
in Section 5.2.1. In detail, generalized power summarizes i) the political inﬂuence
of actors without any original voting power according to their information provi-
sion to actors endowed with formal or informal political power and ii) the political
inﬂuence of actors with original power who give oﬀ original power when they rely
on information provided by elite members to form their ﬁnal policy position. The
lower the number of actors having access to an information receiver, the higher is the
inﬂuence of the sender's position on the ﬁnal position of the receiver. While actors
might be able to contact inﬂuential players directly, they might also gain indirect
access to inﬂuential players via policy brokers. Thus, the generalized power of an
actor follows from the weight of actor j's initial position for agents g's ﬁnal position
3Please note that the belief up-dating in eq. 5.5 is similar, but still diﬀers from the DeGroot model
analyzed by Jackson (2005). In particular, our model includes the DeGroot and the Friedkin
model as a special case.
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(mgj) and an agent's original voting power Cg:
Cj =
∑
g
mgjCg. (5.7)
Policy networks and consensus building Whether communication enables con-
sensus building among actors depends on the embededdness of actors with clashing
beliefs in the communication network and the openness of actors to other opinions,
i.e. the level of own control. Firstly, consider that the communication network is a
connected component. A connected component says that any two agents are con-
nected to each other by direct or indirect communication ties. Assuming γ = 0
our belief formation process would now result in a perfect consensus (Golub and
Jackson, 2009). In practice the assumption of the communication network as a con-
nected component cannot be hold easily. Communication is actually structured and
restricted, e.g. agents communicate directly only with a small subset of the total
population (see Chapter "The Role of Knowledge in the Formation of Political Elite
Communication Networks in Malawi: A Bayesian Econometric Approach" in this
book). If these subsets of the population have clashing beliefs, communication will
not enable consensus building among elite members.
Further, it follows from equation 5.5 that the trust actors put in the beliefs of other
actors determines the level of consensus within reach by communication. Assuming
γ > 0 implies that communication still converges to an equilibrium, but agents
will hold heterogeneous policy positions. In our more general model, actors might
diﬀer regarding the relative trust they put in their own position and on that of
other actors, respectively. For example, diﬀerent levels of own control might reﬂect
an actors' information level. Poorly informed actors might put more weight in
the communicated positions of other actors than experts. Consequently, consensus
building is not self-evident in our model but relies upon country speciﬁc attributes
of the elite communication network.
5.3 An empirical application of the framework: The case of
Malawi
To analyze participatory policy processes using the proposed framework, data collec-
tion must consider several issues. First, the boundaries of the policy network must
be consistently speciﬁed to guarantee an eﬃcient empirical analysis. Second, to en-
sure the comparability of actor's policy positions and interests, interviewees must be
interviewed with standardized questionnaires where questions allow assigning actors
locations in the policy system in that way that metric distances between them can
be assessed empirically. Here, we use quantitative survey data collected via face-to-
face interviews with Malawi's political elite in 2010.4 Such a survey is called a policy
network study in the following. In general, a network study involves questions about
4The questionnaires are based on a method that was used to identify policy preferences, policy
interests and policy networks of relevant actors of the Common Agricultural Policy of the
European Union. See for more information Pappi et al. (1995).
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policy positions and interests as well as about communication networks. The central
theme of the survey used in this analysis is the policy process leading to the approval
of the sector investment program "Agricultural Sector Wide Approach" (ASWAp) in
April 2010, which is based on the principles of CAADP. Main goals of the program
are achieving agricultural growth and poverty reduction through investments in the
agricultural sector and harmonization of policy programs. Moreover, the Govern-
ment of Malawi follows the comprehensive approach of CAADP with inviting local
stakeholder organizations to design, monitor and evaluate policies under ASWAp.
Thus, beyond political actors and donor organizations, the umbrella organizations
of the food security civil society organizations and farmer organizations, CISANET
and FUM, respectively, signed the CAADP Compact in April 2010. All questions in
the interviews about agricultural policy positions and interests relate to this agricul-
tural policy program, see The Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, Republic of
Malawi (2010), while questions about positions and interests in the state of the world
were developed according to information from the Malawi Growth and Development
Programme and ASWAp, respectively (Government of Malawi, 2006).
Preparing such a network study will always follow three steps:
Step 1: Identify rules of legislative decision-making
Step 2: Set boundaries of the communication network
Step 3: Deﬁne the relevant policy space
The ﬁrst two steps are linked because step 1 identiﬁes network members with
formal or informal political power. Step 2 extends the set of inﬂuential agents
by important private and civil sector organizations (see Section 5.3.1). Finally,
questions about policy positions and interests are designed according to results of
step 3 (see Section 5.3.4).
The Section proceeds with a detailed description of the survey and voting power
distributions in Malawi.
5.3.1 Relevant actors
For a valid assessment of the policy process, we need to consistently specify the set
of actors relevant for policy-making in a country, i.e. the boundaries of the policy
network. A policy network is a special case of a social network which is deﬁned
as a speciﬁc set of linkages among a deﬁned set of actors, while the linkages give
information about the social behavior of actors involved (Mitchell, 1969). In case of
a policy network, the deﬁned set of actors corresponds to actors with formal political
power or vested interests in the policy domain under consideration (see Pappi and
Henning, 1998). Note, that we decided to focus on a deﬁned set of organizations and
not among individuals because organizations interested in or formally responsible for
a speciﬁc policy domain instead of individual persons spread and hold information
about eﬃcient policy formulation. Hence, we collect data on relevant organizations
to identify the boundaries of the policy network and respondents are considered as
corporative actors, i.e. experts of their organization for the speciﬁc policy ﬁeld, if
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they answer policy network and policy preference questions during the interviews
(see Coleman, 1990).
To identify formal inﬂuential members of the network, we used the position
method. The position method is a quite simple method of desk research that al-
lows identifying organizations with formal political power and organizations that
have access to formal powerful actors due to their institutional position. In Malawi,
members of the following public bodies will have formal political power or at least
access to members endowed with formal political power:
1. the executive,
2. the legislative,
3. local government institutions and
4. public sector agencies.
While the relevance of the executive and the legislative are self-explaining for a
democracy, an argument for the relevance of public sector agencies and local govern-
ment institutions is their linking of the legislative and executive bodies with society.
Due to their closeness to society, these groups gain valuable insights on how speciﬁc
policies translate into policy outcomes. Members of the executive and parliament
can proﬁt from this information while designing policy programs. In this context,
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) already emphasized that a comprehensive analy-
sis of policy processes comprises all levels of government active in policy formulation
and administration as done in our empirical concept.
According to our theory, policy analysts who enable politicians to choose political
strategies compatible with their goals and who thereby inﬂuence policy decisions
must also be considered for a comprehensive reﬂection of policy processes (see also
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999). Thus, we identiﬁed two other key categories of
organizations for Malawi: donor organizations and research organizations. As donor
organizations support developing countries with budget assistance and political ex-
pertise, they are obviously highly important members of the network. Research
organizations can assist governments in choosing policy strategies to realize govern-
ment's preferred state of the world.
To complete the set of relevant actors, we need to identify relevant private and
civil sector organizations. Such a simple identiﬁcation procedure as the position
method cannot be applied in this case. Thus, we decided to rely on information on
agricultural policy workshop participation and information from an interview round
with stakeholders, donors and politicians engaged in the formulation of the Farm
Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) in 2010. Based on this information, we include
about 60 stakeholder organizations into our set of potential relevant actors. That is
our ﬁnal network of relevant actors in agricultural policy making in Malawi consists
of 98 organizations. Finally, this information is used in the interviews, when actors
are asked to specify actors with whom they maintain a speciﬁc relation. To facilitate
orientation and to gain information about the complete network among actors, we
created a list of organizations based on the above that is organized by the type
of organization or branch of interest represented by the respective organizations,
respectively (see Table 5.1).
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Table 5.1: Classiﬁcation of organizations
Category Group Subgroup
Political actor Government (GOV) President
Ministries
Public Sector (PUB) Public Sector Agencies
Local Government
Legislative (LEG) Parties
Parliamentary committees
Donor Donor (DON) International
National
Research organization Research (RES) International
National
Interest group Agricultural Industry and Trade
(AGIND)
Agricultural Producer Organiza-
tions and Cooperatives (FARM)
Economic governance (ECOGOV)
Trade Unions and Consumer Or-
ganizations (CONSUM)
Church
Media
Source: Authors.
5.3.2 Sample of interviewed organizations
Starting the network study, we interviewed 6 organizations mentioned as extremely
inﬂuential by the prior network study or having formal political power. At ﬁrst,
interviewees were asked to nominate all organizations that they think of as being
inﬂuential in Malawi's agricultural policy process. With these reputation nomina-
tions at hand, further organizations were selected to be interviewed, if they were
mentioned at least twice. We used this snowball system with increasing number of
nominations after each interview round to choose the next interview partners. This
mechanism allows interviewing the most important organizations within a relatively
short time frame. Furthermore, with the ﬁrst round of interviews at hand, we tested
if inﬂuential organizations were missing on our list. Interviewees were always al-
lowed adding names of organizations, if the interviewee judges the organizations as
inﬂuential for agricultural policy decisions or if the interviewee maintains a question
speciﬁc relation to the missing organization. As we learned during our interviews,
our proposed set of relevant actors represents inﬂuential actors in policy-making in
Malawi quite well.
Overall, we interviewed 37 organizations. As we decided to interview only those
organizations that were highly inﬂuential for agricultural policy formulation, i.e. that
were identiﬁed as inﬂuential with our snowball procedure, we did not interview all
organizations of the list but a highly relevant subset of actors. Table 5.2 lists all
interviewed organizations and their indegree centrality. The indegree centrality is
calculated from the reputation network where all interviewees were asked to mention
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the most inﬂuential players in Malawi and to check them on the provided list. This
measure indicates all nominations standardized by possible nominations. Table 5.2
shows that we were able to interview the top-ten of most inﬂuential players in Malawi
and further highly inﬂuential organizations. The top ten of interviewed actors with
outstanding reputation makes intuitively sense. Donors providing budget support
and being involved in ﬁnancing agricultural policy programs are named. Further,
leading ministries are judged as being inﬂuential. And ﬁnally, organizations repre-
senting farmers and especially smallholder farmers have high reputation. Hence, our
sample of interviewed organizations reﬂects all governmental and non-governmental
actors that will strongly inﬂuence ﬁnal agricultural policy decisions.
Table 5.2: Overview about interviewed organizations
OrganizationType IDC Organization Type IDC Organization Type IDC
MoAFS GOV 1.00 STAM IG 0.61 CAMA IG 0.52
EU DON 0.85 GTA IG 0.61 OPC GOV 0.48
DFID DON 0.82 NORAD DON 0.58 MoDPC GOV 0.45
WB DON 0.82 CISANET IG 0.58 SFFRFM PUB 0.45
BC RES 0.82 IMF DON 0.55 ECAMA IG 0.39
MoF GOV 0.79 FW IG 0.55 MCC IG 0.39
FUM IG 0.79 MEJN IG 0.55 ELDS IG 0.36
USAID DON 0.73 CADECOM IG 0.55 MCP LEG 0.33
NASFAM IG 0.73 DADO PUB 0.52 ILO IG 0.33
DPP LEG 0.70 MUB IG 0.52 LU PUB 0.30
MoIWD GOV 0.67 TAM IG 0.52 RB PUB 0.27
ADD PUB 0.67 TAMA IG 0.52 RAB IG 0.27
Irish Aid DON 0.67
Notes: GOV: Government, IG: Civil society or private sector organization, PUB: Public
sector agency or local government organization, LEG: Political party, DON: Donor
organization, RES: Research organization. Source: Calculated by authors from own data.
5.3.3 Policy networks and own control
Since policy networks are the centerpiece of the belief formation model, the study also
collects data about diﬀerent networks among actors: i) Reputation, ii) Monitoring,
iii) Expert information, iv) Social relations and v) Membership in Organizations.
To collect the complete network among actors, we designed our network questions
in a form that we found extremely helpful in earlier network studies (see Pappi
and Henning, 1999). That is interviewees were asked to check those organizations
with which they maintain a speciﬁc relation on a list compiled in advance and
handed out to the interviewee (see Section 5.3.1). In this empirical analysis, we
use data from the question about the demand and supply of expert information on
agricultural policies, as the network about expert information on agricultural policy
is essential to model participatory policy processes according to our framework.
Expert information is not necessarily available in public but circulates among persons
interested in or working in the speciﬁc policy ﬁeld. Further expert information on
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how policy instruments relate to policy goals is a valuable resource to inﬂuence
beliefs.5 In detail, interviewees will check those organizations on our prepared list of
relevant organizations with which they share information about the consequences of
agricultural policies. Such kind of expert information is, for instance, the knowledge
of the eﬀects of farm input subsidies on the welfare of diﬀerent social groups.
Regarding eq. 5.5 another key input factor to analyze belief formation processes
is the weight, which an actor puts in his own initial position. Here, we used two
diﬀerent types of questions to identify an actor's level of own control. Interest groups
were asked to mention their eﬀort spent on mediating members' interest to relevant
political actors compared (active lobbying) to their eﬀort spent on providing solely
information about new bills or policies to their members (monitoring). Political
actors and donors were asked to ascertain to what extent they use externally provided
expertise compared to internal expertise of their own organization to formulate policy
strategies. An interest group's own control is then deﬁned by his eﬀort put in active
lobbying, while the own control of political actors and donors is given by their level
of own internal expertise.
5.3.4 Agricultural policy positions and interests
All questions in the questionnaire about agricultural policy positions (Y ) and inter-
ests (X) relate to the three focus areas and the key support services described in
ASWAp:
I. Food security and risk management,
II. Agri-business and market development,
III. Sustainable land and water management
IV. Technology generation and dissemination/Institutional strengthening and ca-
pacity building.
Table 5.3 presents the conﬂicting and common policy preferences within the pil-
lars.6 The ﬁrst pillar addresses policies to achieve food security and to manage risks
associated with food reserves at the national level. According to the document,
this will be achieved by increasing maize productivity, reducing post-harvest losses,
diversifying food production and managing risks associated with food reserves at
national level. Malnutrition will be reduced by agricultural diversiﬁcation that for
5The reputation network predominantly helps to identify interview partners during the interview
rounds (see Section 5.3.1), while the membership in organizations network is used to explain
the formation of expert information networks in the Chapter "The Role of Knowledge in the
Formation of Political Elite Communication Networks in Malawi: A Bayesian Econometric
Approach". So far, the monitoring network is not used to analyze policy processes, because our
theory focuses on participatory policy process as a knowledge transmission mechanism, while
monitoring networks reﬂect information ﬂows regarding policy proposals to be approved soon.
6Further, we asked questions about positions and interests in eight dimensions of the state of the
world, which we deﬁned according to information from the Malawi Growth and Development
Programme (Government of Malawi, 2006). However, data on these questions is not used in
the following analysis of participatory policy processes.
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Table 5.3: Description of political positions and interests
Pillar Conﬂicting Common X Y Component
preferences preferences (Ø) (Ø) 1 2
Food security & risk
management
production
structure
food security 38 4.50 0.519 0.175
Agribusiness &
market development
traditional
export crops
vs. agro-
processing
economic growth 29 5.47 0.535 0.218
Land & water
management
soil fertility
vs. irrigation
systems
sustainable
resource use
25 5.07 0.648 0.188
Institutional
strengthening
and capacity build-
ing
institutional
conditions
eﬃcient imple-
mentation
of policy
programs
23 4.26 0.157 0.941
Source: Calculated by authors from own data
example includes promoting production of vegetables. Therefore conﬂicts might
arise about the right agricultural production structure for reaching food security.
The overall aim of policies summarized under the second pillar is to promote com-
mercial agriculture, agro-processing and agricultural market development. Further,
policies under this pillar aim at increasing agriculture-led economic growth and the
foreign currency earning potential of the agricultural sector. Actors might diﬀer in
their view how to reach this aim. Either they will prefer to support the production
of traditional export crops or they will stimulate access to new markets for processed
agricultural products.
Within the third pillar policies will focus on the sustainable management of natural
resources. Emphasis will be on conservation farming, aﬀorestation, protection of
fragile land and catchment areas, and rehabilitation of degraded agricultural land.
Activities for water management will focus on water use eﬃciency and expanding
the area under irrigation, e.g. through the Greenbelt Initiative. Actors might put
divergent priority on land and water issues, while they prefer the conservation of
natural resources for future generations and for a productive agricultural sector.
At least, policies under the fourth pillar or the key support services, respectively,
will improve knowledge and information generation and dissemination to allow for
eﬃcient policy implementation under the above described three pillars. Here the
main question is about the right institutional framework to guarantee an eﬃcient
program implementation.
To ensure the comparability of actor's policy positions and interests interviewees
were interviewed with standardized questionnaires. With these standardized ques-
tionnaires, we are able to assign actors locations in a speciﬁc policy system in that
way that metric distances between them can be assessed empirically. Like other
scholars, we adopted the strategy to confront actors with 7-point ordinal scales of
positions that have ﬁxed and meaningful poles of scale anchor. Besides the valid
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assessment of policy positions, we also identiﬁed the interviewee's interest in a spe-
ciﬁc policy. Here, we used the distribution of 100 points across the four pillars. We
handed out questionnaires to the interviewees and also explained the questions to
them. Further, questions were also framed with additional information on the topic
of the question. Summary statistics are given in Table 5.3.
For evaluating the impact of a large number of policy instruments on diﬀerent pol-
icy outcomes, actors reduce complexity by summarizing policy instruments into agro-
political strategies d. To reﬂect the complexity reduction in policies for ASWAp, we
use a principal component analysis (PCA). A principal component analysis extracts
a lower number of unobserved, uncorrelated variables from observed, correlated vari-
ables. For ASWAp, the analysis predicts that the four pillars can be summarized to
two main strategies. Results of the PCA are given in last two columns in Table 5.3.
The ﬁrst component can be labeled as the strategy for designing the agricultural sec-
tor structure because all pillars relating to agricultural sector development project
positively and relatively high on the ﬁrst component. Higher values denote that an
actor would like to invest in agricultural market development, irrigation and diver-
siﬁcation of agricultural production. Regarding the second component, note that
the last pillar highly associates with this component. Hence, the second component
describes the strategy for implementing agricultural policy programs according to a
distinct institutional organization of service deliveries. Higher values will indicate
that an actor prefers the current institutional set up over institutional reforms. To
model belief formation according to eq. 5.5, we use an actor's position within a
speciﬁc policy strategy as his initial policy position Y 0i .
5.3.5 Legislative power distributions
To ascertain the voting power of a political agent, we use the concept of Banzhaf
Power indices. Banzhaf Power indices calculate the voting power of an agent by
counting all winning coalitions and for each agent all winning coalitions where his
vote is critical for winning (Banzhaf, 1965; Coleman, 1971). By deﬁning the thresh-
old of votes to be met for a collective decision and identifying whose vote is com-
pulsory for a ﬁnal decision, indices can be calculated that reﬂect diﬀerent voting
power distributions in policy-making. Table 5.4 summarizes the Banzhaf indices for
speciﬁc voting power games in Malawi. The results from these games are employed
in eq. 5.6 and in eq. 5.7 to predict policy decisions due to divergent power distribu-
tions and to compute the generalized power index of all actors, respectively. Voting
power games were selected according to the constitution of Malawi and qualitative
studies on politics in Malawi and in Africa in general. First, we argue in line with
Bratton (2007) and van der Walle (2003) for "Big Man presidentialism" in Malawi.
In addition to this, the constitution also endows the President with agenda setting
power to initiate bills for submission to the National Assembly and especially his
cabinet assists him in determining what international agreements are to be con-
cluded or acceded to.7 Second, we follow Patel and Tostensen (2006) who argue
7Freedomhouse characterizes Malawi as an electoral democracy with a political right score of
three and civil liberties score of four in 2011 (Freedom House, 2011). Since 1994 Malawi has a
multi-party system and regularly legislative and executive elections. The constitution provides
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that the parliament in Malawi plays a secondary role due to the presidential nature
of Malawi's political regime. Consequently, we solely consider political power distri-
butions within the cabinet to reﬂect policy decision-making, even if the parliament
would have formal voting power according to the constitution. Thus, power indices
are calculated for four internally enforced power distributions: the principle of de-
partmental responsibility (DPR), presidential authority (PA), committee authority
by the President and the Ministry of Agriculture (CPA) and committee authority
by the President, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Finance (CPAF).
The committee scenarios are selected according to a ministry's vested interests in
agricultural policy programs in Malawi and their possible veto power. Veto power
might be especially assigned to the Ministry of Finance due to a weak governmental
budget. All indices are calculated for the subset of formal inﬂuential agents that we
were able to interview. Further, we assume for all these games that cabinet needs
a simple majority to vote policies through, while agenda setting power lies by a
speciﬁc institutional body as deﬁned above.
Table 5.4: Banzhaf power indices
DPR PA CPA CPAF
President 0.1765 0.2941 0.2857 0.2727
MoAFS 0.2941 0.1765 0.2857 0.2727
MoF 0.1765 0.1765 0.1428 0.2727
MoDPC 0.1765 0.1765 0.1428 0.0909
MoIWD 0.1765 0.1765 0.1428 0.0909∑
1 1 1 1
Source: Calculated by authors with IOP 2.0 by Thomas Bräuninger and Thomas König.
5.4 The policy process in Malawi: Empirical facts
5.4.1 Evaluation of model ﬁtness
To test the accuracy of our framework, we look for evidence that a ﬁnal policy deci-
sion as predicted by our framework corresponds to the eﬀective policy strategy laid
down in the policy document. Here, the eﬀective policy decision is extracted from
the oﬃcial policy document published on behalf of the Ministry of Agriculture and
Food Security in 2010 (The Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, Republic of
Malawi, 2010). Then, by using the scoring coeﬃcients of the principal component
analysis, the decision is mapped into the two-dimensional policy space (see Table
5.3). The eﬀective policy strategy (ASWAp) is thereby described by a value of -
1.025 for the agricultural sector development strategy and by a value of 0.548 for
the institutional organization strategy. Regarding content, Malawi aims at devel-
oping the agricultural traditional export sector, maize self-suﬃciency and spending
for a presidential form of government with a unicameral parliament. The president is directly
elected for a ﬁve-year term. Since the 2009 election the Democratic Progressive Party which is
also the President's party rules by a clear majority in parliament holding 113 of the 193 seats.
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more budget on current agricultural institutions. To compare predicted and eﬀec-
tive policy strategies, we use the Euclidean distance between the predicted and the
eﬀective strategy as a measure of the forecasting quality of diﬀerent scenarios. The
distance is calculated for each voting power distribution, strategy-wise and for the
entire policy decision.8 Results are given in Table 5.5.
As can be seen from Table 5.5 model ﬁtness depends on the used power distri-
butions and on the speciﬁc policy strategy. For the policy process framework (see
eq. 5.6), presidential authority (departmental responsibility) power distributions per-
form better than committee power distributions perform. Reﬂecting the Ministry of
Agriculture (and in case of Malawi also the President) as agenda setter vis-à-vis the
cabinet yields by far the best predictions for the ﬁnal policy decision regarding the
agricultural sector development strategy. Nevertheless, the same power distribution
performs well, but not best, for the strategy of institutional organization. Here,
results based on a the triangle -President, Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of
Finance- as agenda setter vis-à-vis the cabinet comes closest to the eﬀective strat-
egy. Overall, assuming departmental responsibility as political power distribution
performs best in predicting the ﬁnal policy decision.
Table 5.5: Eﬀective and predicted policy strategies
Szenario Agr. sector development Inst. organization Fitness
Decision Deviation Decision Deviation
ASWAp SQ -1.025 0.548
Policy process
framework
DPR/PA -0.959 0.066 0.528 0.020 0.069
CPA -1.192 0.167 0.528 0.020 0.168
CPAF -1.199 0.174 0.540 0.008 0.174
Legislative
bargaining
framework
DPR/PA -1.357 0.331 0.632 0.084 0.342
CPA -1.684 0.659 0.658 0.110 0.668
CPAF -1.678 0.653 0.665 0.117 0.663
Source: Calculated by authors from own data.
As a second approach to prove the ﬁtness of the policy process framework, we use a
reduced version of the framework and compare, results from the reduced framework
with results from the policy process framework. The reduced version neglects belief
formation in policy networks and thereby the inﬂuence of non-governmental actors.
That is the reduced version just models results according to the mean voter rule
assuming divergent legislative standards of decision-making. We denote this model
with legislative bargaining framework (see eq. 5.1). To evaluate the ﬁtness of this
framework, we again compare the predicted strategies with the eﬀective policy strat-
egy (see Table 5.5). If there would be a better model ﬁtness without belief formation,
communication among actors plays no important role in policy processes. But the
high deviations of predicted from eﬀective strategies under the legislative bargain-
ing framework argue for belief formation as an essential feature of the policy process
framework. Consequently, the policy process framework performs better in terms of
8Note that in 2010 the President was also the head of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food
Security in Malawi. Thus results are the same for the power distributions DPR and PA.
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overall model ﬁtness for each of the three power distributions than the legislative
bargaining framework. With regard to the participation of non-governmental actors
in policy formulation, results suggest, that they eﬀectively participated in formulat-
ing ASWAp. Modeling the ﬁnal decisions without them leads to minor predictions
of the policy strategy than including their information provision via communication
into the model. Thus, next sections give further insights into the nature participa-
tory policy process in Malawi.
5.4.2 Stakeholder participation in policy formulation
Our central questions in terms of stakeholder participation in policy processes are as
follows: i) Do interest groups heavily inﬂuence government? That is, is information
a valuable resource to gain political power? and ii) Which stakeholder organiza-
tions do have signiﬁcant generalized power to inﬂuence legislation? To answer these
questions, we use the generalized power index described in eq. 5.7 and the network
multipliers described in eq. 5.5 (see Table 5.6).
We start with the ﬁrst part of Table 5.6, which presents the network multipliers.
Multipliers are summarized over the ten groups deﬁned by Table 5.1. However,
media organizations are excluded from our analysis because they do not participate
directly in policy processes. Table 5.6 can be read row- or column-wise. Reading
row-wise, one ﬁnds the power of the row actor to inﬂuence the column actor's beliefs.
And vice versa the values in the columns reﬂect the weight that the column actor
puts on the initial belief of the row actors. Diagonal values are the average weight
kept by the speciﬁc group on their own initial beliefs. Note, that these values are not
equal to the own control of these actors. On contrary, they also consider information
exchange among the set of actors within this group. The numbers sum up to 1 for
each column. Values given are averages over actors of the speciﬁc pair of groups.
Concerning our ﬁrst question, Table 5.6 depicts three interesting features of the
policy process. First, government inﬂuences heavily positions of donor organizations
as well as of local stakeholder organizations as indicated by high network multipliers
in row 1. To form their own beliefs, government relies too a great extent on own in-
formation for designing policy programs. Secondly, results suggest that agricultural
industry and farmer organizations have a relatively low inﬂuence on government's
ﬁnal beliefs. This ﬁnding depends on the fact that government retains control over
their beliefs by about 80%, even if they have contacts with stakeholder organiza-
tions. However, their total weight is slightly above the trust government puts in
donor's proposed policy strategies. Third, there is just a negligible tendency that
government is inﬂuenced by other than agricultural interest groups.
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Consequently, the answer to our question is twofold. On the one hand, information
in the hands of agricultural interest groups is not a valuable resource to gain political
inﬂuence because government relies on own expertise heavily. On the other hand,
we observe an agricultural interest bias in communication, if agricultural policy
decisions are on top of the policy agenda. That is agricultural interest groups are
better able to convey their information to government than non-governmental actors
and donor organizations regarding agricultural policy issues. Nevertheless, network
multipliers state that participatory policy processes in Malawi lean towards top-
down instead of bottom-up processes.
The multipliers further suggest that agricultural industry organizations have far
more inﬂuence on beliefs of donor organizations than farmer organizations (0.073
> 0.046). This result is somewhat unexpected because international development
agencies recently engaged in increasing the capacity of civil society and private sector
organizations to actively participate in policy formulation. With this engagement,
they aim at solving the collective action problem and increasing the political weight
of marginalized groups in the policy process (see OECD, 2005). Thus, we expected
a higher weight of smallholder organizations on their ﬁnal policy position.
To analyze how much generalized power an actor gains from his inclusion into the
elite's communication network, we combine the network multipliers with Banzhaf-
power indices (see eq. 5.7). The lower part in Table 5.6 presents the average gen-
eralized power of each group. Due to their initially high informal voting power and
their high own control, government remains the most powerful player. In general,
they give oﬀ around 20% of their original voting power. However, government passes
roughly 7% of their original power to public sectors agencies and the legislative, while
they give the remaining 13% to stakeholder and donor organizations. Hence, Public
sector agencies and donors are the second and third most powerful groups holding
roughly 5-6% of generalized power. Smallholder farmer organizations are placed on
the fourth position, followed by representatives of the agricultural industry. Hence,
agricultural interest groups have together more power than donor organizations.
Consequently, a ﬁnal policy decision reﬂects information hold by local stakeholder
organizations to a greater extent than information provided by donors. As Patel
and Tostensen (2006) have already described, Malawi's parliament is unimportant
for policy decisions in our case. Parliament does even not gain signiﬁcant power over
policy decisions due to their embeddedness in the communication network, i.e. due
to forming ties with the executive directly or indirectly. In line with their low weight
on government's ﬁnal beliefs, non-agricultural organizations have no signiﬁcant gen-
eralized political power. Overall, generalized political power of groups changes just
slightly with internally enforced power distributions applied to calculate ﬁnal power
indices.
5.4.3 Communication networks as a means for consensus building
Figure 5.2 graphically depicts the potential of consensus building among elite mem-
bers via communication. Policy positions of organizations are mapped before and
after communication into the two-dimensional policy space via a principal compo-
nent analysis (see Table 5.3). The arrow head points on actor i′s position after
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he has updated his beliefs. The arrow tail marks the initial position of actor i.
Overall, arrows point for each dimension predominantly in direction of one policy
position. That is communication among actors builds consensus in Malawi, even if
actors will not perfectly share the same position. Nevertheless, consider that ﬁnal
decisions always depend on political power distributions among actors. Thus, the
ﬁnal policy decision must not be placed in the centre of elite's policy positions after
communication.
Figure 5.2: Consensus building about agro-political strategies
Source: Calculated by authors from own data.
To support the graphical representation of consensus building in Malawi, we com-
pute the direction of belief updating for each actor i for each policy strategy d:
DIRdi = (Y
∗
di − Y 0di) · Y 0di, (5.8)
with Y ∗di denoting an actor's position after belief updating and Y
0
di an actor's initial
position. A negative ﬁgure for the majority of actors indicates that policy positions
converge to a common point after belief formation. Consider that a negative ﬁgure
results in two cases: i) Y 0di>0 and Y
0
di > Y
∗
di, or ii) Y
0
di < 0 and Y
0
di < Y
∗
di. That is
the diﬀerence in ﬁnal policy positions between an actor i and actor j declines with
communication, even if their initial positions are heterogeneous. Given that 84%
(86%) of the calculated belief formation directions are negative for the agricultural
development strategy (institutional organization strategy), policy positions converge
towards a common point after communication. Thus, we can summarize for both
dimensions that communication among actors builds consensus about agricultural
policies. The convergence of policy positions is not presupposed by our model. On
contrary, the convergence indicates that the network connects elite members with
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diverging initial positions and that they are open to use information provided by
other elite members to update their beliefs.
5.5 Conclusion
This paper proposes a framework to analyze and evaluate participatory policy pro-
cesses. The framework combines policy networks, which permit policy belief for-
mation among members of a country's political elite, with a cooperative legislative
decision-making model. While the belief formation part builds on work by Fried-
kin and Johnsen (1990), Friedkin and Johnsen (1997) and Pappi et al. (1995), the
legislative decision-making part uses the mean-voter rule by Henning (2000). The
combination of both strands of theories enables us to consider the inﬂuence stake-
holder organization on ﬁnal policy decision while still modeling legislative bargaining
among political agents. In contrast to other social inﬂuence models, we make no
prior assumptions about the weight that actors place on beliefs of others in our
belief formation module but ascertain their own control empirically. Hence, our
model is ﬂexible in capturing an actor speciﬁc policy belief formation process. In
summary, the framework reﬂects the policy process as a country-speciﬁc mechanism
aggregating policy preferences of divergent actors to a distinct ﬁnal policy decision,
even if some of the actors with vested interests in the speciﬁc policy domain are not
endowed with formal political power by constitution.
To apply the framework empirically, qualitative studies of country-speciﬁc policy
processes and a country's constitution inform the legislative decision-making module
about informal and formal voting power distributions among political agents. Qual-
itative studies about policy processes in Africa are, for instance, Bratton (2007) and
van der Walle (2003), and in case of Malawi also Patel and Tostensen (2006). Fur-
ther, the empirical application requires collecting policy positions and networks via
a quantitative network study. Here, we use data from a network study conducted in
Malawi in 2010. The central theme of the study was the policy process leading to
the approval of the sector investment program "Agricultural Sector Wide Approach"
(ASWAp) in April 2010, which is based on the principles of CAADP (The Ministry
of Agriculture and Food Security, Republic of Malawi, 2010).
For testing the framework's ability to reﬂect policy processes, the policy predic-
tion by the framework is compared to the eﬀective policy decision made by actors
in Malawi. The comparison shows that our theoretical framework is capable of re-
producing the policy process that has lead to the adoption of an agricultural policy
program in line with CAADP principles. Further, results reveal that modeling belief
formation processes is essential to understand eﬀective policy processes. We also use
the framework in order to evaluate the nature of the participatory policy process.
Two major points of the empirical analysis are worth noting.
First, the policy network structure in Malawi facilitates consensus building on
agricultural policy issues. Such consensus building might raise ownership of pol-
icy programs by local stakeholder organizations, which is indeed a goal pursued by
donors via promoting participatory policy processes. Nevertheless, network multipli-
ers imply that processes are dominated by government inﬂuencing local stakeholders
and not vice versa as suggested by advocates of these processes. That is the policy
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process still resembles a top-down instead of a bottom-up process in Malawi. As
we have no information about interest groups' true level of knowledge about policy
impacts, government's information gathering routines might be eﬃcient for choos-
ing and implementing welfare increasing policies. However, in terms of giving the
marginalized groups a voice, higher network multipliers for these groups would be
preferred.
Second, donors will not just impose their own idea about eﬃcient development
programs on government and local stakeholders, but will trust information provided
by government and agricultural interest group to form their policy positions. Ac-
cording to the network multipliers, they further seem to act as policy brokers for
agricultural industry organizations. This ﬁnding is unexpected with regard to the en-
gagement of international development agencies to give marginalized groups a voice.
Finally, results show that donors have less inﬂuence than public sector agencies and
agricultural interest groups in total on agricultural policy decisions.
Even though providing a theoretically founded framework to analyze participa-
tory policy processes in detail, the framework does not allow deriving conclusions
about the eﬃciency of participatory processes in terms of choosing eﬃcient, welfare
increasing development strategies. Thus, the evaluation of Malawi's policy processes
with regard to this topic is left for future research (see Chapter "Assessing political
performance gaps: Application of an evolutionary CGPE-approach to CAADP in
Malawi" in this Book). However, given the knowledge about pro-poor growth policy
strategies, researchers can use the proposed framework to simulate a policy process
that would allow governments to implement a research-based pro-poor growth policy
strategy.
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5.A Appendix
Table 5.7: Organizations in Malawi: Acronym, type and name
Acronym Type Name
MoF GOV Ministry of Finance
MoAFS GOV Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security
MoIWD GOV Ministry of Irrigation and Water Development
MoDPC GOV Ministry of Development Planning and Cooperation
RB PUB Reserve Bank
OPC GOV Oﬃce of the President and the Cabinet
SFFRFM PUB Smallholder Farmers Fertilizer Revolving Fund
LU PUB Logistics Unit
DPP LEG Democratic Progressive Party
MCP LEG Malawi Congress Party
ADD PUB Agricultural Development Divisions
DADO PUB District Agricultural Development Oﬃces
DFID DON Department for International Development UK
Irish Aid DON Irish Aid
NORAD DON Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
USAID DON USAID
EU DON EU
IMF DON International Monetary Fund
WB DON World Bank
BC RES Bunda College
FW IG Farmer's World
ILO IG Ilovo Sugar
RAB IG Rab Processors
STAM IG Seed Trade Association of Malawi
MUB IG Mulli Bros.
GTA IG Grain Trader Association
FUM IG Farmers Union Malawi
NASFAM IG National Smallholder Farmers' Association of Malawi
CISANET IG CISANET
TAM IG Tea Association of Malawi
TAMA IG Tobacco Association Malawi
MEJN IG Malawi Economic Justice Network
ECAMA IG Economics Association of Malawi
CAMA IG Consumers Association of Malawi
MCC IG Malawi Council of Churches
ELDS IG Evangelical Lutheran Development
CADECOM IG Catholic Development Commission
Source: Authors.
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Abstract
With this paper, we present an approach to empirically analyze determinants of elite com-
munication networks. We use an advanced binary regression framework, which can deal
with missing values inevitably occurring within survey data. Estimation of model param-
eters is thereby done in a Bayesian framework using MCMC techniques. In fact, results
from such a model enable us to evaluate participatory policy processes by explicitly deriv-
ing insights into their information/distortion nature. Empirical results from an application
of our model to survey data collected in Malawi suggest that the structural embeddedness
of organizations into the network mainly determines the formation of elite communication
ties, while knowledge is an important but not leading determinant of communication. We
ﬁnd no signiﬁcance of homophily in policy interests and summarize thereby that, in the
case of Malawi, participatory policy processes do not distort policy decisions in favor of
special interests.
Keywords: policy networks; political homophily; distortion-information tradeoﬀ; Bayesian
network estimation
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6.1 Introduction
Lobbying is commonly recognized as a public mechanism to induce policy makers
to follow the interests of well-organized groups. Thereby lobbying is criticized as
distorting policies with respect to the favor of speciﬁc interests at the expense of
society. Nevertheless, such political inﬂuence activities can be also understood as a
mechanism by which interests groups signal their policy preferences. That is lob-
bying conveys socially valuable information about the consequences of policies from
society to political agents. If better-informed political agents now choose social wel-
fare increasing policies, the strategic information provision through lobbying can be
expected to outweigh the negative distortionary eﬀects (see Ball (1995) and litera-
ture cited therein). Such arguments for informational beneﬁts of lobbying are also
in line with the so-called wisdom of the crowd eﬀect. Wisdom of the crowd describes
the idea that a group of relatively uninformed individuals would collectively have
much more knowledge than any single member of a group has, see Galton (1907)).
Such a situation would allow choosing better policies if the individual information
is spread via communication in elite networks and attained by political agents.
The major factor determining whether the informational beneﬁts in fact outweigh
the distortionary costs is the structure of the political elite's communication net-
work. An important issue here is the tradeoﬀ between eﬃcient policy learning of
decision-makers and a potential policy bias inducing negative eﬀects on overall eco-
nomic performance. Political agents learn eﬃciently about the impacts of policy
decisions on the economic system if they choose communication partners similar in
political interests to themselves. Festinger (1954) still argued that similar others
oﬀer relevant information and that thereby similarity in interests is a well-known
determinant of, for instance, friendship. In terms of policy learning, communication
ties with organizations that have similar interests to oneself reduce biased informa-
tion signals and allow for an individually eﬃcient communication process. However,
such individually rational information gathering routines clash obviously with gath-
ering routines that reduce policy distortion in favor of a speciﬁc interest group.
With this study, we provide an empirical analysis to shed light on the determi-
nants of information gathering routines within a country's political elite, i.e. of
local stakeholders, donors and politicians. Such insights are valuable information
for designing participatory policy processes and for increasing knowledge based pol-
icy formulation. In addition to this, results would reveal the nature of participatory
policy processes in terms of increasing special-interest bias in policies or transmitting
valuable information on policy impacts to political decision-makers. At the method-
ological level, a sound empirical assessment of participatory policy processes calls
for sophisticated econometric models to estimate determinants of communication
networks eﬃciently. Further, empirical analysis requires quantitative survey data
collected via face-to-face interviews with a country's political elite. Such surveys in-
volve questions about policy positions and interests as well as about communication
networks. Here, we analyze data collected within a series of face-to-face interviews in
Malawi. The central theme of the survey is the policy process leading to the approval
of the sector investment program "Agricultural Sector Wide Approach" (ASWAp)
in April 2010, which is based on the principles of the Comprehensive Africa Agri-
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culture Development Programme (CAADP) (The Ministry of Agriculture and Food
Security, Republic of Malawi, 2010).
Since data collected via face-to-face interviews is almost inevitably subject to
item and unit non-response despite the highest eﬀorts in ﬁeldwork, we suggest an
advanced probit framework for analyzing elite network generating processes based on
policy network data. In fact, our estimation strategy overcomes the above-mentioned
data features by an adaptation of the Bayesian estimation scheme for binary pro-
bit models based on Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methodology, namely
Gibbs sampling, as suggested by Albert and Chib (1993). Based on a sample from
the posterior distribution of the model parameters obtained via iterative sequential
sampling from the full conditional distributions, parameter estimates are given as
sample moments. This estimation technique is well suited to deal with missing values
in explaining factors and missing values within the dependent network relationship
using the device of data augmentation proposed byTanner and Wong (1987). The
vector of model parameters subject to posterior inference is augmented to include
also the missing values of explaining variables and missing network relationships,
where draws for the missing values within explaining factors are then obtained via
sequential regression trees providing non parametric approximations of the under-
lying full conditional distributions, Burgette and Reiter (see 2010). The proposed
modeling thereby accounts for the uncertainty within parameter estimation due to
missing values, as discussed in Butts (2003). A model ﬁtness criterion is provided
to allow for gauging the predictive capability of the suggested empirical framework
and for model comparison.
Determinants of political communication can be summarized according to two
main strands of literature -the preference driven models and the structure driven
models. First given the results of signaling games between interest groups and
politicians, we consider knowledge as a driving force of network development. Fur-
ther, as information provided by an interest group is seldom sincere but biased in
favor of a group's interests, we introduce political homophily as another determinant
of communication ties (see for example Austen-Smith, 1993; Ball, 1995; Lohmann,
1993). With regard to structural approaches, we suggest three factors that deter-
mine tie formation between a pair of organizations. These factors describe meeting
opportunities among organizations and an organization's perceived political power
(see Knoke, 1990; Knoke et al., 1996; Moody, 2001). We include the determinants
as dyad speciﬁc characteristics into our econometric model, i.e., sender and receiver
speciﬁc individual variables are transformed into pair-wise distances. In addition,
the individual determinants enter the model as sender and receiver speciﬁc variables.
Empirical results suggest structural embeddedness and political inﬂuence as im-
portant determinants of the probability to observe a tie between a pair of organi-
zations, while knowledge is an important but not leading determinant of communi-
cation. In terms of designing a political communication process, the results suggest
umbrella organizations as an opening key for communication.
The paper proceeds as follows. Determinants of political communication and
corresponding empirical data are reviewed in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 introduces the
estimation strategy and the approach to model comparison. Section 6.4 provides
the empirical results and Section 6.5 concludes.
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6.2 Determinants of political communication networks
This section reviews determinants of elite communication structures from the lit-
erature about political inﬂuence of interest groups or social network formation, re-
spectively. With regard to the econometric speciﬁcation, we provide a description of
variables used to assess determinants of communication empirically. Overall, we are
interested in analyzing to what extend political homophily, knowledge and structural
factors determine communication among elite members.
6.2.1 Theoretical considerations
As we observe that actors communicate directly only with a small subset of the
elite, we propose three main categories of determinants of political communication:
1. Knowledge, 2. Political homophily and 3. Structural factors (see Figure 6.1).
Network formation
Political 
homophily
Knowledge
Distortion
Meeting
opportunities
Information
Structural 
factors
Political power
Figure 6.1: Determinants of network formation
Source: Authors
Regarding the ﬁrst two categories, it is important to consider the main attributes
of lobbying. Several papers argue for the informational role of lobbying based on
theoretical derivations from signaling games (see for example Austen-Smith, 1993;
Ball, 1995; Lohmann, 1993). They emphasize that politicians were better able to
choose eﬃcient policies if they are being lobbied. Thus, it is rational for political
agents with minor knowledge about the impacts of policy decisions on the state of
the world to contact non-governmental organizations and especially those with high
expertise in the speciﬁc policy.
Furthermore, it is well recognized that lobbying is always biased in favor of special
interests. On the one hand, this leads at the policy outcome level to policy distor-
tions at the expense of the public interest. On the other hand, the bias component
of inﬂuence activities determines actor's individual information gathering routines.
Therefore, we introduce the political homophily as driving factor of network for-
mation. Political homophily leans on homophily used in social network research.
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Generally homophily describes the fact that similarity between two actors increases
their likeliness to interact. Here, political homophily means that a pair of organi-
zations prefers the same state of the world, i.e. they are similar in policy interests,
which increases their probability to communicate. The reason behind political ho-
mophily as determinant of political communication networks relates to the view that
actors always communicate policy positions biased according to their policy inter-
ests. Thus, receiving information from actors similar in interests to oneself would
lower the likelihood of receiving information that does not match own interests in
the state of the world. That is political homophily as a determinant of political
communication lowers the likelihood of biased signals for the receiver of information
but increases the bias of communication in the overall network.
Concerning factors driving political homophily, for instance, in Malawi, oﬃcial
policy documents provide the basis to extract these factors. We identify policy con-
cerns, which aﬀect the formulation of major policy programs in a country recently
passed through the legislative process. For the case of Malawi, consider the Malawi
Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) and the ASWAp as important policy
programs (Government of Malawi, 2006; NEPAD, 2010). Table 6.1 describes which
policy interests evolve in society that drive political behavior according to this two
policy documents. Interests are listed in descending order of average interest over
interviewed organizations. Overall, interests in food security, poverty reduction,
economic growth and environmental sustainability may drive political homophily.
Further Table 6.1 lists common interests and conﬂicting positions that occur within
one speciﬁc dimension of the state of the world. While common interests will drive
political homophily and thereby communication, conﬂicting positions increase the
potential of policy deadlocks but allow also for policy learning. Consider for ex-
ample the welfare of smallholders. Actors might be equally interested in reducing
hunger and malnutrition but have diﬀerent experiences and information about the
political strategy to reach their common aim. One actor might favor input subsidies
to increase maize yields, the other one might consider budget spending on extension
services as a more eﬃcient policy strategy. Information exchange between these two
actors can help to choose the strategy that ﬁt best their common interests. On
the contrary to the behavioral theories, structural approaches argue that an actor's
meeting opportunities and political inﬂuence determine his tie formation. Consider
overlapping membership in organizations, i.e. structural embeddedness, political in-
ﬂuence and human resources as structural determinants of communication choices.
Theoretical arguments for overlapping membership in organizations as determinant
are twofold. On the one hand, we lean on Moody (2001) who points out that meet-
ing opportunity determines the formation of friendship in school. Transferring this
idea to political communication, membership in umbrella organizations or common
membership in organizations, respectively, as indicator for meeting opportunities
increases the probability that a pair of organizations forms a communication tie.
Umbrella organizations in Malawi are, for instance, the Malawi Economic Justice
Network (MEJN) or the Civil Society Agriculture Network (CISANET), respectively.
On the other hand, a common view on states of world might determine the mem-
bership in (umbrella) organizations and thereby increase the trust an organization
puts on the information of another organization, which is member of the same orga-
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Table 6.1: Description of preferences: state of the world
State of the world Common interests Conﬂicting positions Ø interest
Welfare of
smallholders
reduce hunger and mal-
nutrition
political market inter-
ventions
21
Poverty reduction poverty reduction achievable poverty level
(short-term)
18
Welfare: agr. export
sector
foreign currency
earnings
political market inter-
vention
14
Budget development of the agri-
cultural sector
share of agr. budget in
total budget
13
Environmental
sustainability
conservation of natural
resources
budget priority of envi-
ronmental sustainabil-
ity
12
Gender issues lessen the vulnerability
of the poor
gender speciﬁc policy
programs
10
Welfare: non-agr.
industry
economic growth political market inter-
vention
6
Welfare: urban
consumers
food provision to urban
population
level of food prices 5
Source: The Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, Republic of Malawi (2010),
Government of Malawi (2006), own data.
nizations as herself. That is an organization will seek for information from another
organization if a third organization links them both (see Holland and Leinhardt,
1971).1
Another important determinant is an actor's power to inﬂuence legislation (Knoke,
1990; Knoke et al., 1996). Given the purpose of lobbying as interest mediation
mechanism, actors contact highly inﬂuential players within the political elite in
order to ensure inclusion of their policy positions in ﬁnal policy decisions. We
thereby expect that the higher the receiver's perceived inﬂuence in a speciﬁc policy
domain the more likely actors contact the receiver. We choose perceived inﬂuence
and not formal political power because of two main arguments. First, we argue in
line with Shepsle & Weingast that formal institutional rules cannot explain observed
power distributions. In this context consider also the work of Bratton (2007) who
argues that the rule of law is often weakly developed even if it is not completely
absent in developing countries. Political power is intensely concentrated around the
president which leads to an increase in power of his cabinet (van der Walle, 2003).
Further, considering just formal political power would dismiss the informal inﬂuence
of international organizations in developing countries. Second, as formal political
power will be highly correlated with perceived inﬂuence for actors endowed with
formal power, employing the concept of perceived inﬂuence has the advantage to
1However the informational eﬃciency models contradicts the idea that a common link to third
parties increases the likeliness of information exchange among a pair of organizations. On
contrary this model states that organizations will drop ties to organizations with whom they
are linked by a third party due to information redundancies (Carpenter et al., 2004).
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reﬂect informal and formal political power distributions with one measure at the
same time.
Finally, consider staﬀ and thereby time as a scare resource of an organization
that can be spend to maintain relationships. Given the time-consuming nature
of serious communication relationships, the number of staﬀ therefore determines
contact opportunities between a pair of organizations.
6.2.2 Empirical determinants of communication
According to our theoretical considerations, our set of empirical variables is diﬀer-
entiated into three classes: i) variables describing political homophily, ii) indicator
variables of individual knowledge, and iii) variables related to structural factors. For
further information on the study that collected data for these variables, see Section
6.3.1.
Political homophily. We approximate political homophily by a distance index of
political interests (distance). Such an index provides dyad speciﬁc information on
the probability to observe communication between elite members due to similarity
in policy interests. The index summarizes the distances in interest between two
actors concerning the preferred dimension of the state of the world. We selected
eight dimensions for representing the state of the world that actors address with
designing agricultural policy programs (see Table 6.1). The index is calculated as
a Euclidean distance function based on actor's i and actor's j policy interests X in
dimension z with z:
distanceij =
Z∑
z=1
(X
(z)
i −X(z)j )2. (6.1)
Knowledge. Our strategy to identify an organization's level of knowledge is twofold.
First, as knowledge is hardly observable, we use the age of the organization (age)
and the organization's degree of specialization in agriculture (specialization) to ap-
proximate political knowledge. In our setting age equals 2000 - year of foundation.
Specialization relates to an organization's eﬀort spent on agricultural issues.
Second, we use an alternative indicator that directly measures the technological
knowledge of actors regarding the transformation of CAADP policies into policy
outcomes based on a Computable General Equilibrium model (CGE). In particular,
Henning et al. (2012) models the impact of diﬀerent CAADP policies on the eight
relevant policy concerns Z1, ..., Z8 within an extended CGE approach calibrated for
Malawi. Based on this CGE approach, Henning et al. (2012) identiﬁed further the
optimal CAADP policy positions from the viewpoint of diﬀerent governmental and
non-governmental organizations by maximizing the organizations' political support
functions with respect to the technical translation of CAADP policies into policy
concerns as deﬁned by the extended CGE. Comparing these theoretically derived op-
timal policy positions with the policy positions organizations state in our interviews
implies a measure of an organizations' political knowledge. In particular, Henning
et al. (2012) calculated the Euclidean diﬀerence between the theoretically calculated
and empirically stated policy position. We use this measure as a direct indicator of
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the political knowledge of an organization (expertise) in our econometric analysis.
In our sample, the Tobacco Association of Malawi (TAMA) is the best-informed
organizations, while the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security has the lowest
level of knowledge about policy impacts according to our indicator.
Structural factors. As the perception of an organization as inﬂuential in policy-
making will inﬂuence his probability to form ties, we use information from a rep-
utation network in order to identify the political reputation (reputation) for each
organization. This variable will further proxy the inﬂuence of an organization's leg-
islative power. To account for the meeting opportunities between two organizations,
we include the number of staﬀ working on agricultural policy issues (staﬀ) in our
analysis. Based on information about organizational membership a dyad speciﬁc
variable can be calculated that indicates how often two organizations were member
of the same organization (same).
6.3 Study design and econometric model framework
6.3.1 Study design
To derive insights into communication structures, we collected networks, policy posi-
tions, policy interests and characteristics of organizations via face-to-face interviews
in Malawi in 2010. We decided to focus on networks among organizations and not
among individuals, because organizations interested in the speciﬁc policy domain
instead of individual persons spread and hold mainly information about eﬃcient
policy design. That is respondents are considered as corporative actors, i.e. experts
of their organization for the speciﬁc policy ﬁeld, if they answered policy network and
policy preference questions during the interviews (see Coleman, 1990)Table 6.2 lists
all interviewed organizations and their indegree centrality. The indegree centrality
(IDC) is calculated based on a reputation network question that asks all interviewees
to mention the most inﬂuential players in Malawi's agricultural policy domain (de-
tailed information on the questionnaire is given below). This measure summarizes
all nominations standardized by possible nominations and is denoted by reputation
in further empirical analysis. Overall, our sample represents the top ten of most
inﬂuential players in Malawi and less but still inﬂuential organizations. To ensure
the comparability of answers interviewees were interviewed with standardized ques-
tionnaires. The questionnaires consist of three parts: a) Policy network questions,
in which organizational network data was collected, b) Policy preferences, where
interviewees stated their policy interests and positions and c) Technical data that
describe organizational characteristics, e.g. year of foundation. The organizational
network questions were asked with a method that we have found especially helpful
in earlier network studies (Pappi and Henning, 1999). That is interviewees were
asked to check organizations on a list of relevant organizations with which they
maintain a speciﬁc relation. Regarding this study, the relations were about the de-
mand and supply of expert information on agricultural policies. Thus, interviewees
were asked to check organizations on a list, which we compiled in advance, with
whom they share information about the consequences of agricultural policies. Such
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Table 6.2: Overview about the interviewed organizations
OrganizationType IDC Organization Type IDC Organization Type IDC
MoAFS GOV 1.00 STAM IG 0.61 CAMA IG 0.52
EU DON 0.85 GTA IG 0.61 OPC GOV 0.48
DFID DON 0.82 NORAD DON 0.58 MoDPC GOV 0.45
WB DON 0.82 CISANET IG 0.58 SFFRFM PUB 0.45
BC RES 0.82 IMF DON 0.55 ECAMA IG 0.39
MoF GOV 0.79 FW IG 0.55 MCC IG 0.39
FUM IG 0.79 MEJN IG 0.55 ELDS IG 0.36
USAID DON 0.73 CADECOM IG 0.55 MCP LEG 0.33
NASFAM IG 0.73 DADO PUB 0.52 ILO IG 0.33
DPP LEG 0.70 MUB IG 0.52 LU PUB 0.30
MoIWD GOV 0.67 TAM IG 0.52 RB PUB 0.27
ADD PUB 0.67 TAMA IG 0.52 RAB IG 0.27
Irish Aid DON 0.67
Notes: GOV: Government, IG: Civil society or private sector organization, PUB: Public
sector agency or local government organization, LEG: Political party, DON: Donor
organizations, RES: Research organizations. Source: Calculated by authors from own
data.
kind of expert information is, for instance, the knowledge of the eﬀects of diﬀerent
policy instruments on the welfare of diﬀerent social groups. This expert information
can be very interesting for political organizations as well as for interest groups of
the sector to choose eﬃcient policies or to learn about policy impacts in order to
change own policy positions. The list of organizations that we handed out to the
interviewee is compiled with help of the position method and information on policy
workshop participation. The latter strategy is especially useful to identify relevant
private and civil sector organizations. The position method is a quite simple method
of desk research that allows identifying organizations with formal political power.
To simplify orientation, the list is organized by the formal type of organization for
political organizations and the branch of interest represented by a speciﬁc interest
group. Overall, the list contains 98 organizations for Malawi (for further informa-
tion on study design see also the Chapter "`A network based approach to evaluate
participatory policy processes: An application to CAADP in Malawi"' in this book).
All questions of part b) relate to documents published during the formulation of
the ASWAp program in Malawi or rely on information from oﬃcial policy documents,
respectively (see e.g. NEPAD, 2010). In general, questions can be classiﬁed into two
categories: questions about policy concerns and questions about policy programs.
As political homophily (distance) relates to organizations' interests in speciﬁc pol-
icy concerns, we use in this study interview data from the questions about policy
concerns and especially the question about the interest, X(z)i , in the eight policy
concerns, which together describe an organization's preferred state of the world. In-
terests are ascertained by distributing 100 points across the eight dimensions of the
state of world. For more information on these dimensions see Table 6.1. Informa-
tion on data used to calculate expertise is given by Henning et al. (2012) in this
173
Chapter 6 The Role of Knowledge in the Formation of Political Elite
Communication Networks in Malawi: A Bayesian Econometric Approach
book. Questions about policy programs are described in more detail in Chapter "`A
network based approach to evaluate participatory policy processes: An application
to CAADP in Malawi "' in this book.
Part c) asks questions about organizational attributes that inform about an or-
ganization's degree of specialization in agriculture (specialization), the year of foun-
dation to calculate age and number of staﬀ engaged in agricultural issues (staﬀ).
Further, we asked organizations to name all organizations of which they are a mem-
ber. With this information at hand, we calculate the dyad-speciﬁc variable same,
which informs about overlapping membership in organizations between a pair of or-
ganizations. The mean of this variable reveals that two organizations in Malawi are
on average jointly member of 1.3 organizations.
Summary statistics for all exogenous variables under consideration are provided
in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3: Summary statistics
Variable Description Mean Std. dev.
specialization specialization in agriculture 0.652 0305
age age of organization 26.027 20.288
staﬀ number of staﬀ 19.625 34.753
reputation indegree centrality 0.573 0.179
same overlapping membership in organizations 1.267 0.708
distance political homophily 0.314 0.146
expertise political knowledge 0.641 0.177
Source: Calculated by authors from own data.
6.3.2 Econometric model
We setup an empirical model capturing key elements of the communication pro-
cess between local elite members related to individual characteristics inﬂuencing the
formation probability of a network tie. Individual characteristics are considered as
important network determinants in terms of prevailing homophily of network agents.
For analyzing the process which establishes communication ties δji or δij between
local elite members i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . , n with i 6= j for the considered
directed dichotomous network relationships, determinants of communication rela-
tionships are assessed within a probit framework, i.e. δij = 1, if δ∗ij > 0 and δij = 0
else. Following Hoﬀ and Ward (2004), the latent variable δ∗ij relating determinants
of communication with the observed network tie δij is thereby parameterized as
δij
∗ = Wijβ +Wiκs +Wiκr + hij + eij = Qijθ + eij, (6.2)
where Wij is a set of dyad speciﬁc variables, Wi denotes a set of sender speciﬁc
characteristics for individual i, Wj is a set of receiver speciﬁc characteristics for
individual j and θ = {β, κs, κr, γ} summarizes all model parameters. hij is assumed
to capture distance eﬀects and thus homophily and is hence parameterized in such
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a way to allow the aggregation of individual speciﬁc characteristics to the dyadic
level, i.e.
hij =
K∑
k=1
γ(k)|W (k)i −W (k)j | . (6.3)
Using a probit link, which corresponds to the assumption of a standard normal
distribution for the latent error, i.e. eij˜N(0, 1), allows for establishing a Bayesian
estimation routine facilitated by Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques.
Parameter inference within a Bayesian setup is performed based on the posterior
distribution given as
p (θ|data) = L(data|θ)pi(θ), (6.4)
where L(data|θ) denotes the model likelihood and pi(θ) the assumed prior distri-
bution of model parameters. Parameter inference is based on moments and quantiles
of the posterior distribution. These are obtained on the basis of sample trajecto-
ries drawn from the posterior distribution. Sampling of parameters from their joint
posterior distribution is achieved via iterative sampling from the full conditional
distributions. The model likelihood is then given as
L(data|θ) ∝
∏
i 6=j
Φ((2δij − 1)(Qijθ)), (6.5)
Where Φ(·) denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution function. Given
the above model structure, we adapt conjugate priors for all model parameters, i.e.
a multivariate normal prior for parameter vector β with the corresponding mean
set to zero and variance set to 100. More details on Bayesian estimation via Gibbs
sampling for this kind of models are given in Aßmann and Boysen-Hogrefe (2011)
Next to parameter estimates, interpretation of results is provided by calculation
of marginal eﬀects, where the corresponding uncertainty is directly accessibly by
means of the Gibbs output, see Aßmann and Boysen-Hogrefe (2011) for a more
general discussion.
In addition, the use of Bayesian estimation allows a conceptually straightforward
treatment of missing values within both, the observed network relationship and the
explaining variables. As empirical network data is most often based on personal
interviews and survey data, missing values occur despite tremendous eﬀort in ﬁeld-
work and questionnaire design. Missing values are especially troublesome, as a single
missing value for a considered explaining characteristic for individual i causes the
potential loss of n− 1 observed network relationships for assessing the link between
the formation probability of a network tie and the considered individual charac-
teristics as determinants thereof. Additionally, the parameter estimates would no
longer reﬂect information on all network constituents. Thus proper estimation rou-
tines facilitating the use of variables with single missing observations are needed to
perform proper statistical analysis incorporating the uncertainty in parameter es-
timation stemming from missing values. Dealing with missing values is performed
using the MCMC device of data augmentation as suggested by Tanner and Wong
(1987) .The parameter vector is augmented to include the missing values in the ex-
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plaining factors. Sampling from the full conditional distributions for these missing
values is then incorporated within the iterative sampling scheme providing draws
from the posteriori distribution p(θ|data). For the considered probit model allowing
for analysis of a directed dependent network relationship, the sampling proceeds by
iterating the following basic steps (see Albert and Chib, 1993)
1. Sampling of the parameters β, κs, κr and γ from full conditional distributions
underlying the linear regression setup for latent variable δij
∗ ( see Aßmann and
Boysen-Hogrefe (2011) for details on the corresponding moments of this full
conditional distribution ).
2. Sampling of the latent variable δij
∗ from truncated normal distributions with
means given by the linear regression setup and variance of one. The truncation
at zero from above is δij = 0 and from below if δij = 1 ( see Aßmann and
Boysen-Hogrefe (2011) for details on the corresponding moments of this full
conditional distribution ).
3. Sampling from the full conditional distributions of missing values. These are
obtained using non-parametric approximations for the full conditional distri-
butions as suggested by Burgette and Reiter (2010). Note that for this class
of empirical network models, where the set of individual characteristics is as-
sumed to explain the formation probability of a network tie, only few obser-
vations are at hand to provide a realistic approximation of the full conditional
distribution. If the number of observations required by the non-parametric
approach of Burgette and Reiter (2010) is not reached, draws for the missing
values are obtained from the observed unconditional distribution as the only
approximation of the full conditional distribution at hand to obtain draws for
this variables.
Successive sampling from the outlined full conditional distributions establishes a
sample from the posterior distribution facilitating inference with regard to parame-
ters based on the empirical moments. Although parameter estimates allow for direct
assessment of the direction in which explaining factors inﬂuence the formation prob-
ability of a communication tie, marginal eﬀects provide a quantiﬁcation of the eﬀect
of a change in determining factors on the probability of a communication relation.
Marginal eﬀects are conceptually given as ∂Pr(δij=1|Q˜)
∂w
, where Q˜ denotes a particular
state of the considered control variables, e.g., the mode. An estimate of the marginal
eﬀects is readily obtained from the output of the Gibbs sampling scheme as
1
S
n∑
i=1
φ
(
Q˜θ(s)
)
θ(s), (6.6)
where φ (·) denotes the standard normal density and θ(s), , denote the sampled
trajectories of all considered model parameters. In general estimates will be based
on 10000 draws, i.e., S = 10000, where discarding the initial 2000 draws have been
found suﬃcient to mitigate the eﬀect of burn-in.
However, whilst the necessity to deal with missing values within the explaining
factors is inherent given the considered empirical network model for the surveyed
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network data, it is nevertheless important to check carefully the adequacy of the
considered empirical model. While valid point and interval estimates are readily
available for the above suggested approach for dealing with missing values, other
standard measures for gauging model ﬁtness, like e.g. -tests, are not readily available.
Note that this applies also to alternative approaches allowing for handling of missing
data, see Raghunathan et al. (2001). As a natural approach to gauge model ﬁtness is
based on the capability of the empirical network model to provide accurate forecasts,
the following outlines one possibility to calculate an overall measure of model ﬁtness.
The situation of a network observed with missing values poses a methodological
challenge, as the benchmark for assessing the prediction accuracy, i.e. the true
relationship between network members, remains unobservable. As formal prediction
criteria, we use the AUC measure derived from the ROC curve approach proposed
by Egan (1975). In order to function as a valid criterion of model ﬁtness, the
AUC measure has to be combined with a pseudo out-of-sample experiment gauging
against possible overparametrization, seeAßmann and Boysen-Hogrefe (2011) for a
review of this approach in cross validation experiments for binary panel data. One
possibility to design the out-of-sample is to split the network constituents into four
quarters forming a partition of the set of network constituents, where other fractions
are also possible. Parameter estimation is based on the network formed by three
quarters of the network constituents, where parameter estimates are then used to
predict the network formed by the left quarter of network constituents. Adapting
a fourfold split yields a total of four possible combinations. Since in our situation
the underlying network involves missing data, the predicted network resulting from
complete sample estimation serves as a prediction reference. Note that this approach
allows for a comparison of even non-nested model speciﬁcations.
6.4 Empirical Results
Estimation results concerning the explanatory factors suggested by theory are pro-
vided in Table 6.4 below. Although parameter estimates show the direction in which
explanatory factors inﬂuence the probability of tie formation between two organi-
zations, regression coeﬃcients (columns 3 and 4) provide no correct quantitative
description of the relationship between the probability of communication ties and
changes within the explanatory factors. The relative importance of the diﬀerent ex-
planatory factors can be gauged based on marginal eﬀects (columns 6 and 7). The
in-sample AUC measure reveals that our approach to deal with missing values and
the suggested model speciﬁcation result in high predicting accuracy of communica-
tion ties between organizations. Using the random graph model as an illustrative
benchmark corresponding AUC measure of 0.5), the out-of sample AUC measures
point at the signiﬁcantly increased prediction accuracy due to the considered set of
explaining factors.
Since homophily is a key term of interest in this analysis, we calculate Euclidean
distance measures between sender and receiver speciﬁc values of specialization, age,
staﬀ, reputation and policy concerns (distance). The larger the value of these dis-
tance measures, the more diﬀer organizations in terms of the respective issue. A
negative value of the parameter estimate thereby indicates that the probability to
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Table 6.4: Estimation results
Parameter estimates Marginal eﬀects
mean sd 2.50% 97.50% mean sd
constant −1.254 0.468 −2.185 −0.341 - -
homophily
specialization −0.672 0.201 −1.068 −0.281 −0.223 0.065
age 0.001 0.004 −0.007 0.009 0.000 0.001
expertise 0.423 0.372 −0.315 1.147 0.144 0.128
staﬀ −0.009 0.003 −0.016 −0.004 −0.003 0.001
reputation −0.949 0.346 −1.619 −0.266 −0.316 0.116
distance 0.410 0.366 −0.295 1.141 0.142 0.129
dyad speciﬁc
same 0.814 0.116 0.585 1.043 0.274 0.054
sender speciﬁc
specialization −0.300 0.246 −0.776 0.189 −0.105 0.087
age 0.006 0.004 −0.002 0.013 0.002 0.001
expertise −1.593 0.392 −2.329 −0.786 −0.530 0.128
staﬀ 0.020 0.003 0.014 0.026 0.007 0.001
reputation 0.241 0.336 −0.413 0.896 0.078 0.111
receiver speciﬁc
specialization 0.339 0.170 0.005 0.662 0.111 0.054
age −0.007 0.003 −0.014 −0.001 −0.002 0.001
expertise 0.062 0.293 −0.517 0.642 0.023 0.099
staﬀ 0.020 0.003 0.014 0.026 0.007 0.001
reputation 4.591 0.325 3.930 5.230 1.539 0.191
Predicted (rows)/
Observed (columns)
0 1
0 240 43
1 429 620
AUC (in-sample/
out-of-sample)
0.7262/ 0.6724
Source: Calculated by authors from own data
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form a tie increases with homophily in the respective issue. A positive value would
suggest that heterophily has positive impacts on the probability to communicate.
In Table 6.4, estimated parameters and marginal eﬀects show that homophily in or-
ganizations' attributes increases the probability to interact. All signiﬁcant variables
have a negative sign. If organizations are similar in terms of specialization, staﬀ
and reputation, the probability to form a tie increases. Inspection of the marginal
eﬀects reveals no high quantitative eﬀect of an increase in the diﬀerence of staﬀ
between two organizations on the probability to form a communication tie, while
increasing homophily in reputation and in specialization has a high quantitative im-
pact. Hence, these ﬁndings point at the necessity to look not only at parameter
estimates but also on marginal eﬀects to assess the quantitative eﬀects correctly.
We ﬁnd no signiﬁcance for political homophily (distance) and homophily in age or
expertise, respectively. Thus, political homophily is not an important determinant
of communication. With regard to the distortionary costs of political homophily,
this ﬁnding suggests less biased policy decisions. Nevertheless, organizations have
to adopt eﬃcient information processing routines to ﬁlter received information in
terms of a sender's special-interest bias.
Next, we take a closer look at knowledge and structural factors as determinant
of tie formation. We start with the results for variables that relate to knowledge as
determinant of communication. We observe that communication is clearly driven
by an organization's specialization in agriculture. A receiver's probability to gain
information by communication clearly increases with his level of specialization. A
sender's level of specialization is not signiﬁcantly associated with tie formation. Fur-
ther, the negative and signiﬁcant sign of the diﬀerence in specialization implies that
communication partners are likely to be similar in the level of specialization. With
regard to expertise transmission in the network, this result point at isolated clusters
of knowledge that prohibit the spread of knowledge. Age as another proxy reveals
that the younger an organization, the higher is the probability to receive informa-
tion from others. If we now put age on a high level with knowledge, the process
enables transmission of knowledge from the elderly, more experienced organizations
to the younger and less experienced ones. As these variables are at best proxies
for knowledge, we consider a further indicator expertise. The results for this in-
dicator suggest that the observed communication structure allows for information
transmission within the elite network. Note that low values of expertise indicate a
high level of knowledge about impacts of policy decisions on the state of the world.
A sender's level of expertise is especially associated with tie probabilities. That is it
is likely that better-informed organizations spread their knowledge in the network.
Further, since homophily in expertise has no signiﬁcant impact on the probability to
form a communication tie, knowledge will not circulate within a cluster of highly in-
formed organizations. Consequently, less informed organizations are able to receive
information from experts ceteris paribus.
Turning now to structural factors as determinant of communication, we observe
several signiﬁcant variables. One factor that determines the probability to partici-
pate in elite communication is the number of staﬀ (staﬀ). For senders and receivers
an increase in the number of staﬀ increases the probability to communicate with
others. We again observe homophily among organizations. That is organizations
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of about the same size are more likely to communicate with each other. However,
inspection of the marginal eﬀects reveals no high quantitative eﬀect of an increase
in the number of staﬀ or in the diﬀerence of staﬀ between a pair of organizations,
respectively, on the probability to form a communication tie. Further, the com-
munication network is clearly driven by reputation. Consider here that reputation
might be highly correlated with political power. Thereby senders try to increase
the opportunity that legislation will favor their interests by contacting highly inﬂu-
ential organizations. We expect that the higher the reputation of the receiver the
more likely the receiver is contacted. The observed highly positive marginal eﬀect
of receiver speciﬁc reputation is in line with expectation. The negative sign on the
diﬀerence in reputation suggests that organizations similar in reputation form com-
munication clusters. Consequently, less inﬂuential organizations are less likely to
form ties to powerful actors. Another determinant of communication is overlapping
membership in organizations between a pair of organizations (same). The positive
and signiﬁcant sign of same shows that if two organizations are more often members
of the same organizations, the more likely is tie formation. Inspection of marginal ef-
fects reveals a high quantitative impact of overlapping membership in organizations
for the probability to communicate.
We summarize for knowledge as determinant of communication that young orga-
nizations receive information from older ones and that knowledge is spread among
organizations with diverging levels of knowledge. In fact, the marginal eﬀect of
sender speciﬁc expertise states that knowledge highly inﬂuences the probability for
senders to form ties. However, if specialization in agriculture is well correlated with
knowledge, homophily in specialization would prohibit knowledge transmission. In
our case, we observe the contrary. Specialization is not highly correlated with exper-
tise (corr = 0.069). Hence, we suggest discussing the variable specialization more
generally in terms of an organization's main activity ﬁeld. That is organizations
with heterogeneous activity ﬁelds but high capacity can still be well-informed orga-
nizations. Good cases in point are donor organizations. It is well recognized that
donors rarely specialize in a sector but handle several problem areas of a developing
country. With this example in mind, the negative impact of homophily in specializa-
tion does not trigger information transmission but simply reveals that organizations
with similar activity ﬁelds will form ties more often ceteris paribus.
Nevertheless, with regard to the structural determinants of communication, we
suggest that overlapping membership in organizations and political inﬂuence are
more important determinants of elite communication ties than knowledge. We do
not infer that knowledge can be neglected as a determinant and that an elite network
does not spread information among actors. But the high marginal eﬀects of same
and homophily in reputation narrow the impact of knowledge on tie formation,
even if expertise signiﬁcantly inﬂuences the probability to send information. For
illustration, how overlapping membership in organizations (same) and the level of
knowledge (expertise) inﬂuence the probability to form a tie for senders, the following
calculations are performed. In fact, we calculate the eﬀect of a change in same
(expertise) from the minimum value to the maximal value observed in our sample.
Thereby probabilities to communicate are computed for each of the two determinants
at these extreme positions averaging over all other determinants observed within
180
Chapter 6 The Role of Knowledge in the Formation of Political Elite
Communication Networks in Malawi: A Bayesian Econometric Approach
the sample. The minimum of same corresponds to no overlapping organizations, the
maximum to four overlapping organizations. The minimum level of knowledge is
given by a value of 1.098 of expertise in our sample, while a value of 0.445 of expertise
denotes the highest level of knowledge among the actors. Inspection of eﬀects, see
Table 6.5, reveals that increasing overlapping membership in organizations increases
the probability to observe a tie between a pair of organizations by 29 percentage
points. However, if an uninformed sender gains as much knowledge as the best
informed actor in the sample, the probability to form ties, held all other determinants
at their means except homophily in expertise, increases by 22 percentage points.
Hence, joining other organizations would be ceteris paribus a better means than
accumulating knowledge to increase the probability to send information.
Table 6.5: Simulation of marginal eﬀects: same and expertise
same expertise
min/max Pr(δij = 1) min/max Pr(δij = 1)
0 0.700 1.098 0.571
4 0.997 0.445 0.790
Notes: All other variables, except the distance in expertise for the eﬀect of expertise, are
ﬁxed at their means. Source: Calculated by Authors.
In terms of the bias/information tradeoﬀ of participatory policy processes, results
show that political homophily is not a signiﬁcant determinant of communication.
Consequently, participatory policy processes allow for unbiased information diﬀusion
in Malawi.
6.5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the communication patterns among governmental, local stake-
holder and international organizations in Malawi. We present an approach that is
novel within network estimation as well as within political science. In terms of econo-
metric analysis of surveyed network data, our approach bases on an extended binary
regression framework. In fact, the model relies on a Bayesian estimation framework
to handle missing data due to survey non-response. For political consultants, the
framework allows learning about political communication processes in a country.
Findings will enable them to design communication processes that inﬂuence eﬃcient
policy choices.
In addition to this, we explicitly analyze the information/distortion potential of
participatory policy processes by employing two variables. First, we use an external
measure of an actor's knowledge about policy impacts derived from a Computable
General Equilibrium Model and survey data of actor's policy preferences to analyze
information diﬀusion in the network. Second, we employ an index of homophily in
policy concerns between a pair of organizations to describe the distortion potential.
Insights about this tradeoﬀ are valuable in order to evaluate the potential of partic-
ipatory policy processes in increasing the likelihood of approving welfare increasing
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or distorting policy programs.
Empirical ﬁndings are presented for a case study in Malawi based on data from
face-to-face interviews that gathered policy positions, policy interests and politi-
cal communication networks of local stakeholders, international organizations and
politicians in 2010. We ﬁnd strong support for explanatory factors suggested by
the two strands of literature about determinants of communication - the preference
driven and the structure driven models. Overall, the most inﬂuential determinants of
communication processes are identiﬁed as an actor's reputation, overlapping mem-
bership in organizations and knowledge about policy impacts.
In terms of well-informed policy decisions, it is highly appreciated that knowledge
about policy impacts increases a sender's probability to form communication ties. In
addition to this, special interests will not bias policy decisions, because homophily
in policy concerns turns out to be insigniﬁcant for communication relations in our
analysis. Nevertheless, this positive result for the potential of participatory policy
processes to increase well-informed policy choices is, ﬁrstly, narrowed by the high
inﬂuence of homophily in reputation on the probability to form ties. Homophily in
reputation will disable well-informed but less inﬂuential players to convey valuable
information into the policy process. Secondly, joining other organizations increases
the probability to communicate with elite members more than accumulating knowl-
edge ceteris paribus. That is promoting membership in umbrella organizations is a
means to design communication processes. As overlapping membership in organiza-
tions relates to sharing common communication platforms, the CAADP approach of
creating working groups on priority issues that work on policy proposals for pro-poor
growth policy programs is an adequate intervention in the communication process
to increase the communication opportunities among organizations. However, at the
time of the interview round, an eﬀective institutional organization of dialogue among
stakeholders and between government and stakeholders was still missing. Finally,
the network is clearly reputation driven. That is organizations are more likely to be
contacted, if they are highly inﬂuential. This ﬁnding is in line with the main goal
of information provision, i.e. ensuring that the ﬁnal policy decision considers own
policy positions.
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6.A Appendix
Table 6.6: Organizations in Malawi: Acronym, type and name
Acronym Type Name
MoF GOV Ministry of Finance
MoAFS GOV Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security
MoIWD GOV Ministry of Irrigation and Water Development
MoDPC GOV Ministry of Development Planning and Cooperation
RB PUB Reserve Bank
OPC GOV Oﬃce of the President and the Cabinet
SFFRFM PUB Smallholder Farmers Fertilizer Revolving Fund
LU PUB Logistics Unit
DPP LEG Democratic Progressive Party
MCP LEG Malawi Congress Party
ADD PUB Agricultural Development Divisions
DADO PUB District Agricultural Development Oﬃces
DFID DON Department for International Development UK
Irish Aid DON Irish Aid
NORAD DON Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
USAID DON USAID
EU DON EU
IMF DON International Monetary Fund
WB DON World Bank
BC RES Bunda College
FW IG Farmer's World
ILO IG Ilovo Sugar
RAB IG Rab Processors
STAM IG Seed Trade Association of Malawi
MUB IG Mulli Bros.
GTA IG Grain Trader Association
FUM IG Farmers Union Malawi
NASFAM IG National Smallholder Farmers' Association of Malawi
CISANET IG CISANET
TAM IG Tea Association of Malawi
TAMA IG Tobacco Association Malawi
MEJN IG Malawi Economic Justice Network
ECAMA IG Economics Association of Malawi
CAMA IG Consumers Association of Malawi
MCC IG Malawi Council of Churches
ELDS IG Evangelical Lutheran Development
CADECOM IG Catholic Development Commission
Source: Authors.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
Since the seminal work of Persson and Tabellini, it is common knowledge that po-
litical institutions aﬀect economic policies. But comprehensive studies that explain
observed variation in agricultural protection are still rare. However, studies within
thesis put forward the idea of "clustered" institutions as determinants of the level
of agricultural protection. Hence, theoretically well-grounded hypotheses about the
inﬂuence of interaction eﬀects between informal and informal political institutions
on agricultural policy choice are tested empirically. Results provide robust evidence
on the inﬂuence of political institutions on agricultural policies.
Further, researchers have, so far, not quantitatively analyzed the role of policy
networks as an essential component of participatory policy processes in determining
development policy decisions at the country level in Africa. However, international
organizations are highly interested in studies evaluating policy processes with regard
to their consequences on stakeholder participation and development outcomes. This
thesis contributes to a better understanding of participatory policy processes by
deriving a framework to model policy processes well-grounded in theory and by
applying the proposed evaluation framework on a policy process in Malawi.
Since the two parts of the thesis rely upon diﬀerent strands of theories and quan-
titative methods, I will critically discuss each study on the following pages. One
exception is the ﬁrst two studies because the second study explicitly bases upon the
study presented in Chapter 2.
Interaction Eﬀects of District Magnitude, Voter Beliefs and Protectionism:
Evidence from Agriculture
Constitutional Rules, Informal Institutions and Agricultural Protection in De-
veloping and Industrial Countries: Theory and Empirical Evidence
Both studies focus on the interaction eﬀects between formal and informal political
institutions in determining agricultural protection. So far, Chapter 2 only consid-
ers parliamentary systems and the inﬂuence of voter beliefs, which are assumed to
depend on a political communicated process dominated by a special-interest group,
on the policy preferences of the prime minister. However, the second study clearly
deepens the analysis of agricultural pattern across countries by taking the impact
of presidential systems as another constitutional rule into account and by introduc-
ing legislators' policy preferences depending on lobbying activities of special interest
groups.
At the methodological level, estimation techniques were applied to control for
the potential of endogeneity of electoral rules and form of government. In fact,
the instrument variable estimation approach reveals that valid instruments are em-
ployed to disentangle the eﬀect of political institutions from other unobserved factors
that determine both, political institutions and agricultural protection. However, at
the moment, we use instrument variables that are time constant while we observe
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slightly time-varying political institutions in countries. That is we lose predictive
power of political variables after instrument variable estimation because the pre-
dictions of political variables of the two-step approach are time-constant. However,
political theories about the endogeneity of political institutions do so far not provide
a theoretical basis for choosing time varying instruments that permit explaining in-
stitutional reform in countries. Accordingly, our instrument variables consider the
best set of available variables given the limited understanding of institutional reform.
Concerning the assumption of a uniform lag structure of the dependent vari-
able across political regimes, consider that the proposed theory does so far not
derive whether institutional settings shape government's reaction to changing socio-
economic variables. However, the theory of veto players as drivers of policy gridlock
or reform derived by Tsebelis (2002) might be an interesting framework to derive
insights on determinants of government's reaction functions. Hence, future research
might include this interesting topic in explaining agricultural reform within coun-
tries. Based on such theoretical consideration, heterogeneous lag structures in the
endogenous variable depending on a country's institutional regime might be em-
ployed empirically in order to explain country speciﬁc agricultural protection pat-
terns in more detail (Plümper et al., 2005). However, the main focus of both papers
is to derive evidence on political institutions as determinants of cross-country varia-
tion in agricultural protection that is left after controlling for classical polit-economic
explaining factors. Hence, I leave this interesting topic for future research on within
country variation of agricultural protection.
Finally, both studies assume that each vote has the same value and disregard
malapportionment. Malapportionment refers to the issue of disproportion between
the share of population in an electoral district and district size, i.e. legislative seats to
be elected in a district, across electoral districts of a country (Lijphart, 1994). Hence,
rural or urban voters might be over- or underrepresented in parliament which leads
to biased legislative power distributions and thereby to policy decisions dependent
on the degree of malapportionment in a country. Further, we also disregard unequal
vote values across countries with the same electoral system. Future work based
on the proposed theoretical model might consider this issue in order to explain
agricultural protection patterns across countries.
How the European Union Works: Theory and Empirical Evidence from EU
Agricultural Policy
While Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 analyze the impact of national political institutions
on agricultural domestic support, this Chapter focuses on the eﬀect of legislative
decision-making procedures on agricultural protection in supranational systems like
the European Union. Such eﬀects are essentially derived based on the concept of
vote trading among agents according to their interests in protection for speciﬁc
agricultural commodities, i.e. political exchange.
Even though political exchange provides a well-grounded theoretical model of
CAP legislative decision-making, the empirical part has some drawbacks due to
data scarcity. In fact, the estimation of true causal eﬀects of legislative decision-
making procedures on agricultural protection is not possible because the proposed
dummies also capture other determinants of agricultural protection than legislative
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decision-making rules common to all European member countries. In particular,
the agricultural lobbying system in the EU might be another driver of agricultural
protection captured by the dummy variables. With regard to this endogeneity prob-
lem, an instrument variable estimation approach is suggested by Greene (2003) to
disentangle the eﬀect of lobbying from the legislative system. However, to the best
of my knowledge, data on valid instruments that would allow for such estimation is
not available. A valid instrument would be correlated with the institutional system
of the EU but not with agricultural protection. So far, modeling the eﬀect of the
EU speciﬁc institutional system using a dummy is the best approach. Although
with caution, a well-grounded theory, as derived in this Chapter, permits to inter-
pret estimated parameters as being highly dominated by legislative decision-making
rules.
Finally, the presented results reveal an interesting pattern in the parameters of
standard polit-economic controls. In detail, parameter estimates vary with time.
Hence, future research might consider estimating heterogeneous parameter values of
these controls in time-series cross-section models to capture the non-linear relation-
ship between them and agricultural protection.
A Network Based Approach to Evaluate Participatory Policy Processes: An
Application to CAADP in Malawi
In contrast to the preceding Chapters, the focus of this Chapter lies on evaluating
the role of policy networks for agricultural policy decisions. This is done via an in-
depth country study using the example of Malawi. Further, a theoretically founded
framework is introduced in order to analyze participatory policy processes empiri-
cally. The proposed methodological approach includes two essential components of
policy processes, political institutions and policy networks. An empirical application
of framework to reproduce a participatory policy process in Malawi shows that the
proposed framework is able to reﬂect country-speciﬁc policy processes quite well.
Nevertheless, follow up in-depth country studies would be a systematic approach to
consolidate this ﬁnding.
Further, empirical results describing the nature of Malawi's policy process give
rise to the concern that the eﬀective consequences of participatory policy processes
do not match goals of international organizations promoting such types of processes.
In fact, results reveal a top-down instead of the preferred bottom-up policy process.
However, I am not able to judge with the model at hand whether the a bottom-up
policy process leads to better policy decisions in terms of pro-poor growth than re-
sulting top-down policy process does. Consider here that governmental actors might
be better informed about policy impacts than local stakeholder organizations due
to a higher capacity in evaluating policies. Consequently, the fact that government
provides mainly information to stakeholder organizations and not vice-versa could
be eﬃcient in order to choose welfare increasing. Hence, identifying the optimal pro-
poor growth program for Malawi would lay the basis for an evaluation of the nature
of participatory policy processes with regard to an eﬃcient policy program choice.
Combining this information with the proposed framework would further enable us
to identify attributes of a policy process leading to the adoption of the optimal pro-
poor growth policy programs via policy process simulations. In addition to this,
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simulations of policy processes might also aim at identifying structures that increase
the inﬂuence of stakeholder organizations on ﬁnal policy decisions. Comparing both
policy processes would reveal, whether one faces an eﬃciency-participation tradeoﬀ
when designing policy processes in a speciﬁc country.
Further, the outlier position of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security as
depicted in the last ﬁgure of this Chapter -mapping actor's ideal policy positions
into a two-dimensional space- involves the question whether participatory policy
processes would undermine or support the accountability of government towards
the electorate. In this case, the extreme position of the Ministry favoring especially
maize subsidies might evolve due to an electorate that considers subsidizing maize
as the right policy strategy to ensure food security. If now the participatory policy
process induces the Ministry to choose a strategy, which does not match the policy
position with which government has won election, promoting participatory policy
processes falls into the trap of undermining democratic institutions and legitimating
thereby policy decisions while greater legitimation was the aim of introducing such
processes. Note that the Ministry of Agriculture has in fact a policy position after
communication that diﬀers from the initial policy position resulting from political
support maximization in Malawi. That is future research on participatory policy
processes might focus on the relation between democratic institutions, although
they might be weak in developing countries, and participatory policy processes.
At the methodological level, the proposed belief formation model presents an
approach much more ﬂexible in capturing individual information gathering routines
than the model of Friedkin and Johnsen because it allows the weights actors put
in other policy beliefs to vary among actors. Nevertheless, the assumption that an
actor puts equal trust in information provided by diﬀerent communication partners
might not hold in reality. Consider here that the assumption of a constant level
of trust relies on homophily in policy interests as a determinant of an individual's
communication choices. Homophily in interests would reduce an interest bias in
communication for an actor because he solely receives information about policy
impacts from actors similar in interests about the true state of the world. That is
information received from other actors will always reﬂect a policy strategy capable
from the information sender's point of view to reach the receiver's desired state of the
world. Thereby, homophily in political interests allows for an individually eﬃcient
information gathering via communication and equal trust put in communication
partners' policy beliefs. However, if actors do not choose communication partners
according to common political interests, actor's information processing routine must
account for the bias in communicated positions. In this case, the assumption of equal
weights for all communication partners might not perfectly match with information
processing routines in practice. However, in our case of Malawi the high predictive
quality of our model in terms of the ﬁnal policy decision argues for modeling the
belief formation process in Malawi close to reality, even though we assume equal
weights in the proposed belief formation model.
Further, readers familiar with policy processes in developing countries might ar-
gue that the model disregards donor conditionality, although it is widely perceived
as relevant for policy-making in developing countries. However, the proposed model
captures this attribute of policy processes by ascertaining the level of trust an actor
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puts in information provided by other actors empirically. If donors would really
neglect information on policy impacts on the state of world provided by local orga-
nizations and would instead attach conditions to budget support, the level of trust
that they put in external information would reﬂect this. However, we learned from
the empirical application of the framework to Malawi, that donors were relatively
open to information provided by local interest groups and government.
A last criticism that will always hold, if quantitative methods are used to ascertain
policy positions and interests, is that actors' stated policy positions and interests are
not comparable to each other. In particular, researchers allege that each interviewed
actor judges scalars used in questions to gather policy positions diﬀerently. However,
I put much eﬀort on the right framing of the questions in the policy network study
used here to reduce this bias. In fact, I attached a speciﬁc policy strategy to each
of the points on the Likert-scale used in the questions and scalar positions were
also explained to the interviewees using information from oﬃcial policy documents
during the interviews.
The Formation of Elite Communication Networks in Malawi: A Bayesian
Econometric Approach
The study presented in this Chapter investigates the determinants of an elite com-
munication network and thereby derives insights into the communication process
that leads to ﬁnal agricultural policy decisions in Malawi. At the methodological
level, the study uses an advanced econometric estimation technique that allows esti-
mating communication relations although item- or unit non-response can be found
in the data.
While the study analyzes determinants of communication partner choices quite
well, it still fails to link a speciﬁc network structure to ﬁnal policy beliefs and de-
cisions that result due to belief formation among actors in the network. Hence, it
would be an interesting future research topic to simulate network structures based
on the derived networks determinants that push policy beliefs and decisions into a
distinct direction. In particular, identifying the network structure that enables a
belief formation process resulting in policy decisions capable of promoting pro-poor
growth would be interesting with regard to designing participatory policy processes.
Regarding structural factors as determinants of communication networks, it would
be valuable for an advanced evaluation of policy processes leading to the adoption
of CAADP in a country to gather information about an organization's aﬃliation to
CAADP public working groups or committees. Such information would enable us
to analyze the impact of CAADP's speciﬁc information mechanisms on the proba-
bility to exchange information between a pair of organizations. However, I was not
able to gather such information in Malawi due to missing implementation of these
communication platforms at time of the interviews.
Finally, the network used in this study might suﬀer from overreporting of less
inﬂuential actors. Overreporting describes the fact that less inﬂuential information
senders potentially name highly inﬂuential organizations as information receiver,
although these organizations would not support the importance of their information
in forming policy beliefs. Here, future research might focus on two diﬀerent strategies
to cope with this problem. First, network questions in future network studies can
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be designed with regard to gathering an asymmetric communication relation that
is conﬁrmed by both, the sender and the receiver. Second, estimation techniques
that explicitly account for measurement errors in network data might be used to
estimate determinants of communication relations (see Butts, 2003). However, so
far a reliable technique to estimate asymmetric networks with measurement errors
does not exist. Hence, developing such an advanced estimation strategy would be
an interesting future research topic.
References
Butts, C.T., 2003. Network inference, error, and informant (in)accuracy: a bayesian
approach. Social Networks 25, 103140.
Greene, W.H., 2003. Econometric Analysis. Prentice Hall. 5th edition.
Lijphart, A., 1994. Democracies; Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Govern-
ment in Twenty-One Countries. CT: Yale University Press, New Haven.
Plümper, T., Troeger, V.E., Manow, P., 2005. Panel data analysis in comparative
politics: Linking method to theory. European Journal of Political Research 44,
327354.
Tsebelis, G., 2002. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Russell Sage
Foundation u.a., New York.
191
Chapter 8 Zusammenfassung
Chapter 8
Zusammenfassung
Jede Regierung steht der Aufgabe gegenüber Politikprogramme zu formulieren und
zu implementieren, die die Wohlfahrt der Gesellschaft erhöhen. Jedoch wird sowohl
die Formulierung als auch die Implementierung durch unterschiedliche Faktoren bee-
inﬂusst. Während die Formulierung der richtigen Politikprogramme deren Kennt-
nis vorausgesetzt, hängt die Implementierung stark von den politischen Institutio-
nen und Netzwerken in dem jeweiligen Land ab. Daher trägt das Verständnis der
Auswirkungen verschiedener politischer Institutionen und Netzwerke auf die ﬁnale
Politikentscheidung dazu bei, einen politischen Entscheidungsprozess in einem Land
auf zubauen, der die Implementierung wohlfahrtssteigernder Politiken ermöglicht.
Der Schwerpunkt dieser Arbeit liegt daher auf einer theoretisch fundierten quan-
titativen, empirischen Untersuchung des Einﬂusses von Wahl- und Regierungssyste-
men, als Beispiele formaler Institutionen, sowie von Politiknetzwerken, als zentrale
informelle Determinanten, auf die agrarpolitische Entscheidung. Eine solide polit-
ökonomische Analyse setzt, neben einer mikropolitisch fundierten Ableitung theo-
retischer Hypothesen, insbesondere auch die Verwendung adäquater methodischer
Ansätze zur empirischen Überprüfung eben dieser voraus. Die Wirkungsanalysen
sind in zwei Bereiche gegliedert, die unterschiedliche Schwerpunkte und empirische
Datengrundlagen aufweisen.
Innerhalb des ersten Bereiches, der quantitativen Wirkungsanalyse politischer In-
stitutionen, bildet die ökonometrische Analyse theoretisch abgeleiteter Hypothe-
sen über den Einﬂuss politischer Institutionen auf die Agrarpolitik den Schwer-
punkt. Insbesondere, wird in diesem Teil der Arbeit die beobachtete Varianz im
Agrarprotektionsniveau im internationalen Vergleich, die sich in die klassischen polit-
ökonomischen erklären lässt, durch die Varianz in den konstitutionellen Regeln und
informellen Institutionen zwischen den Ländern erklärt. Mit Hilfe mikro-politisch
fundierter theoretischer Modelle wird gezeigt, dass sowohl das Wahlsystem als auch
bestimmte Merkmale von Regierungssystemen die Agrarprotektion bestimmen. Zu-
dem zeigt die theoretische Modellierung, dass Interaktionseﬀekte zwischen politis-
chen Institutionen und auch zwischen politischen Institutionen und Lobbying agrar-
politische Entscheidungen beeinﬂussen. Eine empirisch fundierte Analyse der Hy-
pothesen bedarf dabei der Kenntnis innovativer ökonometrischer Methoden, die ein-
erseits theoretisch abgeleitete latente Politikregime und auch die Eigenschaften von
Zeitreihen- Querschnittsdaten berücksichtigen müssen. Außerdem muss für die En-
dogenität politischer Institutionen kontrolliert werden, um kausale Eﬀekte der Insti-
tutionen bestimmen zu können.
Der zweite Bereich dieser Arbeit befasst sich mit der Modellierung und Evaluierung
partizipativer politischer Prozesse in Afrika. An eben dieser zeigen seit einigen
Jahren internationale Organisationen vermehrt Interesse, da sie mit der Paris Decla-
ration on Aid Eﬀectiveness aus dem Jahre 2005 Entwicklungsländern mehr Freiräume
und Eigenverantwortung bei der Formulierung ihrer Politikstrategien zur Armutsre-
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duzierung eingeräumt haben. Durch diesen Rückzug aus der tatsächlichen For-
mulierung der Politik bei gleichzeitiger Finanzierung von Politiken, die afrikanis-
che Staaten nun möglichst eigenständig formulieren, haben sie Interesse an einem
verbesserten Verständnis der politischen Entscheidungsprozesse vor Ort. Erken-
ntnisse aus wissenschaftlichen Studien können dabei die gezielte Gestaltung in-
stitutioneller Rahmenbedingungen ermöglichen, die die Implementierung und For-
mulierung von eﬃzienten Entwicklungspolitiken in den Entwicklungsländern erlauben.
Basierend auf den bisher fehlenden quantitativen Analysen in diesem Bereich wird
daher in dieser Arbeit der politische Entscheidungsprozess sowohl theoretisch model-
liert als auch empirisch beispielhaft an einem afrikanischen Land, Malawi, analysiert.
Als methodischer Ansatz wird dabei die Politiknetzwerkanalyse gewählt, die einen
geeigneten und innovativen methodischen Ansatz darstellt, partizipatorische politis-
che Prozesse zu untersuchen, da sie die Beurteilung des Einﬂusses von Interessen-
gruppen auf die Politikentscheidung ermöglicht.
Interaction Eﬀects of District Magnitude, Voter Beliefs and Protection-
ism: Evidence from Agriculture
Dieser Beitrag entwickelt ein theoretisches Modell, um das Zusammenwirken von
Wahlsystemen und Wähler beliefs, die die Politikposition des Ministerpräsidenten in
parlamentarischen Systemen beeinﬂussen, bei der politischen Entscheidungsﬁndung
abzuleiten. Kernhypothese des Modells ist eine nicht-lineare Beziehung zwischen
Wahlsystem und Agrarprotektion in den industrialisierten Ländern.
Um die politischen Präferenzen Abgeordneter zu bestimmen, wird ein probabilis-
tisches Wählermodell verwandt, in dem ländliche Wähler weniger ideologisch als
städtische Wähler wählen (Lohmann, 1998). Somit maximieren Abgeordnete unter-
schiedliche politische Unterstützungsfunktionen, die von dem Anteil der landwirt-
schaftlichen Bevölkerung an der Gesamtbevölkerung in ihrem Wahlkreis abhängen.
Hinsichtlich des Einﬂusses des Wahlsystems auf die Politikpositionen von Abge-
ordneten lässt sich damit zeigen, dass sich mit zunehmender Wahlkreisgröße die
Politikpositionen der Abgeordneten annähern.
Da die agrarpolitische Entscheidung letztendlich eine Verhandlungslösung im Par-
lament darstellt, wird die ﬁnale Politikentscheidung mit einem Modell der legisla-
tiven Entscheidungsﬁndung in parlamentarischen Systemen, in das die theoretisch
abgeleiteten Politikpräferenzen der Abgeordneten eingehen, abgebildet. Innerhalb
dieses Modells ist sowohl die Koalitionsdisziplin des Premierministers bei konﬂik-
tären Politikpräferenzen zwischen ihm und seiner parlamentarischen Mehrheit als
auch das Wahlsystem für die Höhe der Agrarprotektion von Bedeutung. Der Konﬂikt
hängt dabei von der Dominanz einer Interessengruppe in der politischen Kommu-
nikation ab, die die beliefs der Wähler über die Höhe Agrarprotektion steuert. Die
Wähler erwarten eine pro-landwirtschaftliche Politik, wenn die Kommunikation von
landwirtschaftlichen Interessengruppen geprägt ist und eine liberale Agrarpolitik,
wenn nicht-landwirtschaftliche Interessengruppen die Kommunikation über Politiken
dominieren. Da die beliefs der Wähler nur die Politikposition des Premierministers
beeinﬂussen, führen sie zu einem Konﬂikt zwischen dem Ministerpräsidenten und
dem Pivotmitglied seiner Koalition, das immer andere politische Präferenzen als der
Ministerpräsident vertritt. Mit steigender Wahlkreisgröße nähern sich die Politikpo-
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sitionen des Premierministers und des Pivotmitglieds an, da die Bevölkerungsanteile
in den Wahlkreisen immer mehr den nationalen Anteilen entsprechen und damit
die Präferenzheterogenität im Parlament abnimmt. Es folgt, eine inverse u-förmige
Beziehung zwischen Wahlkreisgröße und Agrarprotektion, wenn landwirtschaftliche
Interessenverbände die politische Kommunikation dominieren. Dagegen folgt eine
u-förmige Beziehung, wenn nicht-landwirtschaftliche Interessengruppen Wähler be-
liefs beeinﬂussen. Beide Beziehungen entstehen dadurch, dass der Premierminister
gemäß seiner Koalitionsdisziplin seine präferierte Politik durchsetzen kann, die mit
den beliefs der Wähler variiert.
Die theoretisch abgeleiteten Hypothesen werden anschließend mit Hilfe eines dy-
namischen two way ﬁxed eﬀect error component Modells empirisch überprüft (Wal-
lace and Hussain, 1969). Zudem wird auch für die mögliche Endogenität politischer
Institutionen mit Hilfe einer Instrumentvariablenschätzung kontrolliert. Die Daten-
grundlage für die empirische Analyse bildet die neue Datenbank zu Agrarprotektion-
sraten von Anderson et al. (2008), die eine umfassende Analyse von 23 parlamen-
tarischen Demokratien seit 1966 ermöglicht. Die empirischen Ergebnisse bestätigen
den nicht-linearen Zusammenhang zwischen Agrarprotektion und Wahlsystem. Das
Protektionsniveau steigt zunächst mit steigender Wahlkreisgröße, die hier zur Klassi-
ﬁzierung von Wahlsystemen genutzt wird, an, um dann ab einer mittleren Wahlkreis-
größe (2-9.9 Sitze je Wahlkreis) wieder zu sinken. Die Ergebnisse sind sowohl robust
gegenüber verschiedenen Modellierungsweisen länderspeziﬁscher Heterogenität als
auch der Endogenität politischer Institutionen. Eine dynamische Speziﬁkation des
Modells hat ebenfalls keinen Einﬂuss auf das empirische Ergebnis.
Constitutional Rules, Informal Institutions and Agricultural Protection
in Developing and Industrial Countries: Theory and Empirical Evidence
Dieses Kapitel erweitert das Modell, das in Kapitel 2 vorgestellt wurde, indem auch
präsidentielle Systeme berücksichtigt werden. Außerdem zeigt das Modell detail-
lierter, wie Lobbying die Präferenzen der Abgeordneten determiniert und damit die
agrarpolitische Entscheidung beeinﬂusst.
Das zentrale Thema dieses Kapitels ist die Wirkung von "clustered institutions"
als Determinanten der Agrarpolitik in Industrie- und Entwicklungsländern. Das
Phänomen von "clustered institutions" beschreibt die Tatsache, dass das Zusam-
menspiel formeller und informeller politische Institutionen die Politikentscheidun-
gen beeinﬂusst Acemoglu and Johnson (2005). Hier wird daher modelliert wie
Wahlsysteme, Regierungssysteme, Lobbying und auch demographische Charakter-
istika eines Landes zusammen die Agrarprotektion beeinﬂussen. Um solche Wech-
selwirkungen zu analysieren, wird ein probabilistisches Wählermodell als Grundlage
zur Bestimmung der politischen Präferenzen Abgeordneter herangezogen. Dabei
folgt die Grundannahme des Modells Lohmann (1998). Das heißt, es wird angenom-
men, dass Landwirte und Städter sich in Abhängigkeit ihrer relativen Größe in
der Höhe ihrer ideologischen politischen Verzerrung unterscheiden. Daraus folgt,
dass die Supportfunktion, die Abgeordnete bei Formulierung ihrer Politik max-
imieren, und damit auch ihre Politikpräferenz von dem Anteil der landwirtschaft-
lichen Bevölkerung an der Gesamtbevölkerung ihres Wahlkreises abhängen. Trotz
heterogener Präferenzen müssen sie sich im Parlament auf eine von einer Mehrheit
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akzeptierte Agrarpolitik einigen. Die Verhandlungen über die Agrarpolitik im Parla-
ment werden durch legislative Entscheidungsmodelle modelliert, die die wesentlichen
Merkmale parlamentarischer und präsidentieller Systeme abbilden. Dabei hängt
es von dem Regierungssystem ab, welche legislativen Organe in Konﬂikt zueinan-
der stehen. In einem parlamentarischen System besitzen der Premierminister, der
entweder ländliche oder städtische Politikpositionen vertritt, und seine parlamen-
tarische Mehrheit, die jeweils die im Gegensatz zu seinen Präferenzen stehenden Poli-
tikpositionen vertritt, konﬂiktäre Positionen. In einem präsidentiellen System ergibt
sich der Konﬂikt zwischen dem Median des Agrarausschusses, dessen Wahlkreis
eher einem ländlichen (städtischen) entspricht, und dem Median im Parlament, der
städtische (ländliche) Präferenzen in den Industrieländern (Entwicklungs-)Ländern
hat. Da das Wahlsystem die Heterogenität in den Präferenzen der Abgeordneten
beeinﬂusst, wird der Konﬂikt zwischen den legislativen Organen durch verschiedene
Wahlsysteme determiniert. Die Homogenität der Präferenzen nimmt dabei mit
steigender Wahlkreisgröße zu.
Im Wesentlichen trägt dieser Beitrag zum Verständnis der Agrarprotektion im
internationalen Vergleich bei, indem er den Einﬂuss des Wahlsystems auf die Agrar-
politik in Abhängigkeit länderspeziﬁscher politischer Regime herleitet. Die Regime
werden dabei sowohl von sozio-ökonomischen als auch politischen Rahmenbedin-
gungen determiniert. Im Kern zeigt die Theorie einen inversen u-förmigen Zusam-
menhang zwischen Agrarprotektion und Wahlkreisgröße in Industrieländern auf,
während eine u-förmige Beziehung für die Entwicklungsländer aus dem Modell resul-
tiert. Die Diskrepanz zwischen den Ländertypen ergibt sich in unserem Modell aus
der Tatsache, dass der Anteil der landwirtschaftlichen Bevölkerung an der Gesamt-
bevölkerung in Industrieländern unter 50% und in Entwicklungsländern über 50%
liegt.
Des Weiteren bezieht unser Modell in die Abbildung des agrarpolitischen Wil-
lensbildungsprozesses mit ein, wie Wahlkampfspenden von Interessengruppen an
Parteien das Wählerverhalten bestimmen. Wir nehmen an, dass Wähler sich durch
Wahlkampfaktivitäten der Parteien, die durch Wahlkampfspenden ﬁnanziert werden,
in ihren Politikpräferenzen beeinﬂussen lassen. Da die Höhe der Wahlkampfgelder
jedoch aus einem Verhandlungsspiel zwischen Interessengruppen und dem Parteivor-
sitzenden folgt, berücksichtigt auch nur dieser die Höhe der Wahlkampfausgaben
bei der Formulierung seiner Politikposition. Damit präferiert der Parteivorsitzende
unter Lobbying eine andere Politikposition als die normalen Abgeordneten. Lobby-
ing hat somit nur einen Eﬀekt auf das Level der Agrarprotektion und nicht auf die
Beziehung zwischen Wahlsystem und Agrarprotektion.
Im zweiten Teil des Beitrages werden unsere Hypothesen empirisch getestet. Als
Datengrundlage dient dabei die Datenbank über Agrarprotektionsmaße von Ander-
son et al. (2008), wodurch 52 Länder in der Zeit zwischen 1961 und 2005 in der Anal-
yse als unbalanciertes Panel Berücksichtigung ﬁnden. Da das theoretische Modell
impliziert, dass die Wirkung eines Wahlsystems auf die Politik von latenten Poli-
tikregimen in einem Land abhängt, verwenden wir für die ökonometrische Analyse
ein switching regression model. Da die Wahrscheinlichkeit für eine Länderbeobach-
tung, einem bestimmten Regime zugehörig zu sein, unbeobachtet ist, jedoch von
sozio-ökonomischen Ländermerkmalen abhängt, wird sie mit Hilfe eines Logitmodells
195
Chapter 8 Zusammenfassung
geschätzt. Informationskriterien wie das AIC oder BIC schlagen die Berücksichti-
gung von 6 latenten Regimen zur Schätzung des Eﬀektes von Wahlsystemen auf die
Agrarprotektion vor. Die empirischen Ergebnisse unterstützen unsere Hypothese,
dass die Beziehung zwischen Wahlkreisgröße und Agrarprotektion nicht-linear ist,
da wir signiﬁkante invers u-förmige Beziehungen in unserem Sample ﬁnden. Unsere
Ergebnisse sind zudem robust gegenüber der Verwendung der verzögerten abhängi-
gen Variablen zur Berücksichtigung von Autokorrelation in Zeitreihen- Querschnitts-
daten. Außerdem kontrollieren wir für eine mögliche Endogenität des Wahlsys-
tems mit Hilfe eines zweistuﬁgen Instrumentvariablenansatzes Angrist and Krueger
(2001).
How the European Union Works: Theory and Empirical Evidence from
EU Agricultural Policy
Dieser Beitrag fokussiert auf legislativen Entscheidungsregeln, die die Agrarpolitik
in der Europäischen Union bestimmen. Kernstück dieser Regeln ist politischer Stim-
mentausch zwischen politischen Agenten gemäß ihres Interesses an einer speziﬁschen
Politik (Coleman, 1966). Diese Modellierung europäischer Entscheidungsprozesse
trägt in zweierlei Hinsicht zu einem besseren Verständnis der Gemeinsamen Eu-
ropäischen Agrarpolitik (GAP) bei. Zunächst zeigt das Modell, dass sowohl die
Konsultationsprozedur als auch informelle legislative Entscheidungsregeln eine the-
oretische Erklärung für den Anstieg der Protektionsraten in Ländern, die der EU
beitreten, ist. Zum anderen kann die Modellierung informeller Regeln eine Reform
der Entscheidungsregeln im Agrarministerrat abbilden, obwohl sich die formale, in
der Verfassung festgelegte Entscheidungsregel nicht geändert hat. Das Sinken der
Agrarprotektion nach 1986 weist dabei auf eine Reform des Luxemburger Kompro-
misses, der informellen legislativen Entscheidungsregel für die GAP seit den 60er
Jahren, hin.
Die empirische Überprüfung der Hypothesen erfolgt mit einem dynamischen two
way ﬁxed eﬀect error component Modell. Die Schätzung des Modells beruht vor
allem auf der neuen Datenbank zu Agrarprotektionsraten von Anderson et al. (2008),
die eine Analyse von 58 Ländern ab 1961 als unbalanciertes Panel ermöglicht. Um
die theoretisch abgeleiteten Hypothesen zu überprüfen, werden in den Schätzun-
gen zwei Dummies verwandt. Ein Dummy ist eine Länder-Zeit speziﬁsche Interak-
tionsvariable, die mit Eintritt des Landes in die EU eins wird. Der andere Dummy ist
eine Zeit-Regime Interaktionsvariable, die für ein EU-Mitgliedsland nach 1986 gleich
eins ist, um die Reform der informellen Entscheidungsregel im Rat abzubilden. Die
empirischen Ergebnisse unterstützen die theoretische Hypothese, dass Länder mit
Eintritt in die EU durch das neue Regierungssystem, dem sie dann unterliegen, eine
Erhöhung der Agrarprotektion erfahren. Außerdem kann empirisch validiert wer-
den, dass eine Änderung der informellen Entscheidungsregel zu einem Absinken der
Agrarprotektion nach 1986 führt. Die empirischen Ergebnisse jedoch mit Vorsicht als
kausale Eﬀekte zu interpretieren, da Parameterschätzer der Dummyvariablen eben-
falls den Einﬂuss anderer gemeinsamer Charakteristika von EU Ländern, z.B. des
Lobbyingsystems, aufzeigen könnten. Eine Korrektur dieses Endogenitätsproblems
ist jedoch auf Grund fehlender valider Instrumente zurzeit nicht möglich.
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A Network Based Approach to Evaluate Participatory Policy Processes:
An Application to CAADP in Malawi
Innerhalb dieses Beitrages wird ein theoretisches Modell hergeleitet, das die politis-
che Entscheidungsﬁndung in einem Land reﬂektiert. Das Modell lässt sich in zwei
Komponenten teilen, die zum einen den legislativen Entscheidungsprozess und zum
anderen die Aggregation unterschiedlicher Politikpräferenzen in Politiknetzwerken
modellieren.
Der legislative Entscheidungsprozess wird mit Hilfe einer kooperativen Verhand-
lungsregel, der mean voter Regel, abgebildet (Henning, 2000). Diese Regel bildet
die Politikentscheidung als einen gewichteten Mittelwert über die Idealpositionen
der Akteure ab. Als Gewichte der Idealpositionen gehen Powerindizes gemäß der
formalen oder informellen Machtverteilung zwischen politischen Agenten in die Mod-
ellierung ein. In Malawi, dessen politischer Prozess anhand dieses Modells empirisch
analysiert wird, lassen sich vor allem informelle Machtverhältnisse feststellen. Diese
sind durch die ausgeprägte Konzentration der Macht um den Präsidenten bestimmt.
In der Literatur wird dieses Phänomen häuﬁg mit Big Man presidentialism um-
schrieben (Bratton, 2007; van der Walle, 2003).
Die zweite Komponente bildet ein soziales Einﬂussmodell, das belief formation
der relevanten Akteure durch Informationsaustausch über die Wirkung von Poli-
tikentscheidungen auf die Wohlfahrt sozio-ökonomischer Gruppen in Politiknetzw-
erken wiederspiegelt. Die Zugehörigkeit zu einem solchen Politiknetzwerk ermöglicht
somit Akteuren ohne formale legislative Entscheidungsmacht Teilnahme am politis-
chen Entscheidungsprozess und Einﬂuss auf die Politikpräferenzen der politischen
Agenten. Damit erlangen sie Einﬂuss auf die ﬁnale Politikentscheidung, obwohl sie
formal keine legislative Abstimmungsmacht besitzen.
Die empirische Anwendung des vorgestellten Modells beruht auf selbst erhobe-
nen Daten aus einer Politiknetzwerkstudie in Malawi im Jahr 2010. Zunächst zeigt
die empirische Anwendung, dass das vorgeschlagene Modell sich sehr gut eignet,
um partizipatorische Politikprozesse quantitativ zu modellieren und zu evaluieren.
Des weiteren können Eigenschaften des politischen Prozesses in Malawi wie folgt
charakterisiert werden. Kommunikation unter den für die Agrarpolitik relevanten
Akteuren führt zu einem Konsensus über die Richtung der Agrarpolitik. Außerdem
zeigt die Analyse politischer Machtverteilungen, die sowohl legislative Kontrolle als
auch die Einbettung in Politiknetzwerke berücksichtigen, dass politische Akteure
maßgeblich Interessengruppen beeinﬂussen. Damit spiegelt der Politikprozess in
Malawi einen Top-down und nicht einen Bottom-up Prozess wieder. Letzter würde
jedoch dem Ziel der Förderung eben solcher Prozesse durch internationale Organi-
sationen entsprechen.
The Formation of Elite Communication Networks in Malawi: A Bayesian
Econometric Approach
Da Kommunikationsnetzwerke die Grundlage für den Informationsaustausch zwis-
chen Akteuren bilden, analysiert dieser Beitrag Determinanten der Kommunika-
tionsbeziehung zwischen zwei Akteuren. Im Vordergrund steht dabei zu unter-
suchen, ob Akteure ihren Kommunikationspartner gemäß seiner politischen Inter-
essen oder gemäß seines Wissens über die Auswirkung politischer Entscheidungen
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auf die Wohlfahrt der Gesellschaft wählen. Weitere Faktoren, die die Wahl des
Partners beeinﬂussen können, sind strukturelle Faktoren wie die gemeinsame Mit-
gliedschaft in einer Organisation oder die politische Macht eines Akteurs (siehe zum
Bespiel Moody, 2001; Knoke, 1990; Knoke et al., 1996).
Methodisch wird in diesem Beitrag ein Bayesianisches Modell verwendet, das die
Berücksichtigung fehlender Werte sowohl in den exogenen Variablen als auch in der
Netzwerkbeziehung erlaubt. Die empirische Anwendung dieses Modells beruht auf
selbst erhobenen Daten aus einer Politiknetzwerkstudie in Malawi im Jahr 2010.
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass vor allem strukturelle Faktoren die Wahl des Kommu-
nikationspartners beeinﬂussen. Das Wissen des Kommunikationspartners über die
ökonomischen Auswirkungen politischer Entscheidungen hat einen geringeren Eﬀekt
auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit zwischen zwei Akteuren eine Kommunikationsbeziehung
zu beobachten als die gemeinsame Mitgliedschaft in Organisationen. Dennoch lässt
sich empirisch belegen, dass eben solches Wissen die Wahrscheinlichkeit mit anderen
Akteuren zu kommunizieren erhöht. Im Gegensatz dazu kann für eine Verzerrung
der Kommunikation gemäß den politischen Interessen der Akteure keine empirische
Evidenz gefunden werden. Mit Bezug auf die externe Beeinﬂussung von Kommunika-
tionsstrukturen kann damit festhalten werden, dass der Aufbau von Dachorganisa-
tionen oder gemeinsamen Kommunikationsplattformen die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass
zwei Organisationen Informationen austauschen, erhöht wird, während Investitionen
in die Akkumulierung vonWissen sich weniger stark in vermehrten Kommunikations-
beziehungen niederschlagen werden.
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Appendix A
Empirical Assessment of the Role of Political
Institutions in Agricultural Policies
A.1 Starting points of empirical analysis
Theories in comparative political economy focus on the eﬀect of political institutions
on economic policy choice and economic performance. The main questions that arise
for empirical proofs of these theories are: i) Does theory predict eﬀects of political
institutions on policy outcomes that vary within countries or of institutions that
vary solely between countries? and ii) Does theory predict eﬀects of political insti-
tutions dependent on a speciﬁc (un)observed regime? Answers to these questions
mainly determine the basic econometric framework used in the empirical analysis.
If theory refers to the institutions with within country variation, ﬁxed eﬀect models
are commonly used to estimate the treatment eﬀect of institutional change on policy
outcomes (see e.g. Chapter 4). If theory derives insights about the eﬀect of insti-
tutions that are time-invariant within a country but show cross-country variation,
cross-section models are preferred (see e.g. Chapter 4). Further, regarding the sec-
ond question, econometric models considering latent regimes identiﬁed by observed
country characteristics can be used to assess regime dependent eﬀects of political
institutions (see Chapter 3). Information on econometric methods which supports
the decision on an econometric model can be found in Baltagi (2005) and Greene
(2003), respectively. Further, this appendix refers to articles published by Beck and
Katz that were often cited in political science (Beck et al., 2001; Beck and Katz,
2009, 2011).
Data used in comparative political economy are commonly denoted by time-series
cross-section data (TSCS). Time-series cross-section data are repeated observations
on a series of ﬁxed (non-sampled) units where the units are of interest in themselves
(see Beck et al., 2001). In the context of comparative political economy, one typically
refers to countries as units i with i = 1, ..., N , and years as time periods t with
t = 1, ..., T . Time-series cross-section data diﬀer from panel data in the size of
T , i.e. they have a relatively large T , and from time-series data in the size of N ,
i.e. they have a relatively small N . That is time-series cross section data are neither
dominated by N nor by T .
In what follows, I assume diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the following model:
yit = α + βxit + uit. (A.1)
Eq. A.1 denotes the standard pooled model where α is a constant common to all
units i, yit denotes the vector of the endogenous variable, xit describes a vector of
explanatory variables and uit is an error term, which is independent and identically
distributed IID(0, σ2v). However, running pooled OLS on this model using TSCS
data might cause biased results because, for instance, the presence of country and
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time invariant factors not included into the vector of explaining variables are not
considered by the model. Overall, the use of pooled OLS for TSCS leads to three
main issues that are described in the following sections: i) heterogeneity, ii) dynamics
and iii) robust inference.
A.2 Heterogeneity
In terms of heterogeneity, one distinguishes between time- and country-speciﬁc het-
erogeneity. Country-speciﬁc heterogeneity is widely perceived as heterogeneity re-
lated to local time-invariant factors like geographic location. Time-speciﬁc and
country-invariant factors are mostly considered as time shocks that aﬀect policy
choice in all countries in the same period. Prominent examples for such shocks are
oil price shocks that disrupt economic production and growth. Both types of ﬁxed
eﬀects are commonly not included into the vector of independent variables because
they might be unobservable for researchers. However, estimation techniques like the
ﬁxed eﬀect model allow considering unobservable heterogeneity among countries and
years. In general, this is also the only heterogeneity researchers control for in po-
litical science. Nevertheless, there might be (even theoretically derived) parameter
variation in explaining variables across countries or within countries across time (see
Chapters 4 and 3). In such a case, considering just country- and time-speciﬁc inter-
cepts will still lead to biased estimates (see Section A.2.3 for models that consider
parameter heterogeneity).
Biased estimates arise in the presence of heterogeneity because pooling data ne-
glects local- and time-invariant factors by setting α = α11 = ... = αnt. This bias
is also known as an omitted variable bias. Two common estimation techniques ex-
ist to control for unobserved heterogeneity, the random and the ﬁxed eﬀect model.
Both models can be written as a two-way error component model (see Baltagi, 2005,
p. 33ﬀ.).
yit = α + βxit + uit, with (A.2)
uit = µi + λt + vit.
Here, the error term is split into country-speciﬁc parameters µi, time-speciﬁc pa-
rameters λt and a remainder usual disturbance vit that is independent and identi-
cally distributed IID(0, σ2v). The diﬀerence between the ﬁxed and random eﬀect
model lies in the underlying assumptions about the country- and time-speciﬁc pa-
rameters. While they are assumed to be random parameters, µi ∼ IID(0, σ2µ) and
λt ∼ IID(0, σ2λ), in the random eﬀect model, µi are assumed to be ﬁxed param-
eters in the ﬁxed eﬀect model. Accordingly, inference in the ﬁxed eﬀect model is
conditional on the observed units.
In comparative political economy, the ﬁxed eﬀect approach is mostly preferred
over the random eﬀect approach due to the assumption of ﬁxed, non-sampled eﬀects.
Assuming ﬁxed eﬀects as country and time eﬀects is the appropriate speciﬁcation
because countries, the units of interest, and years, the periods of interest, are not a
randomized but ﬁxed set. The reverse is true for micro panel data like household
surveys that try to draw units at random from a large population to make the
201
Appendix A Empirical Assessment of the Role of Political Institutions in
Agricultural Policies
panel representative.1 Further, consider that a policy variable is allowed to be
systematically correlated with the country eﬀects without rendering the ﬁxed eﬀect
model inconsistent (see Wooldridge, 2002). In particular, within-transformation, as
explained in detail below, wipes out the country eﬀects. Hence, correlation between
the policy variable and the ﬁxed eﬀects does not lead to inconsistent parameter
estimates. That is a ﬁxed eﬀect model enables researchers to estimate the eﬀect
of a policy variable, i.e. an institutional regime switch, consistently, even if time-
invariant characteristics would aﬀect the policy as well as the endogenous variable
(see Chapter 4).
Nevertheless, the commitment to model heterogeneity via ﬁxed parameters arises
problems in estimating the eﬀect of time-invariant variables. However, these eﬀects
are of substantial interest for political economist because they derive theories about
the local time-invariant country characteristics, i.e. political institutions. Thus, Sec-
tion A.2.1 discusses methods for analysing the eﬀect of observable, time-invariant
cross-country heterogeneity in presence of unobservable time-invariant heterogeneity.
Regarding the ﬁxed eﬀect model, eq. A.2 is estimated by a so called within trans-
formation, which no longer uses between country variation to estimate parameters
(Baltagi, 2005, p. 33ﬀ.). Within transformation corresponds to time- and unit-
demeaning data as described in eq. A.3:
(yit − y¯i. − y¯.t + y¯..) = β(xit − x¯i. − x¯.t + x¯..) + (vit − v¯i. − v¯.t + v¯..) (A.3)
with y¯i. = α + βx¯i. + µi + v¯i. and
y¯.t = α + βx¯.t + λt + v¯.t and
y¯.. = α + βx¯.. + v¯.. .
This procedure cancels the direct estimation of the ﬁxed eﬀects. Therefore, the
assumption of no correlation between vi and xit to run OLS is not binding and
one can estimate eq. A.2 using OLS. Dropping the assumption of no correlation
is another advantage of the ﬁxed eﬀect model over the random eﬀect model. The
latter relies upon this assumption for an unbiased estimation. In general, the random
eﬀect model combines the ﬁxed eﬀect estimator with a between-estimator, i.e. an
estimator that just relies on between-variation. The result is a weighted estimator
with a weight θ depending on the variance of µi, λt and vit. If θ is now less than
one, the country-speciﬁc eﬀects still persist in the model. Hence, OLS is biased, if
the country-eﬀects are correlated with the independent variables.
Instead of time-demeaning, including dummies for every i and every t would also
delete between-country and between-time variation. That is, one uses N−1 country
ﬁxed eﬀects and T − 1 time ﬁxed eﬀects to estimate µi and λt in eq. A.2. Thus, the
total country-(time-)speciﬁc eﬀects are α+ µi(λt) with α being the intercept of the
ﬁrst country and the ﬁrst year.
1Further there exist econometric tests that help to choose the right model for speciﬁc data sets.
I do not go into detail here because random eﬀects models are not the appropriate models in
comparative political economy.
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A.2.1 Observed vs. unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity
The most known problem inherent to ﬁxed eﬀects models is the estimation of time-
invariant variables.
yit = βxit + φzi + uit, with (A.4)
uit = µi + λt + vit,
where xit now denotes the vector of time-varying variables and zi the vector of
time-invariant variables. By estimating this model, the individual ﬁxed eﬀect fully
absorbs the eﬀect of the time-invariant variables due to multicollinearity. Further,
the within transformation will wipe out the time-invariant variables because it holds:
zi =
1
T
T∑
t=1
zi = z¯i (A.5)
and thus,
(zi − z¯i) = 0. (A.6)
But, given that political institutions are a predominantly time-invariant feature
of countries, the impact of this observed heterogeneity is of particular interest in
comparative political economy. Thus, one applies speciﬁc estimation techniques to
empirically assess the impact of observed time-invariant heterogeneity on, e.g., policy
outcomes in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. All these techniques imply
assumptions about the relationship between xit, µi and zi.
One approach suggested by Plümper and Troeger (2007) is the ﬁxed eﬀect vector
decomposition model (FEVD). It is widely used by researchers2 but also often crit-
icized (see Greene, 2010; Breusch et al., 2010; Mitze, 2009). In general, the FEVD
is a three step procedure with ﬁrst running a common ﬁxed eﬀect model, second
decomposing the vector of estimated ﬁxed eﬀects µˆi into a part explained by time-
invariant variables zi and an unexplained part hi by OLS estimation and ﬁnally,
employing hi in eq. A.4 to estimate a model including unobserved and observed
time-invariant country heterogeneity.
In particular, Plümper and Troeger's logic of country ﬁxed eﬀects as estimated
by a common ﬁxed eﬀect model µˆi is that µˆi includes unobserved time-invariant
heterogeneity, the country means of the residuals and time-varying variables as well
as observable time-invariant heterogeneity characterized by zi. Hence, one needs to
disentangle the ﬁrst two components of the ﬁxed eﬀect from observed heterogeneity
for estimating the parameters of time-invariant variables with an unbiased model.
Plümper and Troeger (2007) suggest regressing the µˆi on the observed time-invariant
variables zi:
µˆ = γzi + hi, (A.7)
where hi now denotes the part of the estimated ﬁxed eﬀects which is unexplained by
variation in zi. That is their procedure now enables estimating a consistent model
2A search by Google Scholar shows 414 citations of Plümper and Troeger (2007) (Date:
07.05.2012).
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with unobserved and observed country-speciﬁc heterogeneity by including a vector
of ﬁxed eﬀects that is uncorrelated with the time-invariant variables by assumption:
yit = βxit + φzi + δhi + λt + vit. (A.8)
Note that the assumption of no correlation between zi and hi only holds true, if
zi is not correlated with the country means of the time-varying variables and the
error term. Otherwise step 2 (and step 3) will yield biased estimates of zi. In this
case, Plümper and Troeger (2011) propose to use an instrument variable regression
in step 2 with internal or external instrument variables.
A weakness of Plümper and Troeger's article in 2007 is that it does not explicitly
derive the variance-covariance matrix used to compute the standard errors in step
3. Here, Greene (2011b) argues that suggesting a pooled OLS in step 3 leads the
applied researcher to use the standard variance-covariance matrix of OLS. Indeed
this matrix would result in smaller standard errors than the appropriate matrix,
i.e. the matrix of step 1 (Greene, 2011a,b). Based on this criticism, Plümper and
Troeger have written a Stata ado-ﬁle that produces correct standard errors for β and
φ. In their recent paper in Political Analysis, they further test the performance of
diﬀerent standard error corrections used by themselves in an updated Stata ado-ﬁle
and proposed by Greene (2011a) and Breusch et al. (2010) (Plümper and Troeger,
2011). Their simulation results reveal that their implemented matrix performs better
than every other matrix, if N and T are above 20. Finally, the FEVDmodel estimates
consistent parameters and reliable standard errors, if the assumptions of the model
hold for the speciﬁc data generating process.
The FEVD is often compared to the commonly accepted model of Hausman-Taylor
(Hausman and Taylor, 1981). Hausman and Taylor (HT) proposed an instrument
variable approach using instrument variables from within the model. Thereby, HT
is able to estimate consistent parameters, if time-varying as well as time-invariant
variables are correlated with the unobserved country eﬀects. Further, applying HT
yields parameter estimates of time-invariant variables that cannot be derived from
common ﬁxed eﬀect models. Overall, HT suggests the following model:
Ωˆ−1/2yit = Ωˆ−1/2xitβ + Ωˆ−1/2ziφ+ Ωˆ−1/2uit, with (A.9)
uit = µi + λt + vit,
where Ωˆ−1/2 is unknown. To derive an estimate of Ωˆ−1/2, HT assumes that inde-
pendent variables can be split into four sets: i) x1it denotes the vector of exogenous
time-varying variables, ii) x2it denotes the vector of endogenous time-varying vari-
ables, iii) z1i is the vector of exogenous time-invariant variables and iv) z2i is the
vector of endogenous time-invariant variables. µi is estimated as a random eﬀect
with zero mean and ﬁnite variance. Based on these ex ante classiﬁed sets, HT is
now able to estimate the variance components of Ωˆ−1/2, which are needed to ap-
ply standard random eﬀects generalized least squares (GLS) on eq. A.9, via two
auxiliary regressions. First, HT employs a ﬁxed eﬀect regression to obtain within
residuals. These residuals are used to identify the variance of the idiosyncratic error
component σ2vit . Secondly, HT regresses the within residuals on the time-invariant
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variables z1i and z2i instrumenting the endogenous time-invariant variables z2i with
the country means of x1i and x2i and the within changes of x1i and z1i. This sec-
ond step enables HT to estimate the variance of the random eﬀect σ2µ. Hence, a
variance-covariance matrix can be computed to obtain an GLS estimator,Ωˆ−1/2, of
the regression coeﬃcients.
Comparing now both models, it is important to note that the FEVD procedure
also allows for instrument variable estimation in step 2.3 In fact, using at step
2 the same (valid) instruments as used by HT would render the FEVD identical
to HT (see Plümper and Troeger, 2011). But FEVD provides an extension that
is not applicable to the HT model. FEVD allows including external instruments,
while HT only considers the right hand side variables as instruments. Part of the
discussion about using HT or FEVD respectively, is the assumption that right hand
side variables are valid instruments for time-invariant variables. However, the ﬁnal
model choice will depend on, whether theory predicts a relationship between, for
instance, the country mean of independent variables and time-invariant variables
which would render them valid instruments in the HT (see Plümper and Troeger,
2011).
Further, the proposed models diﬀer in their assumption about the country speciﬁc
eﬀects. While HT assumes a randomly distributed eﬀect, Plümper and Troeger use
a non-stochastic eﬀect. In other words, Plümper and Troeger assume that all time-
invariant heterogeneity is, even if unobserved, not randomly assigned to countries.
Regarding comparative political economy, this assumption is plausible. Researchers
agree on non-random country attributes as driving force behind country heterogene-
ity.
A.2.2 Group related intercept heterogeneity
Usually, one can test with an F test the joint signiﬁcance of included dummy vari-
ables in a ﬁxed eﬀect model, i.e. in case of country ﬁxed eﬀects H0 = µ1 = µ2 =
... = µN−1 = 0. In a two-way error component model, testing H0 = µ1 = µ2 = ... =
µN−1 = 0 allowing λ 6= 0 the F -statistic is given as
F =
(RRSS − URSS)/(N − 1)
(URSS/(N − 1)(T − 1)−K) ∼ F(N−1),((N−1)(T−1)−K), where (A.10)
RRSS denotes the restricted residual sums of squares of OLS with time dummies
only, URSS is the unrestricted residual sum of squares from the within regression
given by eq. A.3 and K is the number of explanatory variables.
However, such a test only reveals the joint signiﬁcance of all country-ﬁxed eﬀects
rejecting the null hypothesis potentially due to a few outlying countries. Here, Beck
et al. (2001) propose a cross validation experiment discussed by Stone (1974) adapted
to time-series cross-section. This experiment explicitly allows testing whether het-
erogeneity is just related to groups of countries or whether the sample is indeed
completely heterogeneous. To run the experiment, one estimates eq. A.1 N -times
3Note that Plümper and Troeger (2007, 2011) and Breusch et al. (2011) provide results of exten-
sive Monte-Carlo-Experiments comparing the eﬃciency and consistency of diﬀerent estimation
methods for estimating parameters of time-invariant variables in the presence of ﬁxed eﬀects.
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with N − 1 countries and calculates the prediction yˆit of the omitted country's de-
pendent variable based on the coeﬃcients of the pooled regression. Next, country
speciﬁc heterogeneity can be identiﬁed via mean squared forecast errors (MSFE):
MSFE = (yit − yˆit)2. (A.11)
Comparing the country speciﬁc MSFE's unveils countries that are less well predicted
via pooled regression. With this information at hand, a dummy variable for each
of the less well ﬁtted countries (or for a set of less well ﬁtted countries) Di can be
added to eq. A.1. It follows:
yit = α + βxit +Di + uit, with (A.12)
uit = λt + vit.
To ensure a valid assessment of country speciﬁc heterogeneity, researchers might
employ Akaike (AIC) and Schwarz (BIC) information criteria to compare partial-
non pooled models with ﬁxed eﬀect models:
AIC(K) = log(
RSS
n
) +
2K
n
(A.13)
BIC(K) = log(
RSS
n
) +
K log(n)
n
, (A.14)
with n denoting the number of observations, RSS the squared sum of residuals and
K the number of explaining variables. These criteria are applicable in case models
are non-nested due to consideration of time-invariant variables in the partial-non
pooled model. A lower value of these criteria for the partial-non pooled model com-
pared to the ﬁxed eﬀect model would indicate that heterogeneity appears solely due
to some less ﬁtted countries in the pooled case. That is the partial-non pooled
model is a valid speciﬁcation of country speciﬁc heterogeneity. Both measures sup-
port achieving a better ﬁt with a lower number of parameters, as values of both
criteria increase with a decreasing last term in eq. A.13 and eq. A.14.
Note that this approach only accounts for time-invariant country heterogeneity
as considered in a ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation. The cross-validation experiment would
also apply to detecting parameter heterogeneity. The following section gives a more
detailed description of heterogeneity in parameter values.
A.2.3 Heterogeneous parameter values
Most studies in comparative political economy assume that countries only diﬀer in
country speciﬁc intercept heterogeneity and apply ﬁxed eﬀects models. However,
there can be theoretical reasons to go beyond this limited understanding of hetero-
geneity. Heterogeneity might also arise from variation of the eﬀects of explanatory
variables related to time, regimes or countries, respectively. In econometric models
this type of heterogeneity is modelled via allowing the β to depend on the drivers
of heterogeneity. Compared to standard TSCS methods, these methods do not only
pass heterogeneity to the error term but consider the parameter heterogeneity for
estimation (see also Western, 1998; Beck, 2007).
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A commonly used method to model slope heterogeneity is the random coeﬃcient
model (RCM):
yit = αi + βixit + uit, (A.15)
where
βi = β + bi and (A.16)
E[bi|Xi] = 0 (A.17)
E[bib
′
i|Xi] = Γ (A.18)
Note, that the random coeﬃcient model is identical to the random eﬀects model, if
only the constant term is assumed to be random in the RCM. Following eq. A.15 βi
is the outcome of a random process with mean β and covariance matrix Γ under the
assumption of no autocorrelation or cross-sectional correlation. Finally, an estimator
of Γ is required to estimate the model. While Swamy (1971) provides in this context
a feasible GLS estimator applicable to RCMs, these models can also be ﬁtted by
maximum likelihood or Bayesian methods (Greene, 2003).
With regard to determinants of heterogeneous parameter values, hierarchical ap-
proaches are applied estimating the parameters as a function of time-invariant vari-
ables zi moderating the impact of x on y (see Western, 1998; Beck, 2007). However,
such approaches do still not capture that the inﬂuence of explaining variables will
vary with a country-time speciﬁc latent regime. In this case, one can use other
advanced econometric methods to estimate consistent and theoretically founded pa-
rameters. If regimes are observed, sample selection models like Heckman's two
step estimation procedure allow estimating regime dependent βs (see Greene, 2003,
p. 780ﬀ.). If regimes are unobservable, the estimation of regimes and thereby of
consistent βs is not straightforward. Here, consistent βs can be estimated via a two-
step procedure. This procedure ﬁrst estimates the probability of observing a latent
regime in a country depending on observable country characteristics. In a second
step, regime-dependent parameters are estimated for the variables of interest. The
model equation of such a latent regime model (LRM) is:
yRitit = α + β
R
itxit + uit, (A.19)
where R is the variable denoting the latent regime. Note that, while the RCM as-
sumes a continuous distribution of βi, LRMs suppose a discrete distribution with
R regimes. To estimate now the regime dependent impact of xit on yit, one needs
to identify the probability that an observation of the endogenous variables is deter-
mined by a speciﬁc latent regime. Since determinants wit of the probability that
an observation belongs to a speciﬁc regime can be derived theoretically, probabil-
ities can be modelled in a logit type regression framework (Diebold et al., 1994).
Further, probabilities to be in a speciﬁc regime are also determined by the recent
regime state. That is the model considers both, regime switching of countries and
regime persistence within a country. For further information on estimating regime
switching models, see Section 3.3.2.
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A.3 Dynamics
Eq. A.1 is the common static speciﬁcation of the relation between x and y where
any change in the independent variable x eﬀects y immediately. However, modelling
just the immediate impacts might be misleading, because eﬀects can also persist or
decline over time. In this case the correct model includes lagged values of dependent
variables. Here, researchers have diﬀerent models at hand that can be used to specify
the underlying dynamic process. Further, dynamic processes in data lead to biased
standard errors because the usual applied estimator of the covariance matrix of the
OLS estimator is inconsistent in case of serially correlated error terms. Hence, this
section will discuss several ways to model serial correlation in independent variables
and errors. These models will be special cases of the autoregressive distributed lag
model ADL(M,K). The notation ADL(M,K) speciﬁes the number of included lags
of the endogenous variable (M) and of exogenous variables (K). However, consider
ﬁrst the general concept of dynamic processes.
In general, a dynamic regression model is characterized by the following equation:
yit = α +
∞∑
r=0
βrL
rxit + uit (A.20)
= α +B(L)xt + uit,
where Lr is the standard lag operator Lr = x(t−r) and B(L) a polynomial in L. From
this model short- and long-run multipliers can be derived. If r = 0, β0 describes the
immediate eﬀect of x on y. That is, β0 is the short-run multiplier. The long-run
multiplier β is deﬁned as the cumulated eﬀect over time:
β =
∞∑
r=0
βr. (A.21)
This general model can be diﬀerentiated regarding the assumption underlying the
duration of lagged eﬀects. If the eﬀects of lagged variables gradually fade out over
time, inﬁnite lag models will be used. If theory suggests that the eﬀect will die out
after a short period of time, ﬁnite lag models are estimated. In both cases severe
estimation problems arise (Greene, 2003). As eq. A.20 increases the number of pa-
rameters to be estimated, it reduces simultaneously the number of observations that
are available for estimation. The reduction in degrees of freedom will be even more
severe with increasing lag length, where the optimal lag length is mostly unknown
to the researcher. Thereby, reducing lag length to increase degrees of freedom is
no alternative. Further, the inclusion of lagged values of the same variable might
rise the problem of multicollinearity. As inﬁnite lag models are commonly used in
comparative political economy, further notes will consider only solutions to estimate
eq. A.20 for models of such type. Information on the estimation of ﬁnite lag models
can be found in Greene (2003, p.565).
A well-known approach to estimate distributed lag models is the assumption of a
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speciﬁc polynomial in the lag operator (Greene, 2003, p.563):
A(L) =
∞∑
r=0
(ρL)r, (A.22)
where ρ describes the ratio between βr+1 and βr. This ratio is constant for all r.
Thus, ρ denotes the weight with that the inﬂuence of past values of x fade out.
Equation A.22 reduces to
A(L) =
1
1− ρL, (A.23)
if |ρ| < 1 (convergence of geometric series). In general, this polynomial proposes
that eﬀects of x on y decay geometrically and for all variables in x at the same rate.
Replacing now the lag operator in eq. A.20 by the speciﬁc polynomial in eq. A.22
yit = α + β0
∞∑
r=0
(ρL)rxit + uit (A.24)
and using eq. A.23 leads to
yit = α + β0
1
1− ρLxit + uit. (A.25)
After some rearrangements, a model with a lagged dependent variable and without
lagged independent variables results as follows:
yit = α(1− ρ) + ρyi,t−1 + β0xit + (1− ρL)uit, (A.26)
with 0 < ρ < 1. ρ denotes the inertia of the process. Note that Lα = α because α
is a constant. While β0 is still the short-run multiplier, the long run multiplier can
be computed via:
β =
1
1− ρβ0. (A.27)
Note that the model reduces the general dynamic model to a moving-average form.
It follows that OLS estimation of eq. A.26 is ineﬃcient due to serial correlation of
the disturbances. However, in case of serially correlated error terms in a static model
(eq. A.1),i.e.
uit = oit + ρui,t−1, (A.28)
dynamic models eliminate this problem. Consider therefore that rearranging eq. A.28
leads to
uit − ρui,t−1 = oit = (1− ρL)uit. (A.29)
That is, the error term in model eq. A.26 is no longer serially correlated.
A.3.1 Partial adjustment model
Of special interest for estimating the eﬀect of political institutions on policy out-
comes like protection rates is the model of partial adjustment. This model is closely
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related to the model in eq. A.26. However, on contrary to eq. A.26, the partial
adjustment model is theoretically founded (see Greene, 2003). Overall, the model is
an ADL model with K = 1 and M = 0.
The partial adjustment model assumes a long-run equilibrium relation between
the exogenous and endogenous variables:
y∗it = α + βxit + uit. (A.30)
y∗it describes the equilibrium response of y on x. This long-run equilibrium is not
observed in each period because costs inhibit an immediate adjustment of y to
changes in x. Thus, a second relation, the adjustment relation, results as follows:
yit − yi,t−1 = (1− ρ)(y∗it − yi,t−1), (A.31)
where (1− ρ) determines to what extent yt responds to a change in xt immediately.
Solving now eq. A.31 for yit and inserting eq. A.30 for y∗ yields:
yit = α(1− ρ) + ρyi,t−1 + β(1− ρ)xit + (1− ρ)uit (A.32)
= α′ + ρyi,t−1 + β′xit + u′it
with α′ = α(1− ρ)
β′ = β(1− ρ)
u′it = (1− ρ)uit
Overall, OLS estimation of eq. A.32 is consistent and eﬃcient because the model
is linear in parameters and the error terms are not autocorrelated by construction.
Hence, this model suggests an approach to solve serially correlated error terms based
on theoretical considerations.
A.3.2 Serially correlated error models
Eq. A.28 and eq. A.29 already show that dynamic models with lagged dependent
variables eliminate serial correlation in error terms. Another approach to solve
this problem is the assumption of a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process (AR1) in the
error terms and to estimate a consistent covariance matrix of the OLS estimator
dependent on the autocorrelation parameter ρ. However, as tests on the dynamics
in agricultural protection rates support the use of the lagged dependent variable to
capture model dynamics, I do not go into further detail here how consistent estimates
of Ω(ρ) can be obtained. Further information is given by Greene (2003, p. 273).
A.3.3 Fixed eﬀects and lagged dependent variables
Since the work of Nickell (1981) it is well-known that ﬁxed eﬀect models with lagged
dependent variables are biased. First, a bias arises because the lagged endogenous
variable of yi,t−1 is correlated with country ﬁxed eﬀects µi. Secondly, even if within
transformation eliminates this kind of bias, the transformation produces a new bias
due to a correlation between y˜i,t−1 and v˜it, where y˜i,t−1 denotes the demeaned yi,t−1
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and v˜it the demeaned vit:
y˜i,t−1 = yi,t−1 − 1
Ti
Ti∑
t=1
yi,t−1 (A.33)
v˜i,t = vi,t − 1
Ti
Ti∑
t=1
vi,t.
Consider that y˜i,t−1 contains vi,t−1 with weight 1 − (1/Ti) and that vi,t−1 is part of
v˜it with weight 1/Ti. Nickell estimates the bias of the within transformation to be
of order (1/Ti). Thus, the bias decreases with increasing T .
Three main approaches are discussed in literature about dynamics in micro- and
macro panel data. First, the IV procedure of Anderson and Hsiao (1981) (AH) is
mentioned to solve simultaneity in dynamic panel data estimation. They developed
a model based on ﬁrst diﬀerencing eq. A.26:
yit − yi,t−1 = ρ(yit−1 − yi,t−2) + β(xit − xi,t−1) + uit − uit−1. (A.34)
This approach wipes out the country ﬁxed eﬀects that might be correlated with
the exogenous variables and that are in fact correlated with the lagged endogenous
variable. Thus 4yi,t−1 and 4ui,t, where 4 denotes the diﬀerence operator, are still
correlated in this model. To solve the endogeneity, AH suggest to use 4yi,t−2 or
yi,t−2 as instruments for the ﬁrst diﬀerence of y, 4yi,t−1. Under the assumption of
no serial correlation in the error terms vit, these instruments are not correlated with
the 4ui,t. In terms of eﬃciency Arellano (1989) shows that using the levels instead
of the diﬀerences as instruments will lead the eﬃciency gains.
Second, a wide range of procedures exist that use generalized methods of moment
(GMM) to improve the AH-IV estimation. The basic idea behind these models is to
exploit the number of instruments provided by the panel data structure. Increasing
the number of instruments can lead to eﬃciency gains. Thus, Arellano and Bond
(1991) showed that all variables dated two periods earlier are valid instruments for
4yi,t−1. Consider the following reduced example with t = 4 (Baltagi, 2005):
yi,4 − yi,3 = ρ(yi,3 − yi,2) + β(xi4 − xi,3)(ui,4 − ui,3) (A.35)
Here, sit = (yi,1, yi,2) is the set of applicable instruments because both variables
are correlated with (yi,3 − yi,2) and uncorrelated with the diﬀerenced error term.
However, the latter holds only if the disturbances are not serially correlated. Thus,
the AH-IV set of instruments is expanded by yi,1. In terms of moment conditions it
holds:
E[yi,t−r4uit] = 0, t = 3, ...T, and r ≥ 2, (A.36)
depending on two assumptions. First, error terms uit are serially independent:
E[ui,tui,r] = 0, i = 1, ...N, and ∀t 6= r. (A.37)
Second, the y observed in period one is not correlated with any disturbance in period
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t:
E[yi,1ui,t] = 0, i = 1, ...N, and t = 2, ..., T. (A.38)
Under these assumptions, it is evident that all dependent variables dated two and
more periods ago are not correlated with the ﬁrst diﬀerence in disturbance at t and
can thus serve as instruments for 4yi,t−1.
Another GMMmodel is suggested by Blundell et al. (1998) building on the work of
Arellano and Bover (1995) (AB-GMM estimator). This model relates to the work of
Hausman and Taylor using a system of two equations, the diﬀerence equation and the
level equation. The latter allows including more variables in the set of instruments
due to imposing some more initial restrictions on the moment conditions. Blundell
et al. (1998) derived this extended GMM-estimator because the AB-GMM estimator
performs poorly if the autoregressive process is relatively persistent or if the ratio
of the variance of country ﬁxed eﬀects to the variance of error term is too large
(Blundell and Bond, 1998, p. 120).
Third, Kiviet (1995) has developed the idea of a bias corrected estimator. This
alternative approach relies upon deriving a formula for estimation of the bias in
dynamic LSDV models. In a second step, the estimated bias is substracted from the
estimated LSDV coeﬃcients. With the work of Bruno (2005) the corrected estimator
is now also applicable to the unbalanced panel data case. In Bruno (2005), the bias
formula depend on the variance of the error terms σ2u and on the autocorrelation
parameter ρ. To estimate the bias, the above explained GMM- or IV-estimators
are used to obtain consistent estimates of σ2u and ρ. Finally, the bias terms are
substracted from the LSDV estimators.
Since Nickell (1981) has shown that the bias in dynamic ﬁxed eﬀect models is
decreasing in T , it might be even insigniﬁcant in the time-series cross-section data
case. The application of above described estimation procedures is discussed by Beck
and Katz (2009, 2011) and Judson and Owen (1999) for large T . Monte-Carlo
simulations presented by these authors compare the eﬃciency and consistency of
alternative estimators to the standard OLS estimator. They conclude that standard
LSDV estimation should be used with unbalanced time-series cross-section data if
T is relatively large. However, information about the performance of the corrected
LSDV estimator for unbalanced panel data is not given by these studies.
A.4 Robust statistical inference
For valid statistical inference in OLS models, each disturbance is assumed to have the
same ﬁnite variance σ2 and to be uncorrelated with every other disturbance. If these
assumptions are fulﬁlled, the usual OLS standard error of an estimator can be derived
as the square root of the kth diagonal element of the sample estimate of the variance
matrix {[s2(X ′X)−1]1/2kk }, where s2 is an unbiased estimate of σ2. Note that this
sample estimate can only be obtained if the assumption of homoskedasticity holds.
In case the assumption fails, the ﬁnal asymptotic variance will be diﬀerent. Hence,
a corrected form of the variance matrix must be derived to obtain asymptotically
valid standard errors.
In terms of TSCS data, the assumptions of IID errors might be violated in many
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cases. Three issues that hinder the use of standard OLS errors for robust inference
might arise: i) heteroskedasticity, ii) panel-wise correlated errors and iii) serially
correlated errors. The latter problem is also described in Section A.3 proposing the
use of a lagged dependent variable or AR1 errors to solve serial correlation in the
error terms. Regarding the ﬁrst problem, consider that variances in errors might not
be the same for diﬀerent countries because the scale of the dependent variable varies
between countries (compare protection rates in Iceland and the United States, for
instance).
In case of heteroskedasticity, White (1980) has developed a heteroskedasticity-
robust variance matrix of the estimator β using the law of large numbers:
VˆHR(βˆ) = (X
′X)−1(
N∑
i
T∑
t
uˆ2itx
′
itxit)(X
′X)−1, (A.39)
with uˆit denoting the OLS residual (Wooldridge, 2002). Again the kth diagonal
element of the matrix provides the standard error. Based on the structure of the
estimated variance-covariance matrix, the estimator is also well-known under the
name "sandwich" estimator. If errors are correlated within countries
E[uitu
′
jt] = 0, for i 6= j, (A.40)
one uses the following cluster-robust variance estimator:
VˆCR(βˆ) = (X
′X)−1(
N∑
i
Xiu˜iu˜
′
iX
′
i)(X
′X)−1, (A.41)
where u˜i are in the simplest case, the OLS residuals uˆi, and N is the number of
clusters, i.e. countries. However, for accurate inference in case of clustered errors,
the number of clusters has to be large. Otherwise, the assumption that
E[uiu
′
j] = Ω 6= E[uˆiuˆ′j] (A.42)
does not hold. Here, Kezdi (2004) explicitly shows that a number of clusters greater
than 50 allows for unbiased standard errors using eq. A.41. Hence, in case of small
cluster sizes (N<50) Cameron et al. (2008) suggest to use a wild bootstrap cluster-
robust estimator. In particular, this method forms b pseudosamples by resampling
the residuals from usual OLS to obtain new values of the dependent variable y with
b indicating the number of resampling steps. That is the pseudovalues of y are
calculated as:
yˆ∗i = xiβˆols + uˆ
∗
i , (A.43)
where uˆ∗i is a resampled usual OLS residual. Both, the residuals and the βs, are
obtained from restricted OLS on the original sample imposing H0 : β1 = 0. The
resampling is carried out at cluster level. The residuals uˆi from OLS are assigned
with probability 0.5 as +uˆi = uˆ∗i and with probability 0.5 as −uˆi = uˆ∗i to regressors
xi within each cluster to obtain the new values of y∗i . Finally, Cameron et al. (2008)
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use this pseudosample to obtain the Wald test statistic for an estimator β:
w∗b = (βˆ
∗
1b − β0)/ssˆ∗1b , (A.44)
where βˆ∗1b is obtained from unrestricted OLS estimation using the bth pseudo-sample
and sˆ∗1b is the cluster corrected standard error. They run this estimation for each
of the generated pseudo-samples to obtain a respective distribution of the statistic
of interest. Based on this distribution, inference about the original sample statistic
calculated via the usual cluster-robust variance estimator is obtained.
A.5 Endogeneity of political institutions
Further, consider that most empirical analyses in comparative political economy
suﬀer from the non-existent or in part marginal, institutional variation in a country
to isolate the theoretically derived eﬀects. That is one can rarely observe the eﬀect
of the counterfactual institution for the policy choice or performance in a country.
As noted by Persson et al. (2003) this would be no problem for estimating the causal
eﬀects of political institutions in a world of randomly assigned constitutions. Here, it
would hold that the unobserved, counterfactual outcome in country i with political
institution PI1 is equal to the observed, actual outcome in country j with political
institution PI2. Hence, one would estimate the eﬀect of political institutions as the
observed diﬀerence in the average policy outcome between country i and country
j (see Persson et al., 2003, p.113ﬀ.). However, political institutions are by far not
randomly assigned. On contrary, there exist unobserved determinants that aﬀect
political institutions as well as policy outcome, i.e. it holds:
E(uit|X) 6= 0. (A.45)
That is political institutions and policy outcomes are determined by the same factors.
Hence, one cannot assume that the diﬀerence in observed outcomes between country
i and country j just reﬂects the inﬂuence of the political institutions. Researchers
therefore choose estimation techniques, for instance instrument variable models, to
control for the selection bias in institutional choice.
The ﬁrst step of an instrument variable approach is to derive an instrument ZV
from the theory of constitutional choice that has high predictive power regarding the
explanation of variance in constitutional rules S across countries. However, these
variables need to be uncorrelated with the error term in the model equation. Overall
it must hold:
1. Relevance : Cov(ZV, S) 6= 0 and (A.46)
2. Exogeneity : Cov(ZV, u) = 0. (A.47)
A set of variables that fulﬁlls the above requirements is denoted as a valid and ex-
ogenous set of instruments. However, identifying such variables is mostly a diﬃcult
undertaking. In fact, the case of weak instruments, i.e. instruments are only weakly
correlated with constitutional rule, would hinder an eﬃcient identiﬁcation of the
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endogenous and exogenous parts components. Several tests are proposed in liter-
ature to evaluate instrument variable strategies. First, consider the Hausman test
on endogeneity. This test compares the estimated parameters and their variances of
the instrumented and non-instrumented regression to test whether expected endo-
geneity in fact occurs in the model. Further, tests on overidentiﬁcation can test on
the exogeneity of instruments, if more than one instrument is available. However,
this test relies on the assumption that at least one instrument is truly exogenous.
Hence, a failure to reject the nullhypothesis that all instruments are exogenous can
be at best a slight hint of valid instruments, if theoretical considerations ensure to
judge one of the instruments as truly exogenous.
In the studies presented here, controlling for the endogeneity of political institu-
tions always relies on a two-step approach. That is in a ﬁrst step the endogenous
part of political institutions is disentangled from the exogenous part that is needed
to identify causal eﬀects of political institutions. While Angrist and Krueger (2001)
argues for using linear probability models even though the instrumented variable is
binary, we follow Hirano et al. (2000) and consider both a linear and a multinomial
logit model in the ﬁrst step. Following the estimation of the ﬁrst step, predicted val-
ues of the instrumented variables are used in the model equation. Finally, standard
errors must be corrected to obtain valid estimates of the covariance-variance matrix
because usual OLS standard errors are composed of ﬁrst and second stage residuals.
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Social Network Analysis
B.1 Starting points of network analysis
Social Network analysis is a methodological approach to describe relationships among
actors instead of analyzing their attributes like race, gender and so on. Hence, social
network analysis is especially concerned about deriving insights into the structure of
relationships and how these structures impact on actor's behavior or on the outcome
of an actor's behavior. According to quantitative social network analysis (SNA) a
social network NT is deﬁned as a graph of N2, e.g. any network is a subset of pairs
(i, j) ∈ N2, where i, j ∈ N are usually called vertexes and a pair (i, j) is called
an edge or a node. N = {1, ..., n} denotes a set of individual agents, where i or
j denote a generic element of N .1 Consider further that networks can be directed
or undirected. As ties are oriented from one actor to another in directed graphs,
they reﬂect an asymmetric relation between the two vertices. Such a relation might
be an information exchange relation, where actor i provides valuable information to
actor j although actor j does not return any information to actor i. As edges in
undirected graphs have no speciﬁc orientation, the tie is either present or absent.
In directed graphs reﬂect proximity relations like "is a blood relative of" or "works
with". (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).
Studies using social network analysis can be classiﬁed according to their main
research topics. First, early political sociology studies analyzed policy networks
among governmental and non-governmental organizations in order to explain po-
litical decision-making (Parsons, 1963; Coleman, 1963). In particular, Laumann
and Knoke (1987) and Knoke et al. (1996) put forward the idea to model opinion
formation with social inﬂuence models that reﬂect a political communication pro-
cess, where governmental actors partly adopt their policy positions to the positions
communicated by other non-governmental organizations. That is such models were
predominantly concerned about the distorting inﬂuence of lobbying on policy deci-
sions. More recently, a new branch of network analysis started to highlight the role
of social network structures as an aggregation mechanism of dispersed knowledge
(Jackson, 2008; Golub and Jackson, 2009; Acemoglu and Ozdaglar, 2010). This per-
ception of networks is widely recognized as the wisdom of the crowd eﬀect (Jackson,
2008). Wisdom of the crowd describes the idea that a group of relatively uninformed
individuals would collectively have much more knowledge than any single member
of a group has, see Galton (1907). Such a situation would allow choosing better
policies, if the individual information is spread via communication in elite networks
and attained by political agents.
1For a detailed information on the diﬀerent indicators and concepts to analyze social networks,
see Wasserman and Faust (1994). Most common global and local network indicators correspond
to network density, size, centralization, clustering, transitivity and characteristic path length.
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Appendix B Social Network Analysis
In the next two Sections, I brieﬂy introduce two approaches that model belief
formation among actors and econometric network estimation techniques.
B.2 Diﬀerent approaches to model belief formation
One of the ﬁrst scholars who analyzed the issue of whether a group of agents who hold
dispersed information can aggregate the information and reach a correct consensus
was Marquis de Condorcet. His seminal work is now referred to as the Condorcet's
Jury Theorem.
Generally, belief formation according to communication can be modeled as ei-
ther Bayesian or Non-Bayesian up-dating processes (Acemoglu and Ozdaglar, 2010).
While Bayesian approaches use Bayes rule to model how actors update their posi-
tions after receiving information, non-Bayesian approaches use simple rules of thumb.
Related to the ﬁrst, the general assumption is that individuals are able to update
their beliefs optimally while using a reliable model of the world. To get an intuition
how non-Bayesian updating works, consider the concept of imitation from biology
(Acemoglu and Ozdaglar, 2010). However, non-Bayesian model might be also more
complicated resembling the concept of replicator dynamics from evolutionary biol-
ogy. Such approaches assume that alternatives which perform better get a greater
weight in the belief formation and are thereby more likely to be adopted by oth-
ers (Acemoglu and Ozdaglar, 2010). Comparing the non-Bayesian and Bayesian
up-dating procedures, Golub and Jackson (2009) point out that Bayesian learning
would imply that actors have extremely high mental capabilities and complete in-
formation. Hence, they suggest the much simpler Non-Bayesian models to reﬂect
real world up-dating processes. A well-known case in point for such a model is the
DeGroot model. Consider our model of belief formation presented in Chapter 5:
y∗ =
[
I − (1− γ) Tˆ
]−1
γy0 (B.1)
withM = [I − (1− γ)T ]−1γ being the network multiplier matrix which is similar to
the Hubbell index (Hubbell, 1965). An element of the multiplier matrix mij deﬁnes
the ﬁeld strength of actor j′s initial position operating on actor i′s ﬁnal position. If
i = j, the element mii of the multiplier matrix M equals the weight that an actor i
puts on his own initial position.
Under the assumption of γ = 0, our model corresponds perfectly to the DeG-
root model. Note further that it corresponds to the model of Friedkin and Johnsen
(1990) and Friedkin and Johnsen (1997), if we assume that all actors weight beliefs
of other actors identically, i.e. γi= γj= γ¯>0. Regarding consensus building due
to communication among actors, note that assuming the network as a strongly con-
nected component, i.e. each actors forms ties with each other actor, and that at least
some actors place some low weight on their own belief, i.e. assuming at least weak
aperiodicity, communication according to the DeGroot model leads to a convergence
of opinions. However, such consensus building is not a very realistic feature for po-
litical opinion formation as the assumption of the network as a strongly connected
might fail. Consider for instance that highly inﬂuential actors like political agents
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might not communicate with interest groups representing some marginalized group
of society.
However, major drawbacks of the studies using these models are that they do
neither provide an explanation of social inﬂuence nor information on the eﬃciency
of belief formation in terms of the correspondence of ﬁnal beliefs to a distinct correct
belief, i.e. a policy position in line with a policy position proven to lead to economic
growth.
B.3 Estimation techniques in SNA
In contrast to the previous sections that are concerned with belief formation pro-
cesses, this section gives a short overview on econometric network estimation meth-
ods. Consider ﬁrst the issue of actor-wise correlation of error terms in dyadic data.
This issue of the violated assumption of identically and independently distributed
error terms already showed up in the time-series cross-section data case. With re-
gard to network estimation, Krackhardt (1988) developed the quadratic assignment
procedure (QAP) to correct for such a correlation in network data. QAP is a sim-
ulation based approach that corrects for correlation in the error terms of row and
column actors. In particular, it uses permutations of dependent variable an empir-
ical sampling distribution of parameter estimates. Comparing now the estimated
coeﬃcient with the simulated distribution reveals whether the variable has a signif-
icant inﬂuence on the relation among two actors (compare the wild cluster residual
bootstrap in Chapter A).
Second, researchers might apply network estimations in order to detect whether
structural tendencies, e.g. triads, in the network inﬂuence the probability to form a
relation. In such a case, the exponential random graph model (ERGM) is the work
horse model to estimate and analyze network generating processes (Wasserman and
Faust, 1994).
A drawback of both methods is certainly that the complete social network data is
needed to estimate the network generating process. However, ﬁeld studies collect-
ing network data might suﬀer from item- or unit non-response despite the highest
eﬀorts. Hence, the proposed econometric approach in Chapter 6 is an innovative
method to estimate determinants of communication ties. Another promising esti-
mation approach that explicitly allows imputation of missing network data is the
latent space model of Hoﬀ and Ward (2004).
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